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D ear Reader:
P art o f the ex citem en t o f studying Latin A m erica an d th e C aribbean is the rapidity o f change
th a t characterizes these regions. In the C aribbean, two events are particularly notew orthy: C u b a’s
radical reevaluation o f its econom y an d th e plebiscite o n political status h eld in P u erto Rico on
N ovem ber 14.
T h a t plebiscite left the issue o f P u erto R ico’s status in lim bo. A lthough the p ro -stateh o o d party
was governing the island, th a t o p tio n received only 46.2% o f th e vote, co m p ared with 48.4% for
com m onw ealth a n d 4.4% for in d e p en d e n c e. It should com e as n o surprise, th erefo re, th a t calls
fo r a n o th e r plebiscite are already being h eard . T h e articles in this issue, w ritten with th e 1993
plebiscite in m ind, sh ould serve as a solid in tro d u ctio n to a n d provide in terestin g com parisons
fo r th e n ex t ro u n d .
In o rd e r to cap tu re th e com plexity o f b oth th e C uban a n d P u erto Rican cases, Hemisphere has
p u b lished this special d o u b le issue (S u m m er/F all 1993) fo r th e price o f one. We have g a th ered
som e o f th e finest talen t from b o th islands to provide in -d ep th analysis o f these events.
Please n o te th a t this d ouble issue accounts fo r only o n e issue in your subscription. For exam ple, if
y our subscription p e rio d begins with this issue, you will still be en titled to receive two m o re issues
after this one.
We are d elig h ted to bring you this bonus issue.
Sincerely,
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Voices from Within: Cuba Must Change
A Historic Message from the Cuban Conference of Bishops

n the history o f hum ankind,
there has never been a lack of
voices shouting, “Charity no!
Justice!” But Jesus Christ told
us th at “if your justice is no bet
ter than that o f the Pharisees,
you will n o t en ter into the King
dom o f Heaven, and t h a t . . . if we
do n o t have mercy, what awaits us
is a trial without mercy.”

Justice and Charity
T he struggle for justice is no t a
struggle in which one can rem ain
neutral because that would be like
taking the side o f injustice. . . . But
justice ends where charity begins,
or better yet, charity precedes and
forms part o f justice because justice
is incom plete w ithout love. “An eye
for an eye, and a tooth for a to o th ”
represents justice w ithout love. . . .

Love Overcomes Hatred
H atred is n o t a constructive force.
“W hen I despair,” G andhi said, “I
rem em ber that throughout history,
truth and love have always won
o u t.” . . . From Marti, whose think
ing had biblical underpinnings,
come these phrases: “Sad is the fa
therland (patria) which has hatred
as su p p o rt”; “love is the best law.”

The Mission of the Church
We, pastors o f the Church, are not
politicians. This does limit us, but
it also enables us to base our speech
on the riches the Lord bestowed

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts from the
pastoral message of the Cuban arch
bishops of Havana and Santiago, and
nine bishops and auxiliary bishops else
where in Cuba, September 8, 1993.
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upon us: the W ord o f God . . . and
the m illenium o f the Church.
It also enables us to speak about
the only topic that pertains to us:
the C hurch’s contribution to the
welfare o f all. . . .

We speak as Cubans
to all Cubans, because
we understand that
Cuba’s difficulties
must be solved by all
Cubans together.
To Whom We Address
This Message
We speak to a l l . . . to the politi
cians . . . and to those who, inside
or outside Cuba, aspire to enjoy an
active participation in the n atio n ’s
political life. We speak as Cubans to
all Cubans, because we understand
that C uba’s difficulties m ust be
solved by all Cubans together.

Our Relations with Other
Countries
In the history of this century . . . we
have had the sad experience o f for
eign intervention in our national
affairs. . . . Facing difficulties be
queathed to us by previous gov
ernm ents, we sought a solution to
those problem s from those who had
no t created them and who, because
they were far from our geographic
location and rem oved from our cul
tural traditions, were ignorant of
our condition. Political and mili
tary alliances were m ade, trade
partners were changed, and so on.

It is no t surprising, therefore,
that some o f our curren t obstacles
arise from this close dependence,
which led us to im itate structures
and behavior models. From that
[dependence] came the repercus
sions of the collapse o f true social
ism in Eastern Europe.
At the time, trapped in the mid
dle of the “bloc politics” o f recent
decades, we have end u red the US
em bargo, trade restrictions, isola
tion, threats, etc.
We know that we live in an inter
d ep en d en t world and that no coun
try is sufficient unto itself. Along
with all the nations o f the region,
we hope for Latin Am erican inte
gration . . . because p o o r countries
ought to unite in ord er to over
com e their negative dependence
on rich countries.
But the solution to o u r prob
lems should n o t come only from
overseas [in the form of] foreign
solidarity, foreign investment, for
eign tourism, m oney from those
who live abroad, etc. . . .
In the face o f this situation,
many seem to ease their suffering
by moving abroad whenever pos
sible. If they cannot leave, they
fanatically idolize everything
that is foreign, or simply evade
reality by going into a kind of
inner exile.
Today it is acknowledged that
those Cubans who can help eco
nomically are precisely those we
turned into foreigners. W ould it
n o t be better to adm it that they
also have the legitim ate right and
duty to contribute solutions be
cause they are Cubans?
How can we turn to them and
ask for their help if we d o n ’t first
create a climate of reconciliation
am ong all the children o f the same
people?

Everything Can Be Solved
among Cubans
It is up to us as Cubans to solve the
problem s that exist within our own
country. We m ust ask ourselves seri
ously: Why is it th at so many Cu
bans want to leave—and do leave—
their hom eland? . . . Why do pro
fessionals, workers, artists, priests,
athletes, military people, activists,
or ordinary people take advantage
of any tem porary trip . . . to rem ain
abroad? . . . Marti said that “a m an
away from his fatherland is like a
tree in the sea,” and that “there is
som ething of the shipwrecked ves
sel in every foreign house.”
Why, finally, d o n ’t we try to solve
o ur problem s, together with all
o th er Cubans, from our national
perspective, w ithout som eone pre
sum ing to defend our interests or
arbitrate o u r differences . . . with
solutions that sometimes make
us believe that the only ones who
lose are Cuban nationals? “If your
b ro th er is in need and you close
your heart to him, G od’s love is not
in you” (1 Jn. 3:17).
No one should close his heart to
the present situation in our hom e
land, or close his eyes to the sad re
ality that Cuba is in need. Things
are n o t going well. This topic is
discussed on the street am ong the
people themselves. T here is discon
tent, uncertainty, and despair in
the population.
In the econom ic field, the short
age o f basic m aterial needs has
reached a point of extrem e gravity.
T he beautiful and fertile soil of our
island, the “Pearl of the Antilles,” is
no longer M other Earth. She is now
exhausted and incapable o f feed
ing h er children. . . .
We, the bishops of Cuba, reject
any type of m easure that, in the

guise o f punishing the Cuban gov
ernm ent, increases the difficulties
that affect our people. We rejected
this, at one time, in connection
with the US em bargo, and m ore re
cently, in connection with the socalled Torricelli law.

Today it is
acknowledged that
those Cubans who
can help economically
are precisely those we
turned into foreigners.
Would it not be better
to admit that they
also have the
legitimate right and
duty to contribute
solutions because they
are Cubans?
We also carried out historic ne
gotiations directly with the US ad
m inistration, aim ed at ending the
em bargo, at least as it related to
m edicine. By those actions, we
sought to encourage positive steps
to solve the problem s between the
governm ents of the US and Cuba.

Conditions fora Solution
It is no t within our purview to out
line the path to be followed by our
n atio n ’s economy, bu t we do call
for a tranquil and sincere debate
on the economy and its direction,

with the participation o f all Cubans.
R ather than tem porary em ergency
measures, it becomes imperative to
develop a sharply outlined eco
nom ic plan, capable of inspiring
and mobilizing the energies o f all
the people. . . .

Deterioration of the
Moral Climate
A nother aspect we m ust consider is
the deterioration o f the m oral cli
m ate in our hom eland. . . . The
authorities are often disconcerted
by the increase in delinquency: rob
bery, assaults, . . . prostitution and
violence. . . .
T he high rates of alcoholism and
suicide reveal, am ong o th er fac
tors, the onset of depression and
escape from reality. . . .

Values of Our Culture
Fundam ental values o f Cuban cul
ture are being lost, [particularly]
family values. . . . Prem ature m ar
riage is a sign of reduced social bal
ance. . . . More than half of those
who marry separate a short time
later, and there are many fatherless
children. . . . T he death rate of
babies through abortion . . . is
astonishing. . . .

Political Aspects
It seems to us that, along with cer
tain econom ic changes that are al
ready u n d er way, our national spirit
would be uplifted by the elim ina
tion o f certain riling policies. . . .
* T he exclusive and om nipresent
nature of official ideology that
identifies otherwise distinct
concepts as being coterm inous,
such as “m otherland and social
ism ,” “state and governm ent,”
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Commentary

“authority and power,” “legality
and morality,” “C uban and revo
lutionary.”
■ The limitations im posed . . . on
freedom itself. . . .
■ T he excessive control of the or
gans of state security, which some
times enters even the private lives
o f individuals. . . .
■ T he high n um ber of prisoners in
carcerated for acts that in some
cases should be decrim inalized
and in others should be recon
sidered.
■ Discrim ination due to philo
sophical ideas, politics, or relig
ious beliefs. . . .
We, the bishops o f Cuba, aware
that we are living in a transcen
dental period of history, have con
ducted o ur sacred ministry with the
tact and delicacy that the situation
required. . . . However, a healthy
realism leads us to interpose our
selves. This m ight not please some,
b u t it may lead us to the root o f the

We think that to reject
dialogue is to lose the
right to express one’s
own opinion. To
accept dialogue is
to contribute to an
understanding among
all Cubans.
problem s, and in that way alleviate
the condition of our people. . . .

Seeking New Paths
We bishops, like all our people,
have followed closely the intro
duction of some changes in the
n atio n ’s econom ic structure. . . .

^QUE PASA EN AMERICA LATINA?

Let the

JOURNAL OF
INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Keep you
informed

A GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES
The North-South Center • P.O. Box 248134 • Coral Gables, FL 33124

Given the present living conditions
o f the C uban people . . . it appears
that if there are no real changes
in the economic, political, and so
cial sectors, the achievem ents at
tained after years o f sacrifice could
com e to nought. . . .

Dialogue: The Best Path
We would like to say som ething
about dialogue, better yet, about
the com prom ise achieved through
dialogue. . . . The Holy Father Jo h n
Paul II tells us that “com plex prob
lems are better solved through dia
logue...rather than through strug
gles to destroy the adversary. . . . ”
We m ust recognize that there
are different viewpoints in Cuba
concerning the country’s situation
and the possible solutions. . . . It is
evident that the paths that lead to
reconciliation and peace—such as
dialogue— have undeniable popu
lar support and beyond that, enjoy
sympathy and prestige am ong the
people.

Dialogue among Cubans
The Cuban people . . . desire a
frank, friendly, and free dialogue,
where everyone expresses his
feelings openly and cordially.
A dialogue not aim ed at settling
scores . . . silencing the opponent,
or reclaim ing the past, b u t at per
m itting us to interact.
In Cuba there is a single party,
a single press, a single radio, and
a single television. But the dia
logue we refer to m ust take into
account the diversity of m edia
and people. . . .
We realize there are many inside
and outside Cuba who reject dia
logue because their accum ulated
resentm ent is g r e a t. . . but we
think that to reject dialogue is to
lose the right to express o n e ’s own
opinion. To accept dialogue is to
contribute to an understanding
am ong all Cubans that will lead to
a peaceful and dignified future. ■

(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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Cuban Responses to the Bishops

An U nfounded
Provocation against
the Revolution
by Lazaro Barredo
Trabajadores, Septem ber 20, 1993
People who have never shared the
patriotism and national identity of
m any devout Catholics, and who
have always suffered trivial ordeals
closer to the US than to the Cuban
nation, are now trying to set them 
selves up, in a sibylline m anner, as
the protagonists in an alleged
change in the ap p arent values of
charity and solidarity.
It is too great a coincidence for
these people, who claim to be en 
lightened and to constitute the na
tio n ’s critical conscience bu t who
have historically been accomplices
o f all the n atio n ’s enemies, to be
advocating from their pulpits, as
Catholic leaders, the euphem ism
known as a “call” to love, reconcili
ation, dialogue, and an allegedly
ideal past. Such words are very at
tractive to those who are busy trying
to make the Cuban revolution dis
appear from the face o f the earth.
T he US intelligence services
could n o t have been given a
greater bonus. . . . W hat goal is
being pursued by contrasting that
so-called love o f God to love for the
fatherland? A retu rn to the decade
o f the sixties and deliberately ignor
ing the postulates o f the Gospel?
C ontrasting G od’s principles with
the principles of the revolution?

Editor’s Note: Each declaration is based
on edited excerpts of original statements
gathered and translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service.

Cuba, and the hierarchy knows this
full well, is not closed to dialogue
with the Cuban com m unity abroad,
and in fact, entertains such a dia
logue with many political and busi
ness sectors that differ with some
of our ideas but have no ties to the
CIA or to the policy o f blockade
and aggression against our coun
try. With whom do they wish us to

It is the treachery of
Cain. It is the knife
rammed in the back at
the most difficult, most
decisive, and heroic
moment in the history
of Cuba. It is to join
the imperialist idea of
seeing Cuba immersed
in blood.

engage in dialogue? With the ter
rorist organizations that, u n d er vari
ous facades and encouraged and
supported by the m ost reactionary
forces in Am erican society, operate
with total im punity and constantly
violate G od’s com m andm ents with
in that very com m unity itself and
against the C uban people, includ
ing all believers? . . .
The Catholic hierarchy’s strictly
political incursion into the na
tional reality gives one m uch food
for thought. A report published in
the past by Time m agazine regard
ing a conspiracy by the Catholic

hierarchy of Poland and the CIA to
destroy socialism in Poland cannot
be overlooked. In Poland, however,
the Catholic C hurch had played a
historic role in the struggle against
foreign dom ination during the
long process of national liberation,
a role very different from the role
played in our country by the C atho
lic hierarchies. . . .
The C hurch hierarchy is not
isolated from the outside world;
it knows full well that, despite the
extrem ely strong econom ic crisis
the nation is going through, there
is no o ther country in Latin Amer
ica that exhibits greater political
stability and social justice, the re
sult of the heroism and support of
a revolutionary population.
T he hierarchy forgets th at it was
a tool o f that policy when its m em 
bers were the interm ediaries o f the
US State D epartm ent in getting
15,000 children out o f Cuba with
out their parents in the so-called
“Peter P an” program between 1960
and 1962. In any case, why point a
finger at Cuba, which has one of
the smallest em igrations to the US
in com parison with o th er Latin
American countries, when it is a
fact that the US attracts the most
im m igrants because o f the colossal
econom ic resources that it has
amassed through looting the world.
T he step taken by the bishops
in their so-called call to love is re
ally a deliberate and unfounded
provocation against the revolution.
It is an attem pt to underm ine the
needed unity and m orale of our
people. . . . It is the treachery of
Cain. It is the knife ram m ed in the
back at the most difficult, m ost de
cisive, and heroic m om ent in the
history of Cuba. It is to jo in the im
perialist idea of seeing Cuba im
m ersed in blood. ■

H em isp h ere. Sum m er/F all 1993

Commentary

Survival First,
th en Dialogue
by Cintio Vitier
Granma, Septem ber 22, 1993
Although in the message the bish
ops insist they are n o t politicians
and that the C hurch cannot have a
political platform , in fact—and this
is unobjectionable in itself—they
m ake a political analysis and pro
pose a political solution: a national
dialogue. T he bishops’ docum ent
does n o t at all m ention depend
ency on the US, bu t only the new
dependency that, according to the
bishops, led us to copying struc
tures and behavioral m odels from
Eastern Europe. O nce the first de
pendency is obviated, all relation
ships with the second seem to be
lost, and it is o f course im proper to
differentiate their respective cir
cumstances and features or adm it
the absolute sovereignty we have
attained. Is it right to presuppose
lack of love in social works, such as
literacy drives, education, and free
m edial attention for all, am ong
many others, that are w ithout par
allel in Latin America?
All o f us know there is an in
creasing em igration from poor to
wealthy countries. T he C hurch ap
parently did n o t share this concern
over the revolutionary em igration
in the past century. A large num ber
o f Cubans, even those having the
opportunity to stay abroad, return
to Cuba to continue to experience
all kinds of duress and difficulties
in their hom eland.
I w onder why the bishops’
message longs for “that republic,
corrupt to the very marrow, neo
colonial, and unfair, in an invita
tion to a dialogue.” Regarding the
“right of diversity,” which the bish
ops advocate in their message, has
the C hurch historically exercised
this right? Was diversity practiced
in the Spain of Franco, who was de
clared favorite son of the Church?
T he Catholic C hurch kept “an
enigm atic silence” during the popu
lar dem onstrations to support the

H em isp h ere. Sum m er/F all 1993

Pastors for Peace (who in the US
declared a h unger strike to protest
the blockade against C uba).
The right for diversity m ust be
preserved, but the right to survival
as an in dependent nation m ust be
preserved first. A country harassed
to incredible extrem es ju st cannot
afford to have an irresponsible di
versity and a theoretically perfect
dialogue, just as the US did not
have diversity and dialogue for
m ore than 40 years after attaining
independence, m uch less when the
US faced the Nazi threat and closed
ranks with the Soviet U nion. ■

T he bishops have betrayed the
people because the people of Cuba
do no t today need shows p u t on by
annexationists of the spirit or quit
ters by vocation; they need, rather,
upright conduct by persons o f firm
and steadfast character, forged by
sacrifice for the sake of progress
sharing the Cuban peo p le’s pres
ent reality and fate.
O ur position is clear: we follow
the invincible com m ander o f the
solitary star. We are in favor of the
independence of the fatherland.
We are upright people. ■

Q uestioning the
Bishops

Dialogue: For W hom?
W ith Whom?

by Luis Baez Delgado

Members of the Grupo de Meditation
y Solidaridad Oscar Amulfo Romero

Juventud Rebelde, Septem ber 26, 1993
In the nam e of what justice, or
what love, can they ask us for rec
onciliation, dialogue, brotherhood
with, no t that o ther great mass of
Cubans—whom, let it be said in
passing, we did not turn into for
eigners— but with traitors, m ur
derers, and mercenaries?

The rightfor diversity
must be preserved, but
the right to survival as
an independent nation
must be preserved first.
The m aneuver by the conference
of Catholic bishops o f Cuba is a be
trayal because they betrayed the
faith, and betrayed their Catholic
brothers, in whose nam e they have
spoken w ithout prior consultation.
They have negated their Catholic
brothers in an attem pt to use
them ; and, thanks to the position
they hold as bishops, they are re
ducing their Catholic brothers to
simple instrum ents o f their pre
m editated treachery.

Granma, Septem ber 28, 1993
Cuba is a nation in the process of
building, ju st 90 miles from a
declared enemy, and it is facing
the current setbacks because of
changes in the world situation: the
collapse of the socialist bloc and
the renewal o f the blockade as a
m eans of drowning the hopes of a
society o f equality and social justice.
The bishops’ message claims to
be addressed to the politicians in
side and outside Cuba who aspire
to real participation in the national
political life. In this connection, we
w onder if the politicians referred
to could possibly be the gentlem en
from Alpha 66, the L Com mandos,
and the [Cuban-American Na
tional] Foundation?
It appears the bishops forgot a
few considerations, such as the fact
that, in Cuba, it is the population
that m aintains dialogue. T he bish
ops stress that C uba’s cu rren t eco
nom ic m easures are necessary
because of the difficulties we are
going through. Yet they also stress
that the m easures are neith er detri
m ental to the masses n o r based on
a neoliberal m odel, but are instead
based on a search for a C uban so
lution. ■
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Commentary

“ Dollarization” : Castro’s Latest Economic Miracle?
by Sergio Diaz-Briquets

n what may be considered a
m ajor gam ble to buttress the
crum bling C uban economy,
Fidel Castro announced on
July 26, 1993, that Cubans will
be perm itted to legally hold
foreign currency for the first time
in m ore than 30 years, and that
m ore Cuban-Americans will be
allowed to visit the island. T he in
ten t of these policies is to increase
C uba’s foreign exchange receipts
and thus the country’s ability to
im port vital necessities. C astro’s
hopes hinge in his assum ption that
Cuban-Americans will behave like
em igrants from m any o ther coun
tries and rem it substantial am ounts
of foreign currency to their rela
tives in Cuba. T he expectation is
th at Cuba will receive a dollar wind
fall com parable to that benefiting
o th er countries (like Mexico, the
Dom inican Republic, and El Salva
dor) . In an ironic twist bred by this
time of dire need, Castro expects
the despised Cuban-American com 
m unity— the worms of yore— to
help save the revolution!
With a rapidly deteriorating
econom ic situation m ade m ore
p oignant by the daily press reports
depicting it, there can be no doubt
th at a worried em igre com m unity
will react ju st as Castro has antici
pated. Havana, however, may be
m ore optimistic than warranted
regarding the expected dollar wind
fall. T he volume of em igrant rem it
tances is driven by a com plex web
of determ inants, of which family
obligations is bu t a single elem ent.
A dditional im portant determ inants

I
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are the current or future fulfill
m ents of econom ic and social
expectations on the part of the
em igrants, how long the em igrants
have been abroad, and their in
com e levels in the host country.

Havana may be
more optimistic than
warranted regarding
the expected dollar
windfall. The volume
of emigrant
remittances is driven
by a complex web of
determinants, of which
family obligations is
but a single element.

T he latter variable is generally
the principal determ inant of the
volume o f rem ittances. High-incom e em igrants with m ore dispos
able incom e can send m ore money
than em igrants earning low sala
ries. A further im portant variable is
the chronological occurrence of
the migration: the am ount o f rem it
tances tends to be inversely associ
ated with how long the em igrants
have been abroad. This is a logical
outcom e since the n eed for rem it
tances declines as family m em bers
jo in their relatives abroad, and as
em igrant households gradually
shift their allegiances and obliga

tions away from the hom e to the
host country. In the case o f Cuban
em igrants, this constellation of fac
tors will tend to dam pen the vol
um e of rem ittances. By and large,
the family ties to Cuba of CubanAmericans who have been in the
US for the longest tim e—and who,
therefore, have the highest in
com e—have been ero d ed by the
passage of several decades. In most
instances, im m ediate families have
been reunited in the US (via the
1960s airlift, the Mariel sealift, etc.).
While this is no t typical of recent
em igrants—including many from
the Mariel period and later— these
recent arrivals are no t as well pre
pared to succeed economically as
those who preceded them.
With less to offer in term s of
education and jo b skills, the m ore
recent m igrants reaching US shores
have had to contend with the diffi
cult econom ic conditions facing
South Florida. T he 1990s recession
and im m igration from many o th er
Latin Am erican countries led to in
tense labor m arket com petition. As
a result, many recent C uban arri
vals have been perm anently rele
gated to m inim um wage jobs. Even
if they desired, these im migrants
lack the capacity to send substan
tial am ounts o f dollars to their rela
tives in Cuba.
Two crucial considerations— the
social and econom ic expectations
of the em igrants themselves— seem
to have been ignored by officials in
Havana in their hopeful calcula
tion o f the flood o f anticipated
remittances. C uban em igration dif
fers from that of o th er Caribbean
and Latin Am erican countries in
one im portant respect: until now,
the concept o f return in g has been
a distant possibility. C uban em i
grants have either chosen to sever

their links to Cuba perm anently or
had the governm ent choose for
them with its tightly controlled
retu rn m igration policy. In the
Latin Am erican context, this is a
unique feature of Cuban em igra
tion (shared by em igration from
many o th er form er European
and Asian totalitarian countries)
with m ajor implications for rem it
tance flows.
Countless historical and contem 
porary studies suggest that nearly a
third o f all im migrants either re
turn to their countries of birth, or
expect to do so eventually. They do
so for a variety o f reasons. Many re
turn because they cannot adapt to
living conditions in destination
countries, or simply because things
have not gone as well in the desti
nation country as they expected.
O th er m igrants plan to retire in
their hom e countries, or at least
spend extended periods of time
there to satisfy their cultural and
social longings. Emigrants from

Mexico and many o ther countries,
for example, are notorious for mak
ing considerable investments in
what, by local standards, are con
sidered to be luxurious dwellings,
or to allocate im portant sums for
the purchase of land (m uch of
which is left idle). Some of these
rem ittances are also used to start or
sustain small family-run businesses.
The intent of these rem ittance
investments is to ease the eventual
p erm anent or tem porary return
to the hom e country. Some mi
grants use these investments as
conspicuous consum ption to
dem onstrate to nonm igrants the
success they have attained abroad.
In many countries these invest
m ents account for a very substan
tial am ount of the rem ittances sent
by m igrants to their hom e coun
tries. T he em igration policies of
the C uban socialist governm ent
(and the system’s foreclosing of
the possibility of return) are inimi
cal to rem ittance investment.

O n the basis of these considera
tions, it appears the high hopes
placed by C uba’s socialist authori
ties on m igrants’ rem ittances to
help save the revolution are some
what misplaced. While it can be
safely anticipated that the em igre
com m unity will send an increasing
am ount of dollars to help their
relatives in the besieged island,
the am ount will probably fall far
short of Castro’s wishes. This latest
econom ic m iracle concocted in
Havana—fraught with political
danger—is likely to be eventually
downgraded, ju st as the role o f bio
technology, yesterday’s econom ic
miracle, is currently minimized.
Castro, however, will continue to
daydream and is certain to come
up with o th er purported miracle
cures for the ailing C uban econ
omy. O f course, should there be a
change in the political-economic
system, Cuba could receive the full
benefits of the considerable re
sources o f the Cuban diaspora. ■
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Creolite, Negritude, and Metropolis
by Richard D. E. Burton

n November 1992 the Mar
tinican novelist Patrick
Cham oiseau was awarded
France’s most prestigious
literary prize— the Prix Goncourt—for his novel Texaco,
which had been published in Paris
two m onths earlier. In O ctober of
that year St. Lucian poet and dram 
atist Derek W alcott had received
the Nobel Prize for Literature,
while in November Spain’s prem ier
literary prize—the Cervantes—had
been awarded to the reclusive 89year-old C uban poet, Dulce Maria
Loynaz. T he year 1992 was, in every
way, a rem arkable literary “treble”
for the Caribbean.
Patrick Cham oiseau was born
in Fort-de-France in 1953. Texaco
was his third novel, following on
Chronique des sept miseres (Gallim ard, 1986) and Solibo Magnifique
(Gallimard, 1988). H e is also the
au th o r o f a play, Manman Dio
contre la Fee Carabosse (Editions
Caribeennes, 1981); a collection
of Creole folk stories for children,
Au temps de Vantan (Hatier, 1988);
and an autobiobraphical essay on
his childhood in Fort-de-France,
Antan d ’enfance (Hatier, 1990). His
“nonliterary” works include an es
say on his native country entitled
Martinique (Editions Hoa-Qui,
1989) and a study o f French West
Indian literature, Lettres creoles (Ha
tier, 1991), written in conjunction
with fellow novelist and country
m an, Raphael Confiant.
Finally, Cham oiseau is co-author
with C onfiant and Creole linguist
Jean Bernabe o f the m uch debated
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manifesto Eloge de la Creolite (Galli
m ard, 1989). T he Eloge develops a
theory o f (French) West Indian
identity based on linguistic and cul
tural, rath er than racial, criteria.
Unlike the hitherto dom inant
concept o f negritude (but in com
m on with the counter-theory of
Antillanite elaborated by Edouard
Glissant), it reduces em phasis on
the retention of African cultural

identity is complexity.” If negritu d e ’s figure o f West Indian iden
tity is a single tree rooted in the
landscape, that o f Creolite is a m an
grove swamp: proliferating without
beginning or end, having neith er a
single root n o r an ultim ate goal,
forever in flux and containing
within its myriad recesses a flora
and fauna o f infinite complexity
and diversity. Creolite, in the words
o f the Eloge, is a mangrove of p o ten
tialities (une mangrove de virtualites).

Exploration and Defense

Creole culture and
the Creole language
that sustains it are
fatally vulnerable
when confronted by
the modem world.

forms in the Caribbean and stresses
the creation, out o f a multiplicity
of cultural m aterials (European,
African, A m erindian, Indian, Chi
nese, Lebanese), o f an original and
heterogenous culture that the au
thors have nam ed Creolite. In this
conception, anyone who speaks
Creole, whatever his or h er racial
identity, “qualifies” as West Indian.
Morever, Creolite m aintains that
West Indian culture is no m ore a
set o f African “survivals” than it is a
m imetic copy o f a European proto
type. Rather, it stands as a wholly
original and necessarily complex
cultural creation: a mosaic rather
than a single substance. As the
Eloge puts it, “the very basis o f our

Cham oiseau’s novels are all explo
rations o f the Creoleness o f Mar
tinique and resistance o f that
Creoleness against the m ultiple
pressures o f political, cultural, and,
increasingly, linguistic assimilation
by France and Frenchness. His first
novel Chronique des sept miseres traces
the rise and fall o f the central m ar
ket in Fort-de-France through the
history o f a group o f m arket por
ters— djobeurs. T he porters are even
tually m ade redundant, and their
lives destroyed, by the regulation of
the m arket and its gradual displace
m ent by French-style supermarkets.
His novel Solibo Magnifique relates
the story o f a Creole storyteller
who is found mysteriously dead in
the center of Fort-de-France on the
last night o f carnival. It transpires
that he has somehow choked to
death on his own (Creole) words,
throttled by the very brilliance of
his storytelling prowess.
In both novels, Creole culture
and the Creole language th at sus
tains it are shown to be not only im
mensely rich in their diversity and
resourcefulness, but also fatally vul
nerable when confronted by the
m odern world in the form of im
ported French goods, culture, and,

particularly, language. The novels
are narrated in a highly original
style, which switches between stan
dard French and Creole and, in be
tween, creates its own distinctive
amalgam of French and Creole that
local critics of C ham oiseau—who
is far from being universally ac
claim ed in his native M artinique—
sarcastically call “franfais-banane.”
Poised in the interlectal space be
tween French and Creole that has
gradually opened up since Marti
nique was m ade a departm ent of
France in 1946, C ham oiseau’s ecriture is perhaps the first that fully ex
ploits the heteroglossic diversity
and tensions o f contem porary
M artinique.

within the param eters of planta
tion life. To a considerable degree,
they m anaged to m anipulate the
system o f oppression to their own
advantage in the m an n er pre
scribed by the well-known Creole
proverb debrouya pa peche. it’s no
sin to play the system—i.e. to turn
o n e ’s weakness into a (highly am
bivalent) source o f strength.

Texaco
Texaco continues this exploration
o f the strengths and weaknesses of
Creolite, though its fram e o f histor
ical and cultural reference is far
broader than that o f the earlier
novels. In its m ore than 400 pages,
it attem pts nothing less than a his
tory—or, rather, a series o f histo
ries—of the dom inated majority of
M artinique from the slave epoch
up to the present day. It focuses on
the m anifold tactics o f opposition
whereby th at majority contrived to
create a viable culture within the in
terstices of the very econom ic, po
litical, and cultural system that
oppresses them . For Chamoiseau,
the true heroes o f Creolite are not
the m aroons who fled the planta
tion for the momes (hills) to create,
or rath er recreate, a would-be “Afri
can ” culture in isolation. Rather,
they are those slaves who, rem ain
ing on the plantation, succeeded
by din t o f resourcefulness, duplic
ity, and creative mimicry in forging
a distinctive culture o f their own

A Martinican woman in front of the statue
of Josephine Beuharnais, the first empress
of France

Creole culture is oppositional,
improvisational, and mimetic in a
creative, rath er than a senile, fash
ion. Thus its capacity to create, u n 
der the very eye of the planter, the
overseer of their later avatars, an
interm ediary space in which it was
possible no t merely to survive but
even, within limits, to thrive. Texaco
shows this oppositional culture at
work, first on the slave plantation,
and then—and herein lies its prin
cipal claim to originality—on the
very site of French o r beke (white
Creole) power, the city: first St.
Pierre and then, after that city’s

destruction by volcanic eruption in
1902, the island’s present capital
and C ham oiseau’s own birthplace,
Fort-de-France. In this way, Texaco
redresses what one m ight call the
rural bias o f previous literature
from M artinique, a tren d most
evident, perhaps, in the novels of
E douard Glissant. T he focus of
C ham oiseau’s work is neith er on
the plantation n o r the momes but
on the city, the locus par excel
lence o f assimilationism that, para
doxically, is also revealed as that
area o f life on M artinique where
the oppositional practices of
Creolite achieve their fullest ex
pression. Ironically it is at the very
core o f the system of dom ination
that the dom inated enjoy the
greatest freedom .
T hrough the eyes and words of
an apparently ageless M artinican
woman, Marie-Sophie Laborieux,
Texaco recounts some three centu
ries of oppositional history. This
history is divided into a series of
phases titled by the type o f con
struction m aterial most popularly
used to build dwelling places at the
time: an “age o f huts and shelters”
for the earliest periods o f French
colonization (1635-80) when Carib
influences were still strong; an “age
o f straw” (from the use o f caneleaves for roofing), runn in g from
the peak o f the slave epoch through
1902; an “age o f packing cases”
from the destruction of St. Pierre
to departm entalization in 1946; an
“age o f asbestos cem ent” from 1946
to 1964; and finally, a “concrete
age,” which brings the story up to
the present.
T he novel’s title refers to an
existing quarter o f contem porary
Fort-de-France built on a site once
occupied by T exaco’s petroleum
tanks. It is a quarter whose history,
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from its origins as a shantytown in
the 1950s to its eventual “dom esti
cation” or “stabilization” (“durcifecation") in the 1980s, occupies the
m ain bulk o f C ham oiseau’s epony
mous novel. Squeezed on a narrow
coastal site between the boys’ and
the girls’ lycees—an interstitial, rath
er than a peripheral, dom ain—Tex
aco em bodies the improvisatory
genius o f Creolite at its best: it is
n o t a trivial detail that Chamoiseau,
taking his lead from an influential
study by fellow countrym an and ur
banist Serge Letchimy, describes
the q u arter as une ville-mangrove.
Texaco is both part of, and apart
from, the established city of Fort-deFrance: th at fortress o f Frenchness
referred to in the novel as L ’En-ville.
T exaco’s inhabitants ultimately de
pen d on the city for such employ
m ent as they can find and, above
all, for social security payments.
T he life that residents evolve, and
especially the physical setting they
painstakingly fashion for it, is at
every point opposed to the recti
linear patterns o f the assimilated
capital: Texaco is to LEn-villeas
rom antic or baroque is to (pseudo-)
classical, as momes or mangrove to
plantation, as Creole to French, as
parochial authenticity to an alien
ated and alienating m odernity and
universalism.
In a series of interrelated epi
sodes, Cham oiseau recounts the
determ ination and inventiveness
with which the inhabitants of Tex
aco defend their haven of Creolite
against attem pts by the local mairie,
sometimes backed by police and
param ilitary forces from France, to
remove or, at the very least, to regu
late and reform it: Texaco is no t cal
culated to en d ear the au th o r to
Aime Cesaire, mayor o f Fort-deFrance, or to supporters o f his Parti
Progressiste Martiniquais!
Finally, though, Texaco does
succumb, not to the bulldozer or
the eviction order, but to the m ore
insidious standardization of uni
form concrete dwellings. T hough
they are being progressively sup
planted, the old ad hoc structures,
m ade o f this and that, possess an
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indefinable identity in their ram 
shackle disorderliness, in which
Cham oiseau locates the essence
of Creolite. By the time o f MarieSophie’s death in 1989, Texaco has,
in large part assimilated into LEnville. Its “mangrove o f potentialities”
is drained o f life as it inexorably
succumbs to death by “concretization” (“betonisation"). Like
Chronique de sept miseres and Solibo
Magnifique before it, Texaco both
celebrates the diversity o f Creolite
and shows its losing battle against
the death-bringing hom ogeneities
o f what E douard Glissant—one of
the dedicatees of the novel—calls
the “Sam e” (“le Meme”). By the end
o f the novel, the particular is well
on the way towards absorption in
the pseudo-universal, and French
ness all bu t reigns suprem e.

Chamoiseau’s
celebration of the
popular culture of
the periphery
(Martinique) has
found its warmest
supporters amongst
intellectual elites of
the center (Paris).
Like C ham oiseau’s first two
novels, Texaco m ight be described
as an ethnographic novel in which
the author, or “marqueur de paroles,”
as Cham oiseau prefers to style
himself, transcribes (in standard
French or som ething close to it)
what has been said to him (nor
mally in Creole) by a host o f in
form ants whom, tape recorder in
hand, he has interviewed over a
num ber o f years prior to em bark
ing on the actual redaction o f his
text: the novel is written largely in
standard French, but the alert
reader will sense beneath the or

dered structures o f its syntax some
thing of the rhythm s and patterns
o f the Creole speech on which it is
based. Merely to evoke the novel’s
overt them es gives but a poor idea
of its extraordinary opulence and
density: the natural, cultural, and
linguistic life it sustains is as com
plex and indefinable as the m an
grove swamp it celebrates.

The Center-Periphery Politics
of Criticism
T he novel has perhaps been m ore
enthusiastically received in France
than in M artinique, where its de
fense and illustration of an unfa
vored quarter has been seen by
some, perhaps correctly, as be
tokening a certain nostalgie de la
boue or, at the very least, a certain
rom anticism . Furtherm ore, its use
o f a creolized French, though less
m arked than in the earlier novels,
is criticized both by supporters of
Francophonie and by die-hard
defenders o f “p u re ” basilectal
Creole as a concession to, and le
gitim ation of, the “bastardized” m e
lange o f French and Creole th at is
now the standard m edium o f daily
exchange in assimilated and, in
creasingly, de-creolized M artinique.
Here, perhaps, is the final paradox
o f C ham oiseau’s achievem ent in
winning the Prix G oncourt. His
celebration o f the popular culture
o f the periphery (M artinique) has
found its warmest supporters
am ongst intellectual elites o f the
center (Paris), which thereby in
sidiously assimilates the “D ifferent”
into the “Sam e” by its very enthusi
asm, praising the au th o r for having
“enriched” the French language
and French literature through his
generous transfusions of Creole
and Creolite.
It may be, therefore, that
C ham oiseau’s success will result
in its own neutralization or “recu
peratio n ” by the universal (or
pseudo-universal) that is its great
est enemy. C ham oiseau’s future
novels, along with those o f his close
associate Raphael Confiant, will
show how far this fear is justified. ■

Reports: Democratization

El Salvador: The Electoral Test
by Madalene T. O ’Donnell

he campaign for the 1994
elections has begun in El
Salvador. These elections
will be the first held since
the end o f the 12-year
civil war, and while many
Salvadorans are trying to put hatred
behind them and consolidate the
gains m ade toward peace, others
are w hipping up cam paign fever.
As the level of cam paign rh eto 
ric rises, the peace process is en ter
ing a critical phase. Reforms set
in m otion with the signing o f the
peace accords in January 1992 are
only now touching key institutions
such as the arm ed forces and the
courts. A rep o rt released by a UNsponsored “T ruth Com mission” in
M arch 1993 b rought many o f these
issues to a head.

The Truth Commission
“We d id n ’t carry out a struggle
for 20 years in o rder to ru n for
public office. We did it to trans
form the country,” claims Joaquin
Villalobos, one o f the m ost charis
matic leaders of the Frente Farabu ndo Marti para la Liberacion
Nacional (FMLN)—once El Salva
d o r’s guerrilla army and now a
newly legalized political party that
will run candidates in the com ing
elections. Villalobos, however, has
been banned from seeking public
office for 10 years.
O n M arch 15, 1993, a truth com 
mission established by the Salva
doran peace accords, and headed
by three foreign dignitaries, held

Madalene T. O ’Donnell works for the
“Hemisphere Initiatives ’’project in El
Salvador, which has published a series
of reports on the country’s peace accords
and electoral process.

Villalobos and five o th er FMLN
leaders responsible for the assassi
nation o f 11 rural mayors during
the war and recom m ended the
10-year ban. In addition to the six
FMLN leaders, 40 Salvadoran mili
tary officers were banned from pub
lic office for their involvement in
hum an rights violations. Villalobos
has indicated that he will accept
the ban if others do and if the gov
ern m en t im plem ents some o f the
re p o rt’s stiff recom m endations for
the judicial system. Meanwhile, the
conservative Partido de Concilia
tio n Nacional has announced as its
presidential candidate one of the
40 military officers banned by the
report, Gen. Ju an Rafael Bustillo.

The legitimacy of the
coming elections will
be largely determined
by the extent to which
all sides can work
together in the time
that remains to
promote massive
voter participation.
T he T ruth Commission was
charged with reviewing the most
egregious acts o f violence com
m itted during the war. In most
cases, it uncovered little new infor
m ation but confirm ed what many
Salvadorans had always believed:
that the arm ed forces were re
sponsible for the great majority
o f abuses (some 85%), including
massacres o f m ore than 500 m en,
women, and children at the Sumpul

River and the town of El Mozote;
that the Guardia Nacional m ur
dered four American nuns on the
side of a highway in 1980; that
R oberto D ’Aubisson, founder of
the ruling Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), paid assassins
to kill Archbishop Oscar Rom ero
as he said mass in 1980; and that
the FMLN m urdered four offduty US Marines in 1985 and two
w ounded US servicemen in 1991.
T he rep o rt confirm ed th at m em 
bers of the army killed six Jesuit
priests and their housekeeper and
h er daughter in 1989. Mid-level
military officers were tried and con
victed o f the crim e in 1991, but the
T ruth Commission established for
the first time that they carried out
the killings u n d er explicit orders
from the military high com m and.
Specifically, the rep o rt finds that
Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce “gave
the order to kill Father Ignacio
Ellacuria and leave no witnesses.”
Since reportedly giving th at order,
Ponce was prom oted to general and
nam ed defense minister. T hree
days before the T ruth Commission
report was released, he offered his
resignation. Four m onths later he
finally left his post and was re
placed by Col. H um berto C orado
Figueroa.
T he T ruth Commission recom 
m ended the 10-year political ban
rath er than legal proceedings
against those nam ed in the rep o rt
because, it claimed, “no adminis
tration o f justice exists [in El Sal
vador] that meets the m inimal
requisites o f objectivity and im
partiality.” In banning individuals
from public office, however, the
T ruth Commission is touching one
of the m ost critical nerves in the
country— the 1994 elections. Villa
lobos claims the purpose o f his
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20-year struggle was not to ru n for
political office, but he knows that,
unless his party perform s well in
the 1994 elections and dem on
strates credible political strength,
the FMLN may lose at the polling
place what it gained at the negotiat
ing table.

Reforms under the
Peace Accords
W hat the FMLN gained—at least
on paper— has been called a “nego
tiated revolution.” T he com prehen
sive peace accords signed by the
governm ent and the FMLN in Ja n 
uary 1992 include provisions to
end the military conflict, impose
civilian controls over the military,
revamp the judicial system, and,
through a series of o ther reforms,
institutionalize the peace.
In practice, the record has been
mixed. O n several issues, the gov
ern m en t has backed away from,
ignored, or openly opposed con
cessions it m ade during the nego
tiations. T he FMLN, for its part,
m aintained secret caches o f arms
in Nicaragua, including surface-toair missiles, while claiming to have
disarm ed entirely.
Despite these failings, however,
there have been concrete advances.
T he military conflict ended in Feb
ruary 1992 and the guerrilla army
was dem obilized over the following
11 m onths. At the end o f this proc
ess, the FMLN was legalized as a
political party.
Many provisions o f the accords
are aim ed at reversing 60 years of
dom ination by the arm ed forces.
T he UN-sponsored Ad Hoc Com
mission, com posed o f three Salva
dorans, reviewed the records of
Salvadoran officers and recom 
m ended 103 for transfer or dismiss
al. T he US has frozen $11 million
in military assistance pending full
im plem entation of the Ad Hoc
Commission report, and G eneral
Ponce referred to these “pressures”
as he ten d ered his resignation.
Ponce is reportedly nam ed by the
Ad Hoc Commission, although its
rep o rt has never been m ade pub
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lic. O n July 1, 1993, nine m onths
after the original deadline, Presi
d en t Alfredo Crisdani announced
changes in the military high com
m and to remove the last o f the
officers nam ed in the Ad Hoc
Commission report, although 15
will rem ain on the payroll through
the end of the year.

One likely scenario is
that the right will win
the presidency and the
left and center toill
control the assembly.
Reforms to the constitution, rati
fied in January 1992 as part o f the
peace process, limit the role o f the
arm ed forces to territorial defense
and elim inate their responsibility
for public security. Two military
security forces formerly charged
with public order, the Policia de
H acienda and the Guardia Na
cional, no longer exist. Five elite
battalions were disbanded, am ong
them the notorious Batallon Atlacatl that carried ou t the El Mozote
massacre and the Jesuit m urders.
Manpower levels o f the military as
a whole have fallen by 40-50%.
T he accords create a new na
tional civilian police, trained by a
new police academy, to m aintain
order. Yet the governm ent has not
given the police sufficient resources
and this has discouraged interna
tional donors as well. The arm ed
forces stripped the preexisting na
tional police of almost every vehi
cle and most o f the infrastructure,
leaving very little for the new force
to inherit. In addition, the acad
emy’s first class graduated in the
face o f trem endous anxiety about
a rise in violent crime. Instead of
accelerating deploym ent o f the
civilian police, however, the gov
ern m ent has chosen to reinsert the
arm ed forces into their form er se
curity role, initiating military pa

trols throughout the country as a
d eterren t to crime. Despite many
delays and few resources, the Poli
cia Nacional Civil seems to be suc
cessfully operating in four of the
country’s 14 departm ents.
Judicial reforms, outlined in the
accords and passed by the Asamblea Legislativa, sought to make
the judiciary m ore in d ep en d en t by
modifying the way in which judges
at all levels are appointed. N one
theless, the judicial system, and par
ticularly the courts, continues to
com e u n d er fire. The T ruth Com
mission has called for the im m edi
ate resignation o f all m em bers of
the suprem e court, arguing that
“the judicial branch continues u n 
d er the direction of the same peo
ple whose failings created many of
the problem s Salvadorans are now
trying to overcom e.”
T he report charges the pres
ident of the suprem e court,
Mauricio Gutierrez Castro, with
“unprofessional con d u ct” and ob
struction o f several hum an rights
investigations. It furth er requests
that he step down voluntarily. In
m aking this request, the T ruth
Commission has taken on one of
the m ost powerful officials in the
country, once touted as a presi
dential candidate for the ARENA
party. As president he n o t only pre
sides over the suprem e court but
controls the prom otion and sala
ries o f judges and the accreditation
o f lawyers throughou t the country.
“Only God can remove me from
this post,” he announ ced soon af
ter the report was released.
T he Asamblea Legislativa unani
mously passed a new electoral code
that, despite some flaws, appears to
have the support o f all political
parties, including the FMLN. The
ARENA party, which dom inates the
Asamblea Legislativa, m ade a clear
attem pt to reach consensus on this
issue. As one ARENA official ex
plained, “O ur objective was to pro
duce an electoral code that could
not be blam ed for the success or
failure o f any party in the next elec
tions.” Enforcem ent o f some o f the
key provisions, however, will be

very difficult. Television stations,
for example, are strongly opposed
to provisions th at require equal
m edia access at equal rates for all
parties.

The March Elections
T he 1994 elections are seen as the
culm ination o f the peace process
and its reform s, and thus as the
p o in t by which a relatively fair play
ing field should be in place for all
sectors o f society. T he hope was
that by M arch 1994 the civilian
police would be deployed across
the country, but this goal will not
be met.
O ne FMLN leader rem arked:
“For many years, we were outside
the system; that is true. But we
were always inside the society.” The
elections will m easure, imperfectly
but in stark percentages, what por
tion of society supports the FMLN.
Political parties will have to pro
duce votes or accept seats on the
sidelines. To raise the stakes still
higher, elections at all three lev
els— local, legislative, and presiden
tial— coincide in 1994, som ething
that happens only once every 15
years.
T he m ain issues o f the cam
paign are already em erging: the
economy, crime, and the provision
o f basic services such as drinking
water. T he large majority o f Salva
dorans still live in extrem e poverty.
They need econom ic opportunity.
T he left, right, and center cur
rently face critical choices about
electoral strategy. T he left and its
m ost im portant com ponent, the
FMLN, are seriously divided. R uben
Zam ora will be the presidential can
didate for the Convergencia Democratica: a coalition o f three
center-left parties. T he FMLN has
endorsed Zam ora’s candidacy as
well, but only after a series of de
lays and over the opposition o f two
o f the five groups that comprise
the FMLN. Divisions within the left
may also cause the FMLN and the
Convergencia Dem ocratica to run
candidates against each o ther at
the legislative level, a strategy likely

to reduce their total num ber of
seats in the assembly.
Two of the five FMLN factions
supported Christian Dem ocrat
A braham Rodriguez, but his candi
dacy was largely derailed when he
lost his party’s nom ination to Fidel
Chavez Mena. As general secretary
o f the Christian Democrats, Chavez
M ena has been plagued by deep di
visions within his party. H e ran for
the presidency in 1989, losing to
Cristiani, but continues to enjoy
the support o f many loyal party
m embers. He m ust decide if the
Christian Democrats will partici
pate in the elections alone—as he
m aintains they will—or enter into
an inform al pact with the left. The
Christian Democrats are unlikely to
win the presidency alone, bu t they
m ight lose their claim to the cen
ter—and the conservative portion
o f their base— if they ally with the
left.

If the interests that
mobilize against the
government can find
expression urithin the
system, it may be the
beginning of real
democracy.
O n the right, one ARENA dep
uty stated that his party fully ex
pects the 1994 elections to be “all
parties against ARENA.” San Salva
d o r mayor A rm ando Calderon Sol
will be the ARENA candidate. He
was chosen over m ore m oderate,
less ideological candidates— like
businessm an Roberto Murray
Mesa—who m ight have attracted
broader support outside the party,
bu t caused greater divisions within
it. Some ARENA sectors are report
edly unhappy that the party did
no t take the bold step o f seeking a
m ore charismatic candidate. N one
theless, ARENA knows how to run
national campaigns and has the
resources to do it well. Unless a

clear alternative to ARENA soon
emerges, C alderon Sol and his
party organization will be difficult
to beat.
T he m onths leading up to the
March elections will be brutal and
divisive. Already there are reports
o f both party activists and m em bers
of the military being kidnapped, or
simply disappearing. The T ribunal
Suprem o Electoral, dom inated by
parties on the right and deeply poli
ticized, has finally approved a na
tional voter registration plan—four
m onths short o f the registration
deadline. T he legitimacy o f the
com ing elections will be largely
determ ined by the extent to which
the Tribunal and all political par
ties can work together in the time
that rem ains to prom ote massive
voter participation.
If the right wins in 1994, it will
face a well-organized left—possibly
with a majority in the Asamblea
Legislativa—prepared to defend
recent reform s and supported by
popular organizations. If the left
wins, it will face a business sector
and an army capable of defending
their own interests and controlling
key resources in the country. A cen
trist governm ent will have to care
fully seek out m ore powerful allies
and construct a coalition that will
hold. O ne likely scenario is that
the right will win the presidency
and the left and center will control
the assembly, forcing the parties to
work together to avoid gridlock.
The 1994 elections will produce
the first post-war governm ent in El
Salvador. W hatever the govern
m ent, however, if the interests that
mobilize against it can find expres
sion within the system, it may be
the beginning o f real dem ocracy in
El Salvador. It is critical the next
president of El Salvador bear in
m ind that the civil war did n o t end
and the peace accords were not ne
gotiated because one side defeated
the other, but rather because each
side finally recognized the strength
of the other; there was no winner.
In 1994 there will be a w inner and
his or h er task will be to govern a
still divided country. ■
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Ecuador: Is Modernization Enough?
by Donna Lee Van Cott

uring President Sixto
D uran B allen’s visit to
W ashington in March
1993, President Bill Clin
ton cited Ecuador as a
m odel o f democracy in
Latin America and praised its eco
nom ic reform program . But the
D uran Ballen governm ent’s reform
plan, as set forth in the proposed
Ley de M odernization del Estado,
which now dom inates political de
bate in the country, falls short on
at least one critical score: it fails to
address significant problem s in
Ecuadoran dem ocracy and eco
nom ic developm ent caused by the
exclusion o f E cuador’s large rural
population—particularly E cuador’s
approxim ately 35% ethnic Indian
population.
E cuador’s Ley de M odernization
del Estado follows the standard
form ula used by its neighbors to
increase the efficiency of the state
and the economy. It would stream 
line the bureaucracy, privatize
national industries, elim inate mo
nopolies, and dism antle cum ber
some regulations. O ne flaw in the
plan, which has been advertised as
an effort to decentralize the gov
ernm ent, is th at decisionm aking
power will be fu rth er concentrated
in the hands o f the executive, and
away from congress, provincial offi
cials, and unions, as these groups
are cut o u t o f the revenue food
chain.
T he plan is opposed by several
o f the m ajor political parties, in
p art because they stand to lose
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their powers o f patronage. The
m ost strident criticism of the law is
voiced by congressional president
Carlos Vallejo, who has called for a
national plebiscite and an open de
bate over the m erits o f the pro
gram, an idea seconded by the
labor sector, which faces the loss
o f thousands of state jobs. Details
of the plan have not been pub
lished, creating an atm osphere
o f speculation and mistrust.

The government’s
reform plan fails to
address significant
problems; it excludes
Ecuador’s large
rural population,
particularly ethnic
Indians.

But no t all the criticisms are selfinterested. The Ley de M oderniza
tio n del Estado fails to do what
highly centralized econom ies like
Ecuador’s must. It fails to “dem oc
ratize” the economy; that is, it fails
to allow local preferences and de
m ands to flow to the centralized
state agencies responsible for satislying them.

The Development Quagmire
Econom ic developm ent as prac
ticed in Ecuador—and in the rest
o f Latin America—is already

m arked by a lack of consultation
between governm ent and rural
com m unities. “Nos imponen— no
mas" (“They im pose them on us—
th at’s all”), explains M ariano Curicama, president of the Consejo
M unicipal de Guam ote in the heav
ily Indian Chim borazo province.
Curicama is an exam ple o f the
increased political presence o f in
digenous Ecuadorans since the na
tionwide indigenous uprising of
1990. In many areas, strong local in
digenous organizations and persist
ence have com bined to dem and
and receive the attention o f the
distant Quito governm ent. In ex
change for an endorsem ent of
D uran Ballen’s candidacy in 1992,
C uricam a’s indigenous organiza
tion received assurances from the
future president o f attention to the
developm ent and infrastructure
needs of the area’s 30,000 Indians.
Since taking office in May 1992,
Curicam a has been able to involve
the com m unity in the planning
and im plem entation of state-spon
sored developm ent plans for the
area—som ething un h eard o f in the
majority o f Ecuador’s indigenous
municipios, where all plans are im
posed from above and 70-80% of
funds earm arked for com m unity
projects are absorbed by E cuador’s
central administrative apparatus.
According to Curicama, the ha
bitual lack o f com m unity par
ticipation in the design o f state
developm ent projects ensured the
continued poverty o f the region.
By directly contacting the US
adm inistration and the InterAm erican Developm ent Bank in
W ashington, he has been able to
force the D uran Ballen adm inistra
tion to deliver funds reserved for
his com m unity that have, in the
past, been diverted.

T he majority of indigenous com
m unities have n o t been so fortu
nate. Carlos M oreno, head of
COMUNIDEC, an Ecuadoran
not-for-profit organization that
m anages grassroots developm ent
projects for international organi
zations, is all too familiar with the
problem . H e explains how cen
trally generated developm ent plans
are launched w ithout consulting
the com m unity affected o r even
calculating what the needs o f the
com m unity are. They are im ple
m ented w ithout participation of
the local population or local leader
ship. For Ecuador’s indigenous
population, the absence of com 
m unity participation reflects the
belief o f governm ent officials that
Indians are incapable o f contribut
ing to their own developm ent.
M oreno’s long experience with
developm ent projects in indigenous
com m unities has proven that com 
munity planning and participation
are the key to the success o f any
project. Indigenous leaders—like
C uricam a and Miguel Puwainchir
o f the Shuar Federation—state
time and again that projects im
posed and im plem ented by outsid
ers receive little enthusiasm from
the local population. Due to the
lack o f com m unity participation
and poor planning, according to
M oreno, the few social investment
projects undertaken in these aus
tere times are doom ed to failure or
irrelevance.

The Armed Forces— Exploiting
the Development Vacuum
T hough the central governm ent
has n o t responded to indigenous
dem ands for participation in devel
o p m en t initiatives, the Ecuadoran
military has. Stunned by the depth
of rage in the countryside m ani
fested by the 1990 nationwide
indigenous uprising, the military
has moved independently o f the
elected governm ent to increase its
presence in the provinces, espe
cially in the Amazon, where the
military provides m ost public serv
ices— and where many retired offi

cers have large landholdings. The
arm ed forces have also worked on
infrastructure projects with local
indigenous leaders, such as Puwainchir’s Shuar Federation. T he mili
tary’s attention has satisfied some
o f the Indians’ m aterial dem ands,
but in doing so has perpetuated
the dependency o f campesino and
indigenous com m unities on the
goodwill o f a powerful patron.

Military blockade in Ambato during the
Columbus quincentennial celebration (1992)

The D uran Ballen adm inistra
tion can address both the objec
tions to its Ley de M odernization
del Estado and the frustration of
Ecuador’s diverse Indian nationali
ties by opening a debate on the
country’s econom ic future. He
could also borrow two im portant
them es from the Plan Nacional de
Desarrollo para las Poblaciones
Indigenas being developed by his
own Oficina de Asuntos Indigenas
de la Presidencia de la Republica.
T hat plan was devised by Ecuador’s
first indigenous director o f the of
fice—Jose Quim bo, an Otavalan
lawyer. T he plan incorporates the
active local participation into the
planning, im plem entation, and
evaluation o f econom ic develop
m ent projects—a proven way to
make projects m ore efficient and

politically popular. M oreover, it
concentrates resources on Ecua
d o r’s m ost intractable econom ic
and political problem : the poverty
and isolation o f its Indian popu
lation. According to Q u ito ’s El
Comercio, scarcely 1 % o f social and
econom ic spending is directed to
ward this population.
Curicam a hopes Q uim bo’s par
ticipatory developm ent program s
receive substantial support and re
sources from the state: “We hope
he does no t fail; that we d o n ’t have
to wait for three m ore years, o r the
next adm inistration. Hopefully we
will not have to paralyze the coun
try again to get the governm ent’s
attention.”
In mid-June 1993 the Confedera
tio n de Nacionalidades Indigenas
de Ecuador (CONAIE) jo in ed
urban unions to protest the gov
e rn m e n t’s refusal to consider an
alternative agrarian policy. D em on
strations were called off, however,
when the governm ent and con
gress agreed to discuss the Indians’
plan. But not before A ntonio Lanchim ba—a CONAIE activist from
Im babura—was killed in a car acci
d ent that witnesses blam e on the
military. Several o ther CONAIE
leaders were beaten and jailed.
T he governm ent was furious
that the protests coincided with the
Copa America soccer cham pion
ship, hosted by Ecuador, which
had drawn the international press
to Quito. While m ost Ecuadorans
were enthralled by the national
team ’s semifinal match, congress
passed the first 6 o f 63 articles of
the Ley de M odernization del
Estado.
The leaner Ecuadoran state en
visioned by the Ley de M oderni
zation del Estado is a worthwhile
goal, but it alone will no t enable
Ecuador to m easure up to Clin
to n ’s praise or provide an example
for o th er m odernizing Latin Am er
ican nations. To do that, Duran
Ballen m ust open a dialogue on
the country’s econom ic future
and seriously focus on the needs
of the n atio n ’s long-neglected In
dian com m unities. ■
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Reports: Gender and the Legal System

Women Judges in Central America
by Tirza Rivera-Cira

um erous international
declarations emphasize
that gaining equal access
to decisionm aking posi
tions is a key to w om en’s
struggle for equality. In
C entral America, however, there
are very few wom en in such posi
tions. In the political sphere, only
15% of candidates for elected of
fice are women, which, in turn,
yields a lim ited num ber o f parlia
m entary representatives (10%) and
local governm ent officials (between
8 and 28%). In the economic sphere,
only 20% o f all union leaders are
women. It is truly surprising, then,
to find th at 23% of C entral Amer
ica’s judges are women. Indeed,
wom en account for m ore than a
third o f the judges in Costa Rica,
Panam a, and Nicaragua.
This notable group o f Central
Am erican wom en has advanced
dramatically in a m ajor position of
influence traditionally dom inated
by m en. Every day, these women
issue decisions that have substan
tial im pact on individuals and com
munities. In a region where less
than 3% o f women everacquire a
university education, simply being
both a lawyer and a woman is a
uniquely privileged position. Never
theless, the persistence of gender
inequality has kept women judges,
for the m ost part, in the lower lev
els of the judicial hierarchy.
A 1991 study profiling women
judges shows they are relatively
young (40-44 years old) and tend
to com e from small, middle-class
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families where the m o th er’s edu
cational level was higher than the
fath er’s. Commonly they are the
oldest o f three children. T heir ini
tial education was in public schools,
and very few of them have done
postgraduate studies after law
school. Most were m arried in their
twenties and have three children
(between 14 and 25 years old).
Most have served some 10 years in
the judiciary.

Though ever more
Central American
women are optingfor
thejudiciary, once
in the system, they
encounter more
stumbling blocks to
advancement than do
their male colleagues.
Significant historical
and cultural obstacles
to women remain.

Access to the judiciary in Cen
tral America has been fostered by
the increasing num ber o f women
studying and practicing law. Today,
50% o f Central A m erica’s law stu
dents and 40% of its law school
graduating classes are women.
While women lawyers are a grow
ing force in the Central American
labor market, m ost of them still
have problem s obtaining employ

m ent in private law firms. T he ju d i
ciary thus em erges as an attractive
em ploym ent option, especially as
low judicial salaries dim inish the
interest o f male lawyers. T he issue
o f equal access aside, the term s of
judicial em ploym ent are them 
selves attractive to wom en lawyers.
W omen judges have cited jo b and
salary stability, fixed work sched
ules (which allow time for family
responsibilities), and potential
benefits (such as m aternity and
sick leaves and scholarship possi
bilities) as incentives to seeking
em ploym ent in the judiciary.
T hough ever m ore C entral
Am erican wom en are opting for
the judiciary, once in the system,
they encounter m ore stum bling
blocks to advancem ent than do
their male colleagues. Significant
historical and cultural obstacles to
wom en rem ain. P ertinent to this
problem is the fact that women
have only been enfranchised as
voters, and therefore eligible for
nom ination or election to the ju d i
ciary, for about 40 years.
T he region’s first wom en judges
were restricted to courts dealing
with traditionally “fem inine prob
lem s,” such as family and children.
T he first handful o f C entral Ameri
can women nam ed to suprem e
courts only took office in the early
1980s. W om en sitting on suprem e
courts continue to be isolated sym
bols o f progress whose decisions
have little im pact beyond the im
m ediate judicial sphere.
Suprem e courts in C entral Amer
ica tend to have the fewest women
as sitting judges. C urrently there
are two wom en sitting on the su
prem e courts o f Costa Rica, Gua
temala, and Panam a, o ne each
in H onduras and Nicaragua, and
none in El Salvador. These appoint

ments, however, are the result of
party politics rath er than organized
pressure to place women in higher
judicial positions. Only one woman
has ever presided over a suprem e
court in the region. In that case,
Marisol Reyes, who becam e presi
d en t of the Panam anian suprem e
court in 1984, was heavily criticized
because o f h er personal friendship
with then-dictator, Gen. Manuel
Noriega.
W ithin the judiciaries o f Central
America, the form al m echanisms
o f selection and advancem ent are
gender-neutral, but de facto dis
crim ination blocks women from
prom otion. A basic disadvantage is
that selection boards are usually
com posed entirely o f m en. Dis
crim ination by m en is no t the only
obstacle, however. W om en judges
may simply be m ore reluctant than
their male colleagues to com pete
for higher positions because of
cultural conditioning: traditional
stereotypes o f female inferiority
and insecurity can lead wom en to
exclude themselves from considera
tion for advancem ent.
W om en judges have suffered in
the past for their lack of political
organization. Realization o f this,
however, has inspired some crea
tive action, as wom en judges in
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Gua
tem ala have recently established
their own political associations.
These new associations have de
cided n o t only to prom ote the pro
fessional advancem ent of their
m em bers, but also to work toward
a general im provem ent in the inde
pendence, accessibility, and ac
countability o f C entral American
judiciaries.
In the final analysis, being a
woman on the bench may prove
to be an advantage. T he prevailing
perception in C entral America ap
pears to be that wom en judges are
m ore honest and less susceptible
to corruption than their male col
leagues, and th at they are m ore
concerned than their male col
leagues about o th er problem s in
the judicial system. A w om an’s atti
tude about h er role as a judge also

The emergence of
new opportunities
for women in Central
America is crucial
for the reform of the
region’s judiciary,
which can play a
strategic pa rt in the
wider process of
democratizati on.
differs considerably from that of
h er male counterpart. In listing
their personal reasons for becom 
ing judges, the m ost frequently
cited responses from wom en were
“the possibility o f serving o th ers”
and “the possibility o f m aking a
better society.” In contrast, male
judges tended to cite “the possibil
ity of adm inistering justice and
applying the law,” as well as “the
prestige” and “social status” at
tached to being a judge.

This difference in viewpoints
between male and female judges
indicates that the enhanced partici
pation o f wom en in national ju d i
ciaries will make the exercise of
justice m ore dem ocratic. Increased
formal and inform al exchange be
tween female and male judges will
mutually educate and sensitize
them to the urgent problem s of
their societies. Education o f judges
and judicial personnel to m atters
o f gender equity in the courts is
particularly im portant; studies indi
cate that C entral A m erican women
are often shortchanged in cases of
divorce, child care, dom estic vio
lence, and sexual offenses because
of the stereotypes o f women held
by male judges.
The em ergence of new o p p ortu
nities for wom en in C entral Amer
ica is crucial for the reform o f the
region’s judiciary, which can play a
strategic part in the wider process
of dem ocratization. While many
wom en judges have acted individu
ally to improve the adm inistration
o f justice, as a politically organized
force they will achieve far m ore for
both women and the cause o f jus
tice in general. ■

WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY
% of all judges

Costa Rica

Panama

Honduras

El Salvador

Guatemala

Nicaragua

Source: Center for the Administration of Justice, Florida International University, 1991
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Cuba on My Mind

IDB Going Back to Its Roots

Beats Me, Mon

A 1995 poll o f Cuban-Americans
living in Miami revealed that 80%
favor m aintaining the current pol
icy o f no diplom atic relations and
no trade with Cuba and 60% favor
a US invasion of Cuba. C onducted
by Florida International Univer
sity’s Institute for Public O pinion
and Research for the Cuban Re
search Institute, the poll sampled
the opinions o f 601 Cuban-Ameri
cans in Dade County. For m ore
inform ation, contact CRI at
(305) 348-1991.

O ne o f the speakers in the InterAmerican D evelopm ent Bank’s
C ultural C enter lecture series last
sum m er was Benito Peralta, a PaiPai Indian from Baja California.
The 76-year-old visitor told the tale
of a giant m onster nam ed Jalkutat,
who lived in the rocks n ear a water
fall outside the village of Jaktbjol,
Baja California. T he narrative is ac
tually an allegory about the Spanish
conquest of Mexico’s native peoples.
Given all the concern about how
the IDB develops its projects, one
m ight w onder what the IDB really
intended with Don B enito’s visit.

W hen Jo h n Paul II visited Jam aica
on August 9, 1993, many Jam aicans
asked themselves why the Pope
chose to visit the country in the
first place. After all, only 7% o f the
island’s 2.3 million people are
Catholic. His visit to the island na
tion was the first in papal history,
an event m ade even m ore singular
by the fact the vast majority o f Ja
m aica’s church-going citizens be
long to the Anglican, M ethodist,
Presbyterian, and evangelical
churches.

■

Fast Food— But Don’t
Forget the Chorizo
Franchising is one of Latin Amer
ica’s fastest growing new business
opportunities. M cDonald’s already
has 227 stores throughout the re
gion, including 100 in Brazil and
65 in Mexico. RFC is close behind
with 203 stores, including 10 in
Panam a. Burger King has half that
num ber, with 105. Even Taco Bell
is beginning to show a presence,
with 3 stores in Mexico, 3 in Guate
mala, and 13 in all throughout the
region. Asked about the growing
presence o f fast-food operations in
his country, the Mexican m anager
of a m ore traditional restaurant dis
missed the potential challenge of
the fast-food shops: “Mexico is a
country o f street food. If I’m look
ing for som ething cheap and quick,
I’ll have a chorizo on the corner . . . ”
( US/Latin Trade, O ctober 1993).

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Come Back to Jamaica
A large new investm ent in Jam aica
may help that country to improve
the visibility o f one of its major
products in the US market. Guinness
PLC purchased 51% o f Desnoes
& Geddes, a 75-year-old Jamaicabased com pany that produces,
am ong o ther products, Jam aica’s
Red Stripe lager beer. Guinness
paid $62 million in the acquisition,
which is intended to help Guinness
expand its share o f the N orth Amer
ican beverage market.

A View from the South
The C entro de Econom ia Interna
tio n al—based in Santiago, Chile—
published, in its July 1993 newslet
ter, an exhaustive analysis o f that
sum m er’s G roup o f Seven Eco
nom ic Summ it in Tokyo and its im
plications for developing countries.
H ernan Buchi, one of the architects
o f C hile’s econom ic opening, is
on the cen ter’s board o f editors.

A Ruminating Gringo
T he Strategic Studies Institute of
the US Army War College pub
lished a well-written “trip re p o rt”
(Septem ber 1993) that pulls no
punches when evaluating the lead
ing candidates for H on d u ras’s
November 1993 presidential elec
tion. According to au th o r Donald
Schulz, “. . . [Oswaldo] Ramos Soto
[the Partido Nacional candidate] is
a loose cannon. If he is elected,
one anticipates an orgy of corrup
tion. T he . . . candidate represents
the most retrograde and authoritar
ian sectors o f the Partido Nacional
and the military. H e is a suprem e
dem agogue and opportunist whose
election could well en danger the
dem ocratic gains that H onduras
has m ade over the last 13 years.”
O f the o ther candidate— Carlos
R oberto Reina— Schulz writes that
he . . is an old party war-horse, a
socialist dem ocrat who still carries
a lot o f political baggage . . . he
is an honorable m an and fairly
com petent, even if still somewhat
m ired in a 1960s leftist mindset. . . .”

Just the Facts

Good News

Case Studies

Flash Facts—an autom ated facsim
ile delivery system— provides up-todate inform ation on the Mexican
m arket. M anaged by the US D epart
m en t of C om m erce’s Office o f Mex
ico, Flash Facts offers 24-hour-a-day
access to m ore than 100 different
m enu items, each focusing on a
different aspect o f the Mexican
market. The service can be ac
cessed by calling (202) 482-4464.

N et capital inflows to Latin America
rose to $57 billion in 1992. T he pre
vious year, such inflows were $39.2
million, double the level o f 1990.
For the past two years, Latin Am er
ica has been a net im porter o f capi
tal. For further inform ation, see the
UN World Investment Report, 1993.

T he Georgetown University Pew
Case Study C enter is circulating
a very useful catalog that lists and
provides an abstract o f case studies
in international affairs that have
been developed u n d er the cen ter’s
auspices. As described in the cata
log, “a case study is essentially a
scenario which describes a situa
tion up to a point at which some
decision needs to be taken. The
student is asked what they would
do about the issues being posed.
T he m ethod involves active learn
ing.” Latin American cases include
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Contadora, the Panam a Canal negotia
tions, and US-Grenada relations.
For further inform ation, contact
the center at (202) 687-8971.

He’s Good for Capitalism
Good News, Bad News
A Journal of Commerce article (May 4,
1993) filed from Brazil by journalist
K atherine Ellison presents some
startling inform ation. According to
the article, Brazilian families now
watch television an average o f seven
hours a day— some 20 m inutes
longer than US families. Worse yet,
Brazilian Planning D epartm ent sta
tistics show th at m ore families own
televisions than refrigerators. In ad
dition, an estim ated 800,000 Brazil
ian families own parabolic dishes,
with an average o f 30,000 additional
systems being sold each m onth.

F ernando Enrique Cardoso—one
o f Brazil’s leading public affairs
personalities—is best known in
academic circles for his stinging
analyses of capitalism ’s negative im
pact on developing countries. Now
that he is the country’s m inister of
finance, however, he seems to be
good for capitalism. Sao Paulo’s
stock m arket had a record day on
S eptem ber 17, 1993, when Cardoso
hinted he m ight unify Brazil’s ex
change rate. Nearly $280 million
worth of securities were exchanged
as the m arket’s index rose by m ore
than 7%.

He’s Also Good for Sweets
Workers and NAFTA
At the AFL-CIO’s annual m eeting
in San Francisco in O ctober 1993,
President Bill Clinton provided his
own analysis o f labor’s opposition
to the N orth Am erican Free Trade
A greem ent: “W hat I really believe
is th at this has becom e the symbol
o f the legitimate grievances o f the
Am erican working people about
the way they’ve been worked over
the last 12 years.”

Brazilian chocolate is being con
sum ed in record quantities. By Sep
tem ber 1993 Brazilians had already
eaten an average o f 3.3 pounds
o f chocolate, nearly double the
am ount that was consum ed in 1980.
O ne o f the latest candy products in
Brazil is N estle’s Turm a de Monica
bar, com bining dark and white
chocolate. Intended for children,
the Brazilian cartoonist Mauricio
de Souza has been contracted to
design his characters onto the bar.

Role Models
In the face o f a dramatically shrink
ing economy, Cuban governm ent
officials are now once again look
ing east for assistance— this time to
Vietnam and China. According to
an August 21, 1993, Reuters report,
C uba’s m inister o f finances Jose
Luis Rodriguez said in H anoi that
“he was interested in studying how
Vietnam had initiated economic
reform s even while m aintaining
its socialist identity.” But he also
cautioned that lessons from the
econom ic policies o f Vietnam
and China would have to be
adapted to the realities of Cuba.
Perhaps he was thinking o f the
wage structure in both countries,
where hourly labor is the lowest
paid in the world at about 24 and
28 cents respectively.
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Quid Pro Quo with Cuba
by Anthony P. Maingot

Now is the time to draw Fidel Castro away from the arena he dominates— Cuban
nationalism vs. US imperialism—and into the arena he doesn’t: Cuban economic
performance. The US embargo is an obstacle to such a shift

ccording to Deputy Sec
retary o f State Clifton
R. W harton, Jr., the
Clinton adm inistration
is com m itted to a West
ern H em isphere “linked
by open markets and dem ocratic
values” (W ashington, DC, May 3,
1993). As worthy and laudable
a goal as this is, the question is
w hether generating open markets
necessarily engenders dem ocratic
values in authoritarian societies.
This question applies as m uch to
Cuba as it does to China. U nfortu
nately, we have been m uch m ore
prone to discuss the Chinese case
than the C uban one. It is time the
US governm ent changes this n o n 
productive and politically m oti
vated predisposition.
T he opening o f com m and
econom ies can lead to pressures
for the institution of dem ocratic
values. In the case o f Cuba, the first
step towards encouraging an open
m arket should be the com m ence
m ent o f negotiations to lift the US
em bargo. Negotiations aim ed at
the institution of dem ocratic values
in Cuba via the opening in the com
m and economy should be on a
quid pro quo basis, i.e. specific eco
nom ic openings in exchange for
specific political changes.

A

Anthony P. Maingot is editor of
H em isphere.
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T he single m ost im portant socio
logical study o f Cuba done before
1959 was Lowry N elson’s Rural Cuba
(1950). Observing the richness of
C uba’s soil and the vast am ount
of government-owned land lying
fallow (the so-called realengos), Nel
son felt that if such natural endow
m ents were everything, C uba’s
future was assured. But natural
endow m ents are never everything.

It is time the US
government changes
its nonproductive and
politically motivated
predisposition to
discuss China more
than Cuba.

Much depends, Nelson reasoned,
upon the degree o f im agination
that the Cuban people can bring to
the task of finding and developing
new products from their natural re
sources. T he C uban revolution
of 1959 was initially prem ised on
m eeting that very challenge. T hree
decades later, Cuba is being chal
lenged like never before, as the
country’s economists are adm it
ting with rem arkable candor.

The econom ic literature em anat
ing from Cuba today confronts the
present crisis with great realism
and a predisposition to accept
changes. In 1993 Julio Carranza
Valdes, C uba’s most articulate po
litical econom ist, seem ed to be
echoing N elson’s words when he
w arned that the survival o f the
C uban revolution depends on a
“strategic redefinition o f the revolu
tionary m odel. . . . This is the chal
lenge: what is needed is creativity
and political audacity” (Cuademos
de Nuestra America 19, 1993).
The nature o f the challenge is
simply m onum ental: m aking the
socialist system work with less than
a third o f the resources th at it had
in 1989. T hat 70% drop reflects
the disappearance o f socialist bloc
subsidies. W hat is the capacity of
the national econom y to com pen
sate for a loss of such m agnitude?
It is impossible to be optimistic, for
reasons cited by C uban economists
themselves. Even if C uban produc
tion during the “Special Period in
Tim e of Peace” achieved total effi
ciency in m aking and selling local
products, it would still be 40% be
low what in 1989 was considered
minimally necessary to sustain the
“norm al” rhythm of the economy.
According to the UN Develop
m ent Program ’s Human Develop
ment Report for 1993, Cuba is now
in 75th place on the hum an devel
opm ent index (which measures
real purchasing power, education,

and health). C om pare this to the
20th place of Barbados or the 31st
place of Trinidad and Tobago. In
the C aribbean, only St. Vincent
(76th) and Guyana (105th) rank
lower than Cuba.

Flagging Spirits
T hough hardly ever discussed in
such term s by economists (who
refer, am ong o th er things, to “the
need for m ore labor discipline”),
analysis has to begin with certain
dom estic realities, prim e am ong
them being the social-psychological
climate in present-day Cuba. In
fact, every even modestly im partial
observer has rem arked that, since
the closing o f the free peasant m ar
kets th at were authorized in 1986,
there has been an evident flagging
o f C uban spirits. A large num ber of
com m odities, especially food items,
th at had not been seen in years
were m ade available virtually over
night by the mercados campesinos.
W ithin m onths Castro ordered the
experim ent stopped, politically iso
lated the economists who had de
signed the experim ent, and began
what was called the rectification de
errores, th at is, an attem pt to create
a p u rer form o f socialist disinterest.
N one o f this had anything to
do with the US em bargo. In 1986
C uba’s leadership m ade what now
appears to have been a fatally
flawed decision to fu rth er central
ize and tighten the com m and econ
omy at the expense of individual
initiative. The ideas behind peres
troika and glasnost were already in
the air. T he socialist countries that
subsidized the C uban form of so
cialism were evidently in structural
crisis. Mikhail Gorbachev was as
clear as a ro o ster’s crow when he
warned in his 1987 book, Perestroika,

that “socialism’s prestige and possi
bilities would be directly harm ed if
we cling to the old forms of coop
eration. . . . ” T he forms o f coopera
tion m ost obviously targeted for
revision were the socialist bloc’s
agreem ent to pay m ore than 150%
of the world m arket price for every
thing im ported from Cuba, and
the subsidization o f Cuban oil
purchases.

Economic indications
are that the Cuban
system is involved in a
pattern of deterioration
that the mere lifting
of the embargo urill
not correct.

Aside from a social-psychological
factor that we m ight call “sacrifice
exhaustion,” there are econom ic
indications the Cuban system is in
volved in a pattern o f deterioration
that the m ere lifting of the em bar
go will no t correct. T he com bined
im pact o f a totally centralized econ
omy of im ports and exports and
fuel and equipm ent shortages is
taking a terrible toll in term s of the
increasing am ounts of inputs neces
sary to produce m arginal gains in
outputs. For every one peso in
vested between 1981 and 1985
there was a $0.53 increase in Cu
ban production. Between 1986
and 1990 the situation was simply
unsustainable: for every one peso
invested there was only a $0.02
increase in production. T he inef

ficiency of the system could also be
ju d g ed by the fact that, as Cuban
economists now admit, fully
600,000 people were unproductively employed. This was part of
a payout in social services th at was
growing three times faster than
productivity.
As if those indications were
no t warning enough, it is now re
vealed that during the last five
years money in circulation has
been growing 1.5 times faster than
the availability of m erchandise.
The results were predictable: not
just inflation bu t a boom ing black
market. Just how artificial, n o t to
say unreal, things have becom e is
evident in a study by C uba’s Centro
de Investigaciones de la Econom ia
M undial, which reveals that in
1989 70% of the existing savings
accounts contained less than 200
pesos, or US$3.50 at black-market
exchange rates. Clearly the level of
internal savings needed to capital
ize a new initiative in local produc
tion is simply not there.

The Cuban Catch-22
N othing illustrates the virtual
collapse o f the C uban econom ic
m odel m ore dramatically than the
paradox o f sugar as it affects plans
to reinsert Cuba in the world
economy—the one thing all play
ers seem to agree on. M anual Rua
and Pedro M onreal’s much-cited
article, “La apertura economica cubana” {Cuba’sForeign Trade, Feb
ruary 1993), illustrates the problem ,
a veritable C uban Catch-22 that is
related no t to the US em bargo but
to earlier decisions.
Rua and M onreal believe C uba’s
reinsertion into the world economy
can be achieved through an aper
tura economica anchored on three
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pillars: attracting m ore foreign
investments, diversifying C uba’s
foreign trade, and accelerating the
developm ent o f the tourist sector.
The authors note that the appropri
ate legal changes to accom m odate
these initiatives have been made,
to wit: Article 23 o f the 1992 consti
tution, which recognizes and pro
tects foreign investments, and the
decision to remove the state’s m o
nopoly over exports. The C uban
Cam ara de Com ercio claims that,
by 1993, 500 econom ic entities
were directly, if not totally autono
mously, involved in foreign trade.
Ah, b u t there is a fly in the oint
m ent. T he fundam ental engine
driving that econom ic reorienta
tion, according to the authors and
many others, would still have to be
the sugar industry. As C uba’s eco
nom ic czar, Carlos Lage, said in No
vem ber 1992 on Havana television,
C uba’s goal is to gain an increased
share of sugar’s hard-currency m ar
ket. This, he admits, will require
m ore land, m ore fertilizer, and a
longer cane-cutting season to in
crease production.

New W ine, Old Bottles
C uba’s 1992 production of 7 mil
lion tons gave Lage and the authors
in Cuba’s Foreign Trade the confi
dence to believe that, with 6.3 mil
lion tons for export, Cuba m ight
ju st make it. U nfortunately for
Cuba, this has turned out to be
little m ore than pouring new wine
into old bottles. For the past 25
years Cuba has hitched its eco
nom ic destinies to that star called
sugar. Sugar cultivation takes up
nearly 60% o f all of C uba’s culti
vated area, consum es m ore than
30% of the n atio n ’s energy, and
employs 440,000 people. But even
Lage had to recognize some crucial
econom ic realities that would sure
ly affect C uba’s plans: in 1989 Cuba
im ported 13 million tons of oil; in
1992 th at am ount was cut in half.
Keeping in m ind that C uba’s sugar
m illing equipm ent is of gas guz
zling (and polluting) vintage, that
its sugar mills are spread across
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Cuba, and that such dispersion
requires an intensive use of fueldriven transportation, the drastic
nature of fuel deficits is clear.
A nother problem is that Cuban
sugar has becom e d ep e n d en t on
the extensive use o f fertilizers. In
1989 Cuba im ported 1.3 million
tons of fertilizer; by 1992 that fig
ure was slashed by some 75%. In
1989 Cuba purchased US$80 mil
lion worth of herbicides; by 1992
that had been cut by about 60%.

Should a country
that cannot produce
enough alcohol or
aspirins for its
hospitals invest so
heavily in interferon?
The result o f these reductions was
quickly evident: the 1992-93 sugar
harvest, a crop o f 4.2 m illion tons,
is the smallest in 30 years, repre
senting the single largest annual
drop in sugar production. Cuba
has argued force m ajeure in sus
pending sales o f sugar contracted
to convertible-currency clients—
hardly a way to start a reinsertion
into the world market.
T he news could not have come
at a worse time for the island. With
so m uch land devoted to sugar, the
deficit in food production has been
increasing: in 1989 Cuba was im
porting 57% of the proteins and
51% o f the calories consum ed.
C uba’s purchasing power in 1993
is considerably less than it was in
1989. T he deficiency in local food
production has affected plans to in
tegrate the tourist industry through
backward linkages into the agricul
tural sector, which, in the rest of
the C aribbean, is sustained by im
ports. As we shall see, it is relevant
as well to state initiatives in the do
main of biotechnology.
Cuba began investing in medical
education and research early in the

revolutionary phase. In those days
the idea was to perform “interna
tionalist” duties in other devel
oping countries. Today’s goal is
medical technology as a business.
Plans exist to create a locally based
com plex for medical treatm ents of
all sorts—from cosmetic surgery
to oncology—for patients paying
hard currency. Such a com plex
could intersect with the burgeon
ing tourist industry. A nother di
m ension of the plan calls for
exports from the C uban medical
complex, including physical plants,
instrum ents, equipm ent, and even
the doctors and technicians to op
erate them . Cuban agencies using
Western-style m arketing tech
niques are already at work. MediCuba and H eber Biotec handle
sophisticated m edications such as
reagents, epiderm al growth factors,
diagnostic kits for the HIV virus,
hepatitis B and m eningitis B vac
cines, and alpha, beta, and gam m a
interferons. According to US soci
ologist Julie Feinsilver’s Healing
the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at
Home and Abroad (1993), indica
tions are that Cubans are at least
breaking even and th at their 15odd biotechnological centers are
self-sustaining.
The very first issue regarding
this sector is the question of m atch
ing appropriate technology to lev
els o f developm ent. O ne question
repeatedly asked about Cuba is
w hether a country that cannot
produce enough alcohol or aspi
rins for its hospitals should be in
vesting so heavily in the production
o f interferon.

Investor Liabilities?
Beyond this relatively simple issue
of accounting and opportunity costs
lie the risks that, with or w ithout
the US em bargo, any potential in
vestor should consider. Potential
legal liabilities are one such risk.
In a field dom inated by US, Euro
pean, and Japanese m ultinationals,
the Cubans appear weak in both
basic research and sales. Indeed,
Cuba does not recognize patents,

a m ajor problem any jo in t ventures
will have to take into account.
T he relationship between ap
propriate technological inputs and
productive outputs also applies
to C uba’s goal of becom ing selfsufficient in foodstuffs. The plan
has been to increase production
through greater and greater in
fusions of highly trained technical
personnel. According to the Boletin
de Information sobre la Economia Cubana (January 1992), Cuba has
been spending twice the Latin
Am erican average on technical
and scientific education and train
ing. As in m edicine, the Cuban
governm ent has decided that ad
vanced technological and scientific
inputs are the paths to agricultural
developm ent. Yet Cuba rem ains
heavily d ep e n d en t on the im port
o f a wide range of cereals, beans,
oils, milk, poultry, and other basic
foodstuffs. Similarly, if Cuba is
m arketing five different types of
advanced biotechnological m edica
tions for veterinary use, why has it
failed to stop simple fowl diseases
from u nderm ining plans to have
people raise their own poultry?

Tourism Dollars
Havana took off as a m ajor tourist
spot after W orld War II. W hen
Miami Beach rejected the institu
tion o f gam bling casinos, the big
money moved to Havana. This
move would prove to be a doubleedged sword: the m ore successful it
becam e as an industry, the m ore it
fueled nationalist and reform ist re
sentm ent. Am ong the first acts of
the revolutionary governm ent in
1959 was to close down all casinos
and de-emphasize tourism in gen
eral. Thirty years later, the regim e
reversed itself and launched a dra
matic tourism initiative. Its first
step was to open up the industry to
jo in t ventures, with considerable
success thus far. In 1991 Cuba
attracted 300,000 tourists, m atch
ing the highest figure of the pre
revolutionary days—and is perhaps
over-optimistically targeting 1.5 mil
lion tourists by 1995.

Tourism will be contained in 11
m ajor tourist enclaves, the biggest
being Varadero Beach. Access to
this truly m agnificent stretch of
white sand and crystal clear waters
is m ade possible by a first-rate high
way running from Havana, an inter
national airport that can service
the largest ju m b o jets, and a m od
ern m arina with m oorings for 110
deep-sea fishing yachts. In the European-style grading system, Varadero
will have three five-star hotels and
an o th er 5,000 room s o f at least
three stars.

The embargo reduces
the maneuverability
of Cuban interests
who understand that
reforms are the only
way out.

Spanish, Mexican, British, and
Jam aican interests have entered
into jo in t ventures and m anage
m ent arrangem ents, which give the
foreigners nearly com plete freedom
o f m anagerial and administrative
policy. Several West Indian firms
have been inquiring about (and
some were investing in) a range
of possible deals, from building
new—or restoring old— hotels,
and supplying foodstuffs, to the
assembly o f small cars for the
rental business. Firms from other
C aribbean nations are interested in
pursuing the Cuban idea o f m ulti
destination packaging.
The truly big plums, of course,
would be m ultidestination packages
with Miami and San Juan, Puerto
Rico. T he risks o f such investm ent
are great, but the new investors are
gam bling on the profitability of
what is surely the future o f Carib
bean tourism: m ultidestination
vacations, perhaps with Cuba as
the principal site.

The Embargo’s Effects
C uba’s econom ic decline cannot
be attributed to the em bargo. W hat
the em bargo does, however, is two
fold. First, it m onopolizes both the
language and the agenda of eco
nom ic opportunities by focusing
attention where it should n o t be:
on Cuban nationalism vs. US im
perialism. And second, precisely
because o f this m onopoly, the
em bargo reduces the m aneuver
ability of those interests in Cuba
who understand that basic eco
nom ic and political reforms, not
simply lifting the em bargo, are the
only way out.
Those concerned with C uba’s
econom ic and political future u n 
derstand that half-measures will
not bring the island’s econom y
ou t of its structural crisis. Remov
ing the em bargo will merely be a
half-measure given the absence of
hard-currency credits, the elim ina
tion o f barter trade, and, m ost fun
damentally, the lack o f opportunity
to sell at a profit what is locally pro
duced. If the lifting of the em bargo
would encourage such changes,
then it would be worthwhile. But
let me repeat: the political realities
in the US are such that a whole
sale, unilateral, lifting o f the em 
bargo is perhaps not possible. W hat
m ight be possible is a negotiated
quid pro quo—specific econom ic
openings in exchange for specific
political changes in Cuba.
Now that the C uban economy
has been “dollarized”—an admis
sion that the inform al econom y is
m ore im portant than the com 
m and economy—the time is right
to facilitate fu rth er change and re
form. T here is no absolute guaran
tee that such a m easure will work.
Yet, when balanced against the fu
tility o f 33 years o f political and
econom ic stagnation, the risk is
certainly worth taking. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts of testi
mony presented to the US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, July 29,
1993.
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The Social Safety Net Unravels
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

--------rior to the collapse of so
cialism in Eastern Europe
and the USSR, Cuba had
the m ost com prehensive,
generous, and costly state
social safety net (SSN)
am ong all those countries, as well
as in Latin America. T hat feat was
largely possible because o f the enor
m ous econom ic aid provided by
the USSR and the Council for Mu
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
T he disappearance o f the latter has
g enerated a severe econom ic crisis.
As the economy has fallen, the bur
d en o f the SSN has becom e unbear
able. T he crisis is quite evident in
the areas o f health care, education,
em ploym ent, social security, hous
ing, and, m ore broadly, in general
patterns o f consum ption.

The Boom and Deterioration
of Health Care
By the end of the 1980s, Cuba
had one o f the m ost com prehen
sive free health-care systems in the
world, yielding some of the highest
health standards on the planet.
Cuba led Latin America and the
socialist world in virtually all health
indicators: infant mortality was only
11 p er 1,000 (the lowest in all Latin
Am erican and socialist countries);
life expectancy reached 75 years
(m atched only by Costa Rica); there
were 33 physicians p er 10,000 in
habitants (equaled only by the
USSR and Czechoslovakia); and

Carmelo Mesa-Lago is the Distin
guished Service Professor of Economics
and Latin American Studies at the Uni
versity of Pittsburgh. He is the editor of
Cuba after the Cold War (University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
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there were 5.3 hospital beds per
10,000 inhabitants (superseded
only by Argentina, Uruguay, and
the USSR). Although the most
im portant health-care problem s
had been solved by 1986, Cuba
launched a costly family doctor
program that covered 67% o f the
population by 1992, but, in the
midst of severe scarcities, was a
wasteful extravagance. A nother
indication o f waste was a national
hospital-bed occupancy rate o f less
than 73% and an average rate of
almost 10 days of hospital stay; the
first was low by international stan
dards, the second clearly excessive.
C uba’s health-care system was
therefore one o f the w orld’s most
capital intensive, costly, and waste
ful. Such largesse was possible
mainly because o f generous Soviet
econom ic aid to Cuba— estim ated
at $65 billion between 1960 and
1990. US social scientist Kathleen
B arrett has amply docum ented the

devastating im pact o f the collapse
of the Soviet bloc on C uba’s health
care system.
According to Barrett, Cuban
health care has been plagued by a
n um ber o f shortages, most o f which
are associated with the deprivation
stem m ing from the collapse of
socialism in Eastern Europe and
the USSR. These shortages are led
by a sharp decline in CMEA im
ports of drugs and medical equip
m ent, as well as raw materials,
required to produce 85% o f the
m edicines consum ed in Cuba.
This has resulted in the virtual dis
appearance o f 229 drugs (includ
ing antibiotics, anesthetics, asthm a
m edicine, and insulin). O th er ba
sic supplies, such as sutures, x-ray
plates, and surgical gloves are also
scarce. T he lack o f condom s and
antibiotics has com bined with the
increase in tourism and prostitu
tion to create a fast expansion in
venereal diseases. Cases o f syphilis

and g onorrhea ju m p ed twofold be
tween 1980 and 1989, and the situa
tion was reportedly worse between
1990 and 1992.
While n o t directly connected
with the practice of m edicine,
the scarcity o f o th er vital m ate
rials— spare parts for am bulances,
operating pum ps for the public
water system, and insecticide used
in com bating malarial m osqui
toes—seriously im pairs the health
care infrastructure. T he lack of raw
m aterials for m aking soap renders
the m aintenance of personal hy
giene m uch m ore difficult. Fuel
reductions affect everything from
garbage pick-up (which sometimes
does n o t occur for m onths) to the
refrigeration of blood supplies.
Food shortages have re-introduced
the specter of m alnutrition-rooted
diseases, such as the optic neurop
athy blam ed on a deficiency of
B com plex vitamins.
Not surprisingly, growing stress
on the population has probably in
creased ulcers, hypertension, and
cardiac and m ental diseases. The
tightening o f the US em bargo and
US pressure on W estern European
countries and Jap an no t to export
to Cuba have aggravated these scar
cities and problem s.
B arrett reports that the govern
m en t has taken several m easures to
cope with the health crisis:
■ Scarce m edicine and food have
been reserved for vulnerable
groups such as pregnant m oth
ers, children below the age of
seven, the elderly, and those with
chronic diseases.
■ Traditional and herbal m edicine,
therm al waters, and acupuncture
are used even in the best hospi
tals (e.g., acupuncture has re
placed anesthetics for surgery
and a powder m ade of crusty
shells is used to heal w ounds).
■ Patients are treated at hom e
whenever possible, thus reducing
hospital admissions and length
o f stay (but increasing u n d er
utilized services).
■ Diagnosis is increasingly done
with clinical exam inations rather
than tests.

■ The reduction of fat and m eat
consum ption, com bined with an
increase in exercise (i.e., riding
bicycles), is claim ed to have re
duced cholesterol levels (but con
sum ption o f eggs has increased,
m ore accidents may be occurring
because of bikes, and m alnutri
tion has grown).
■ A new program m onitors health
care using family doctors to de
tect diseases, but it lacks the m edi
cations necessary to cure m ost of
them.

These policies are a
mere survival strategy.
The crisis can only be
solved ivith massive
aid and imports
that are unlikely to
materialize in the
nearfuture.

B arrett concludes that these pol
icies are a m ere survival strategy
and that the crisis can only be
solved with massive aid and im
ports that are unlikely to m aterial
ize in the near future. She reports
widespread skepticism and cyni
cism on the part o f a population
besieged by all types o f difficulties,
while simultaneously bom barded
by governm ent claims that health
standards are improving. Some of
the physicians and public health
officials she interviewed acknow
ledged—in private— the deteriora
tion o f health standards and the
potential for epidem ic. Barrett
observes that health statistics have
n o t been released for three years,
probably because they are negative
and—in view of the political stat
ure o f health care—would dam age
the image o f the revolution abroad.

Educational Standards,
Costs, and Crisis
All levels of education are free in
Cuba. T here is universal access to
elem entary school and nearly uni
versal access to secondary educa
tion; entrance to higher education
is conditioned on exams and quotas.
Between 1953 and 1970 C uba’s
illiteracy rate was alm ost halved;
by 1990 it had declined to 16% of
the 1953 level and was 25% of the
Latin Am erican average. In 1987
virtually the entire population of
elementary-school age was enrolled,
as were 88% o f those o f secondaryschool age (a sixfold increase over
1960) and 23% o f those of college
age (7.6 times that of 1960).
While the ratio of students per
teacher was 16 in 1979-80, it fell to
10 in 1989-90. At the beginning of
the 1990s C uba’s m ean years of
schooling was 7.6, similar to that
o f the Soviet bloc and twice the
average o f the developing world.
Fellowships that, in addition to free
education, included food, clothing,
and shelter were awarded to 43%
of all students enrolled in secon
dary school in 1989-90 and to 28%
of all students enrolled in higher
education. In 1988-89 there were
6,029 Cubans with fellowships en 
rolled in higher education abroad.
In addition, there were 4,660 for
eign students enrolled in higher
education in Cuba, and as many as
22,000 in all educational levels who
received those services free. Many
had C uban fellowships in addition.
As a percentage of gross social
product (GSP), educational expen
ditures increased from 4.2% in
1970 to 6.8% in 1990. The latter
was almost twice the average p ro
portion o f the developing world
and Latin America (3.5%) and
higher than the average o f the in
dustrial world (5.9%). Because of
declining GSP in 1990-92, the Cu
ban share o f educational expenses
probably increased, with estimates
ranging from 8.5% to 13% o f GSP
in 1992.
The C uban governm ent has
tried to m aintain educational
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standards during the crisis, bu t it
has been forced to make im portant
cuts and changes. Unlike health
care, however, we lack detailed in
form ation on the im pact of the
collapse of the Soviet bloc on the
quality of C uban education.
Fidel Castro claims that no
schools have been closed and that
there is no paucity of books and
o th er utensils. R ecent visitors to
Cuba rep o rt otherwise. They claim
there are grave shortages o f books,
paper, and chalk in schools, as well
as a reduction in student meals.
Part of the textbook deficit can be
attributed to the fact that very few
books are now im ported. About
30% o f the raw m aterial used in
the dom estic production o f paper
is wood pulp (the rest is sugarcane
bagasse), which used to be im
p o rted at very low prices from
Eastern Europe and the USSR; it
now m ust be bought through the
world m arket in hard currency. In
addition, 25-30% of paper output
is wasted due to obsolete technol
ogy, lack o f spare parts, inadequate
raw m aterial, and labor and quality
control problem s. T he scarcity of
books is so severe that a small book
fair organized at the end o f 1992
drew a line three-city blocks long.
T he decline in production and
supply comes at a time when most
of C uba’s textbooks are in need of
revision or replacem ent. T he col
lapse of socialism in the Soviet bloc
has forced education officials to
drastically review textbooks (e.g.,
on econom ics and Marxism) that
used to be published by those coun
tries, and significant changes are
being introduced in the curriculum.
With the Soviet bloc transition,
virtually all Cubans studying in
those countries retu rn ed hom e
or asked for asylum. T he alterna
tive, th at o f sending Cubans to
study in hard-currency countries,
is precluded by the scarcity o f re
sources. To com pensate, the gov
ern m en t has relaxed the restric
tions on C uban scientists going
abroad for training in developed
m arket countries, and is encourag
ing groups of technical personnel
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to work abroad and share their
earnings with the state.
Prior to the crisis, em phasis was
placed on form al academic train
ing, as opposed to vocational educa
tion. T hat priority was inconsistent
with the labor m arket’s needs and
is even m ore incongruous now in
term s of prospects for em ploym ent
generation. In 1989-90, 76% of
students who had com pleted ele
m entary school were enrolled in
secondary, pre-university, or higher

Living conditions
among the elderly
and pensioners have
rapidly deteriorated.
Old people lack
transportation to
receive medical
attention and cannot
stand in long lines
for food.

education, while only 24% were
enrolled in technical-professional
(20.3%), special (3% ), and voca
tional (0.5%) schools. In 1991-92,
however, the Ministerio de Edu
cation established that 60% of
students would go to vocational
schools and only 40% to pre-uni
versity schools; many of the latter
were being converted into voca
tional schools.

Employment and Social Security
T hroughout the revolution, a pol
icy o f full em ploym ent has been
pursued that now faces enorm ous
difficulties. In 1970 open unem 
ploym ent registered its lowest rate:

1.3% o f the labor force—virtually
full em ployment. U nderem ploy
m ent, however, was enorm ous in
the state sector, which em braces
95% of the labor force. As the mild
econom ic reform s introduced in
1971-85 released part o f the hid
den labor surplus, the rate o f u nem 
ploym ent rose to about 6% during
m ost of the 1980s. Most o f these
idle workers, nevertheless, contin
ued receiving their wages and were
p u t on a “reserve” until they found
o ther jobs. T he crisis of the 1990s
has severely aggravated this prob
lem as probably 80% of factories
have been shut down, transporta
tion is virtually paralyzed, and
electricity production, as well as
com m erce and entertain m en t ac
tivities, have declined dramatically.
In 1992 an estim ated 10-18% o f the
labor force was inactive and most
o f it (as well as young workers en
tering the m arket after graduation)
was u n d er some type of unem ploy
m ent com pensation.
In the early 1990s Cuba had the
m ost com prehensive and liberal
social security system in both Latin
America and the socialist world. Vir
tually all the labor force was enti
tled to pensions (old age, disability,
and survivors), as well as paid leave
for sickness and m aternity. Employ
ers alone contributed to this fund.
T he age of retirem en t was lower in
Cuba than in the four m ost socially
advanced Latin Am erican coun
tries, but the island’s life expectan
cy was higher. T he average pension
replaced 90% o f the salary previous
to retirem ent, which was quite gen
erous in the wider Latin American
and socialist perspective. Relaxa
tion of requirem ents for pensions
took place in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, which, com bined with
poor financing, led to a 40% defi
cit in the system. This deficit was
automatically covered by the al
ready overstretched state budget.
Still, living conditions am ong the
elderly and pensioners have rapidly
deteriorated: old people lack trans
portation to receive medical atten
tion as well as essential drugs, they
cannot stand in the long queues in

front o f state stores that may last
six or seven hours, and, because
their m inim um pension equals
about US$1 in the black market,
they cannot buy adequate food.
Estimates o f the cost o f C uba’s
SSN in 1992 (com bining health
care, education, and social security
expenditures) range from 22% to
34% o f GSP—n o t including the
costs o f consum er goods subsidies
and unem ploym ent com pensation.
As GSP was cut by half in 1992-93,
the burden o f the SSN becam e
intolerable.

Housing Shortages
In contrast with the developm ent
o f o th er social services, housing
has been seriously neglected in
Cuba. C uba’s housing deficit was
an estim ated 655,000 units at the
beginning of the revolution. From
1960 to 1980 n o t only was the
am ount o f housing constructed
severely inadequate but a good
part o f the existing stock disap
peared because o f lack of m ainte
nance: the governm ent neglected
repairs o f public housing and those
residents who own their hom es
lacked construction materials to
m aintain them . Even as the popu
lation growth rate declined, these
problem s raised the housing deficit
considerably.
In the early 1980s the expanded
availability of m ore construction
m aterials to build and repair pri
vate housing construction by the
state m eant that the housing deficit
grew by only 1%. In 1985, however,
the deficit was 36% higher than in
1959. For the years since then, the
scarce data indicate substantial
worsening of the situation. The
new housing law enacted in 1988
tightened the rules for private con
struction and exchange while state
construction also decreased.
U n d er the first wave of adjust
m en t m easures in 1990, housing ex
penditures were cut by 20%, and in
1991-92 there was a virtual freeze
in housing construction (except
for labor camps in the countryside).
In spite of C astro’s claim that con

struction m icrobrigades would
build 100,000 dwelling units an
nually, they built only 18,315 units
from 1986 to 1989. C em ent produc
tion has sharply decreased and it is
impossible to get the needed m ate
rials for repairs. By 1992 the hous
ing deficit probably surpassed the
one m illion mark. Furtherm ore,
the housing stock is rapidly dete
riorating: in some Havana neigh
borhoods m ost buildings are
propped up.

HOUSING DEFICIT
Millions of units
+1--------------------

.8

cuts in consum ption u n d er the
revolution: 15% in 1989-91 and
m uch m ore in 1991-92.
By the beginning of 1993 vir
tually every consum er good in
Cuba was rationed. It is estim ated
that current rationing quotas (as
sum ing they are fulfilled in prac
tice, which is n o t usually the case)
only satisfy 14 days o f the popula
tio n ’s m inim um food needs. In
1989, 57% o f the protein and 51%
of the calories consum ed in Cuba
came from imports. T he result is
that the daily caloric intake de
clined from 3,103 in the mid-1980s
to 2,000 in 1992, below the m ini
m um standards set by the World
H ealth Organization.

Restructuring the SSN

ill
1959-63

1970

1985

1992

Source: Based on Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Historia
Economica de Cuba Socialista (forthcoming)

Consumption Levels
C onsum ption o f essential consum er
goods has been quite restricted u n 
d er the revolution. R ationing was
introduced in 1962 and rapidly
expanded to cover m ost consum er
goods. Between 1966 and 1970 the
num ber o f goods rationed was ex
panded and their physical quotas
reduced, but u n d er the mild eco
nom ic reform of 1971-85 there
was some im provem ent in both
liberating goods from rationing
and increasing the quotas. In ad
dition, the quotas could be sup
plem ented by purchases in the
state-parallel, free-peasant, and
artisan markets. T he Proceso de
Rectification launched in 1986,
com bined with the collapse of so
cialism in the Soviet bloc and the
“Special Period in Time o f Peace”
in the early 1990s led to the worst

It should be evident from this
analysis that different social poli
cies—geared to the short and longru n — should be im plem ented in
both the transition period and
later, as a full-market econom y is
approached. It is im portant to
avoid the introduction of perm a
n e n t rights that could no t be fi
nancially feasible in the long run.
Scarce resources should be tar
geted to protect the m ost vulner
able groups, and clear priorities set
to preserve or cut program s and
specific benefits.
T he shares of the various pro
grams within C uba’s SSN should be
restructured according to the fol
lowing guidelines:
■ Social security expenditures
should be cut by tightening en
titlem ent conditions for both
pensions and sickness-maternity
m onetary benefits.
■ H ealth and education expendi
tures should be reduced (as their
infrastructure and personnel are
m ore than sufficient) through
im proved efficiency.
■ Subsidies to prices and en ter
prises should be elim inated.
■ U nem ploym ent com pensation
should be extended (as the num 
ber o f jobless will expand), but its
entitlem ent conditions should be
tightened.
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■ Social assistance expenditures
should be expanded to protect
the poorest and most vulnerable
groups.
A lthough the bulk of the SSN
in socialist countries is furnished
and financed by the central govern
m ent, state enterprises usually p ro
vide some m onetary benefits such
as: occupational accident insur
ance, sickness and m aternity paid
leaves, partial disability and provi
sional pensions, funeral aid, and
subsidized cafeterias. As these en 
terprises are privatized it will be
necessary to develop a new infra
structure and funding to sustain
such benefits. Furtherm ore, several
socialist countries in transition (as
well as Latin Am erican nations)
have decentralized social program s
by transferring them to local gov
ernm ents. They have failed, how
ever, to provide adequate financing.
Administrative decentralization is
norm ally a positive developm ent,
b u t it should n o t be used as a trick
to cut benefits.

The SSN in socialist countries—
including Cuba—is financed by the
central governm ent and state enter
prises at virtually no charge to the
user. In the transition to the full
m arket, the financial burden on
employers should be balanced with
em ployees’ contributions, user fees
for some health services, etc. The
state burden should be reduced by
those techniques, as well as increas
ing the participation o f the private
sector.
Part of any international aid
provided to help finance the
transition in Cuba should be al
located to defray a portion of the
cost of the SSN, particularly in its
first stage, through direct aid to
the needy. Such action would
facilitate the shutdown of ineffi
cient enterprises; reduce pressure
on the governm ent to p rin t money
and increase the budgetary deficit;
enable the governm ent to reduce
o r elim inate subsidies for con
sum er goods; aid in stabilizing
the m onetary currency; and

generate political support for the
reform .
If an adequate SSN is n o t pro
vided, there will be serious political
and econom ic costs. A consensus
or social pact will either be impossi
ble to achieve or, if initially estab
lished, will rapidly vanish. Strong
popular opposition to the needed
m arket reform s will obstruct their
passage and enforcem ent or re
verse those m easures already im
plem ented. T he probability of
violence and authoritarianism will
increase, and there will be a high
risk o f massive em igration to the
US. T he lesson is that early invest
m ent in a C uban SSN would be less
costly than repairing the dam age
created by the lack o f it. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited excerptsfrom
“Transition in Cuba: New Challenges
for US Policy, ”a study prepared for the
US Department of State by the Cuban
Research Institute at Florida Interna
tional University.
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and its legacy
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Argueta, Pedro Albizu Campos,
Ernesto Cardenal, Ruben Dario,
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Garcia Marquez, Rigoberta
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T he Network o f Educators on the Am ericas (NECA) d istributes additional titles for teaching about the A m ericas. R equest a catalogue. For
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inform ed introduction to Puerto R ican life today.” - Dr. R ina B enm ayor, Center fo r Puerto Rican Studies , Hunter College.

H em isphere

•

Sum m er/F all 1993

Seized Properties vs. Embargo Losses
by Archibald R. M. Ritter

hould Cuba pay com pen
sation to US citizens for
properties seized without
paym ent between 1959
and 1961? Should the
US pay com pensation to
Cuba in view of the damages to the
econom y and the harm to the m ate
rial welfare of Cubans that resulted
from the embargo? These questions
do n o t have quick or easy answers.
T he norm alization of C uba’s
place in the international financial
and trading system requires a reso
lution o f its d eb t problem and the
issue of com pensation for the prop
erties of US nationals seized be
tween 1959 and 1961—a time of
radicalization in Cuba and deterio
rating relations with the US. The
cu rren t value o f the properties ex
propriated is estim ated to be $5.3
billion. At the same time, however,
there are indications that Cuba is
considering a $28 billion counter
claim against the US for damages
due to the em bargo.
C oncerning com pensation for
nationalization, international law
and p reced en t are reasonably u n 
ambiguous. Indeed, C uba’s 1959
“F undam ental Law of the Revolu
tio n ” recognized the appropriate
ness of com pensation, and, in fact,
Cuba has com pensated the nation
als of o th er foreign countries for
the expropriation of their proper-

Archibald R. M. Ritter is a professor in
the Norman Paterson School of Interna
tional Affairs and the Department of
Economics at Carleton University in
Ottawa, Canada. He is the co-editor
(with M. Cameron and D. Pollock) of
Latin America to the Year 2000:
Reactivating Growth, Im proving
Equity, Sustaining Democracy
(Praeger, 1992).

ties during 1959-61. In contrast,
there appears to be no body o f in
ternational law relating to em bar
goes or econom ic sanctions. While
law may not support any claim that
Cuba may make for losses arising
from the US em bargo, a sense of
fairness and equity would suggest
that the severe dam age that the em 
bargo was designed to impose on
Cuba should not be ignored in fu
ture negotiations on com pensation.

Fairness suggests that
the damage caused by
the embargo should
not be ignored in
future negotiations
on compensation for
expropriated property.

Some Ethical Questions
T here are a num ber o f reasons why
Cuba should pay com pensation for
the expropriated properties. First,
in m ost countries, governm ents are
legally required to protect citizens
and businesses from dam ages aris
ing from arbitrary governm ent
actions, as well as to refrain from
imposing such dam ages in the first
place. Thus, while governm ents are
entitled to acquire properties for
the well-being of society, it is con
sidered appropriate that they in
demnify the original owners of

these expropriated properties.
Second, the Cuban governm ent
did com pensate the citizens and
businesses o f countries such as Can
ada, Spain, and Switzerland. Cuba
also allowed for some com pensa
tion— though it was no t paid— to
landowners whose lands were be
ing nationalized u n d er the first
agrarian reform law o f May 1959;
these lands included the large hold
ings of some US com panies, espe
cially in sugar. Third, the Cuban
governm ent initially agreed to com 
pensate US nationals for some of
the m ajor nationalizations o f prop
erties, but the term s of repaym ent
did no t appear reasonable.
O n the o ther hand, there are a
num ber o f grounds on which, argu
ably, com pensation for the expro
priation of US properties should
no t be paid. First, if the properties
had been acquired in the first place
through theft or corrupt practices,
then com pensation would n o t be
appropriate. (The properties
seized from Batista and his close
associates in February 1959 were
allegedly acquired illegally, and, as
a result, they did no t receive com 
pensation; this policy was widely
viewed as reasonable.) T here were,
however, no allegations at the time
that the expropriated US pro p er
ties were illegally acquired, and to
my knowledge this argum ent has
not been m ade since.
Second, it m ight be argued that
the US enterprises that were ex
propriated had paid adequate or
m ore-than-adequate returns to
their owners through profit repa
triation or o ther m eans (i.e., trans
fer pricing or expatriate employee
rem ittances). This may have been
the case, but it would now be dif
ficult to determ ine if it was indeed.
Nonetheless, w hether this justifies
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nonpaym ent of com pensation or
n o t is a m atter open to question.
T hird, should current and future
generations of Cubans be liable for
the actions, policies, o r errors of
the Cuban leadership between 1959
and 1961? H ere one could con
clude that, ju st as we do no t hold
children responsible for the ac
tions of their parents, Cubans to
day should n o t have to pay for the
earlier actions o f their governm ent.
While this appears to apply in crim
inal law and everyday life, it does
n o t seem to apply to finance and
economics (or the environm ent),
where future generations in fact do
assume responsibility for domestic
fiscal debts and external debts (as
well as environm ental damages)
incurred by earlier generations for
short-term gains.
Fourth, it m ight be argued that
the particular com pensation ar
rangem ents proposed and the fail
ure to provide any com pensation
m ust be viewed within the specific
historical context of 1959-61, that
is, the deterioration o f relations
with the US that led ultimately to
the em bargo and the rupture of
diplom atic ties. If the US had not
been applying pressures on the
Cuban governm ent in order to in
fluence the design of public policy
and to defend the econom ic and
strategic interests of the US, or to
destabilize or overthrow the C uban
governm ent, perhaps neither the
em bargo and the diplomatic break
n o r the radicalization of the revolu
tion would have occurred. In this
case, a m ore reasonable com pensa
tion arrangem ent m ight have been
proposed, negotiated, and accepted.
If the ru p tu re o f econom ic and
political relations had been purely
the result of unilateral US actions,
then perhaps one could argue that
the proposed com pensation pack
age and the nonpaym ent of com 
pensation were a natural and
reasonable response. T he rupture
o f relations, however, was no t sim
ply the result o f unilateral action by
the US to which Cuba responded
by nonpaym ent o f com pensation.
Instead, it was an action-counter-
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US CLAIMS
($ U S M illio n s)

Cuban Electric

797.5

ITT

389.5

North American Sugar

324.8

Moa Bay Mining

263.1

United Fruit Sugar

253.6

West Indies Sugar

253.0

American Sugar

241.4

Standard Oil

213.4

Bangor Punta

159.1

Francisco Sugar

156.7

Texaco

149.3

Manati Sugar

144.8

Nicaro Nickel

98.3

Coca-Cola

82.0

New Tuinueu Sugar

69.4

Lone-Star Cement

65.3

Colgate Palmolive

42.9

Braga Brothers

37.5

Broise Cascade

34.9

American Brands

31.6

Atlantic Richfield

30.4

Burns Mills

29.2

Pan American Life Insurance

28.9

United States Rubber

28.3

F. W. Woolworth

27.4

Havana Docks

26.8

Continental Can

26.5

Firestone Tire and Rubber

24.7

International Han/ester

24.7

Owens-Illinois

24.1

General Motors

22.9

Chase Manhattan

21.8

IBM World Trade

19.1

First National City Bank

18.5

Swift

17.9

First National Bank, Boston

17.6

General Electric

17.6

Libby

17.0

Goodyear Tire and Rubber

15.2

Sears Roebuck

11.0

Reynolds Metals

10.1

Lykes Brothers

10.1

Sherwin Williams

10.1

Note: For compensation under the
Cuban claims program of the US
Federal Claims Settlement Commission
Source: Updated data based on
Business International Corporation
(New York), March 1992

action p h enom enon with both
Cuba and the US responding to
the actions o f the o th er—cycles
characterized on both sides by mis
calculation, provocation, brinkm an
ship, and recklessness. T he Cuban
governm ent bears a share of the
responsibility for the course of
events in its relationship with the
US. Indeed the revolutionary lead
ership welcomed the cancellation
o f the sugar quota and the eco
nom ic em bargo, at least in their
official statem ents. They seem ed to
willingly participate in the escala
tion of econom ic animosities be
tween the two countries.
Thus it would be difficult to
argue that Cuba should be freed
from an obligation to pay com pen
sation on the grounds that it was
the victim of purely unilateral ac
tion on the part of the US. O n the
o ther hand, the US was also an ac
tive participant in the course of
events that m ade it difficult, and
then, after the diplom atic rupture,
impossible for Cuba to negotiate or
pay com pensation.
A fifth argum ent is that, while
u n d er an obligation to pay com
pensation, Cuba has already paid a
num ber o f times over through the
dam ages caused by the econom ic
em bargo. Such dam ages were in
flicted intentionally, they were
genuine, and they were serious.
T he value of such dam ages is
probably impossible to determ ine.
Should the US be liable for the
dam ages caused to an o th er coun
try through im position o f an em 
bargo on that country? Again this
is a difficult question. Are coun
tries u n d er a m oral o r legal obliga
tion to trade with each other, or is
this merely a m atter o f m utual con
venience? To my knowledge, no
analyst, philosopher, or policy
m aker has proposed th at when a
country imposes tariff or nontariff
barriers to trade or investm ent that
there should be com pensation for
the foreign enterprises or coun
tries that are dam aged by such ac
tion. N or was it argued that the
OPEC countries should com pen
sate the oil im porting low-income

countries for the econom ic injuries
caused by oil em bargo or subse
q u en t higher oil prices. But when
a very large country imposes an
econom ic em bargo on a small
country whose econom y is closely
integrated into that o f the large
country, is the form er liable in
some ethical senses for the damages
inflicted on the latter? Perhaps.
From a legal standpoint, however,
there would appear to be no such
liability. Can a similar argum ent be
m ade for the Bay o f Pigs Invasion
or o th er covert actions?
Should Cuba be asked to make
com pensation when its foreign ex
change earnings have fallen pre
cipitously in real terms, when its
internal econom y has been in
turm oil as a result o f the disrup
tions in relations with Eastern Eu
rope and the form er Soviet U nion,
and w hen the difficulties o f a tran
sition to a m ore decentralized and
export-oriented economy are just
beginning to be felt? W hatever the
governm ent, should Cuba then be
asked to make com pensation pay
m ents involving real n et resource
transfers out of the country? Prob
ably not.

Legal Dimensions
International law and established
preced en t seem to be reasonably
clear on the issues o f com pensa
tion for nationalization. Indeed,
with the exception of US claimants,
Cuba appears to have agreed with
the principle and practice o f com 
pensating enterprises and indi
viduals whose properties were
nationalized. O n the o th er hand,
there appears to be no body o f in
ternational law or established set of
precedents concerning com pen
sation payments to a country that
has faced econom ic sanctions, em 
bargoes, or covert destabilization
im posed by a large country on a
smaller neighbor. The established
corpus of law thus appears to favor
the com pensation claims of the US.
T he standard approach to na
tionalization and com pensation
from 1959 through to the present

is that nationalization is acceptable
when carried out for a legitimate
public purpose. T he m anner of im
plem entation m ust be nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory, and
com pensation (if it is to be pro
vided) m ust be “prom pt, adequate,
and effective.” Most countries have
bodies of law that incorporate these
essential elem ents, and Latin Amer
ica is no exception. C uba’s Consti
tution o f 1940 and Article 24 of
the Fundam ental Law of the Rev
olution (adopted in 1959) were
consistent with international law.
Article 24 perm itted nationaliza
tion: . . for duly established
reasons o f public utility or social
interest, and in every case after pay
m ent in cash of proper com pensa
tion, the am ount o f which will be
determ ined by the court.”
International law concerning
nationalization and com pensation
m ight be described generally as
follows. First, nationalization is le
gitim ate when undertaken for pur
poses o f public interest. This may
include general social and eco
nomic reform , and specifically, the
nationalization of large-scale land
holdings or latifundia when this
accomplishes m ore equitable land
tenure patterns, m ore equitable
patterns o f incom e distribution,
reduced poverty, and social justice.
Thus, C uba’s First Agrarian Reform
Law has been considered an accept
able rationale for nationalization
in term s o f public interest. Second,
nationalization is supposed to be
nondiscrim inatory and nonretalia
tory. It is supposed to focus on tar
get groups equitably rath er than
being directed specifically against a
particular ethnic, religious, racial,
or national group. It also is not sup
posed to be undertaken in retalia
tion for actions o f an o th er party or
governm ent. Third, com pensation
m ust be paid, and the com pensa
tion is supposed to be “prom pt,
adequate, and effective.” T here has
been some disagreem ent over the
term s o f com pensation. Im m ediate
paym ent o f cash for the m arket
value o f a nationalized property
would certainly be highly “prom pt,

adequate, and effective.” T he
“prom ptness” criterion, however,
can be stretched out to 20 years or
m ore with paym ent in installm ents
or the issuing of bonds payable in
the future, presumably earning a
reasonable interest.
G reater controversy centers on
what constitutes “adequate” com 
pensation. Should this be the m ar
ket value of the property, before or
after expropriation is proposed?
Should it be the tax assessed value
(which is usually substantially be
low the m arket-determ ined value)?
How is “effective” com pensation to
be defined? Does this require pay
m ent in convertible foreign cur
rency or can local inconvertible
currency be employed? For foreign
owners, com pensation would be
of lim ited value if it could n o t be
translated into a currency of use to
them . In m ost cases this would ne
cessitate paym ent in a foreign cur
rency, or some arrangem ent to
perm it convertibility.
Did C uba’s nationalization law
and processes conform to the com 
monly accepted international law
and precedent? O n that score, the
First Agrarian Reform Law seems
to have been largely acceptable
and accepted:
■ It was undertaken for a purpose
of legitim ate public interest,
namely, to reconstitute the lati
fundia into different property
forms and improve economic
and social equity.
■ It was no t passed in retaliation
against the policies of a foreign
governm ent.
■ It was no t im plem ented with
discrim ination against specific
ethnic, national, or religious
groups—although it was directed
at large-scale landholdings.
The com pensation provisions of
this law—paym ent through the is
suance of bonds serviced in Cuban
currency—were dubious with re
spect to the “effectiveness” crite
rion, because the C uban peso was
no t convertible and the exchange
controls would have m ade the
transfer o f funds out of Cuba dif
ficult. As it turned out, however,
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COSTS TO CUBA OF THE US ECONOMIC EMBARGO
($US M illio ns )

Loss of Preferential US Sugar Market

4,676

Increased Inventory Requirements

1,990

Monetary and Financial Costs

3,128

Geographical Reorientation of Trade: Transport Costs

5,921

Losses to the Tourist Sector

3,508

Losses to Other Economic Sectors

9,224

Losses to Public Health, Culture, and Sport

234

Additional Infrastructure Investments Required

1,732

Loss of Access to US Technology

2,318

Loss of Human Capital through Emigration

1,779

Blockage of Attempts to Renegotiate the Debt (to 1990)

3,303

Obstacles to Financing through Unconventional Channels
Total

84
37,897

Source: Based on Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas (Havana), September 1992

the relevant lands, buildings, equip
m ent, and cattle were seized, often
w ithout court order, appraisal, or
receipt. This would have m ade a
systematic and equitable paym ent
of com pensation difficult. N one
theless, no com pensation bonds
were issued or apparently even
printed; no formal valuations of
the affected properties for com
pensation purposes were m ade
public; and no com pensation was
ultimately paid.
T he various interventions o f US
enterprises th at were undertaken
were considered initially to be
tem porary rath er than full nation
alizations. For this reason the
com pensation issue did no t arise
initially. In time, however, the
interventions becam e full nation
alizations—mainly after the enact
m en t of Nationalization Law 851
on July 6, 1960.
Law 851 appears to be dubious
with respect to its im plem entation
and com pensation provisions. First,
the law was explicitly retaliatory,
aim ed, as it was, at US-owned prop
erties and in direct response to the
action o f the US Congress authoriz
ing the president to cut C uba’s
preferential sugar quota. Law 851
was discrim inatory in that it af
fected only properties owned by
US citizens.
T he com pensation provisions of
Law 851 appeared to be designed

H em isphere

•

Sum m er/F all 1993

to be unacceptable, although it
is also possible that the Cubans
thought that this m ight be a good
position from which to begin nego
tiations on com pensation. T he pro
visions called for:
• paym ent in 30-year bonds, with
2% interest rate payable on un
am ortized balances;
■ am ortization and interest to be
paid with 25% o f the proceeds
from US sugar purchase in excess
of 3 m illion long tons (2,240
pounds p er ton) and with reve
nues accruing when the price
exceeded 5.75 cents p er pound.
■ annual interest that could no t be
paid w hen the previous-cited con
ditions did not occur would be
considered canceled.
It would have been difficult for
the US to accept these com pensa
tion provisions. C uba’s quota in
the preferential US m arket, where
price was a good deal m ore than
the world price, averaged about
2.6 million short tons (at 2,000
pounds p er ton) from 1952 to 1959.
To increase C uba’s quota further
in order to perm it com pensation
to be paid, the US would have had
to reduce the quota shares of other
foreign suppliers or of its own beet
and cane sugar producers in order
to make space for increased im
ports from Cuba.
In any case, neither the US nor
Cuba was bluffing. T he US re

sponded to Law 851 by cutting the
sugar quota— though only for a
three-m onth period—beginning in
October. Cuba did no t back down.
Instead, it reacted by accelerating
the nationalization process. With
the im position o f the em bargo
(O ctober 19), extension of the
sugar quota, and the diplomatic
rupture, Cuba argued th at the US
had m ade it impossible for it—as
well as unjustifiable— to pay com 
pensation. Thus, there was never a
serious negotiation or discussion of
the com pensation proposals of Law
851. This is where the issue rem ains
to this day.
In contrast to the existence of
the reasonably well-elaborated body
o f law dealing with com pensation
for nationalization there appears
to be no international law on com
pensation for the im pact o f em bar
goes, econom ic sanctions, boycotts,
or any refusal of a country to trade,
or have econom ic interaction on
an o th er country. Em bargoes or
sanctions are usually im posed on
one country by an o th er country or
group o f countries in order to pres
sure the country to desist from cer
tain actions, to change certain
policies, or to comply with certain
internationally accepted standards
o f behavior. The countries subject
to such sanctions obviously have no
recourse to com pensation.

Law vs. Fairness
In o ther cases, countries have im
posed em bargoes in o rd er to effect
changes in the policies o f o th er
countries a n d /o r to exercise collu
sive power to increase export reve
nues. T he OPEC oil em bargo of
1973 is an obvious case in point.
T here is no law that says a country
or countries im posing an export
em bargo for whatever reason then
has to com pensate the losing coun
tries for the higher prices of their
imports. F urtherm ore, countries
may impose im port restrictions or
prohibitions for a variety of rea
sons. A considerable body of trade
law, codified u n d er the General
A greem ent on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT), attem pts to limit the im
position o f tariff or nontariff bar
riers to trade. Again, however,
there is no recourse to com pen
sation for countries dam aged by
such actions. Retaliation by the ag
grieved party is the only possible
response if appeals through the
GATT fail. In this situation, small
countries that are highly d ep en d 
en t on a trade or b roader eco
nom ic relationship (e.g., capital
flows, tourism, and w orkers’ rem it
tances) are vulnerable to the unilat
eral action of the larger econom ic
partner. Only the m utual accep
tance o f fair “rules o f the gam e” as
in terp reted and ruled upon by a
m ultilateral agreem ent such as the
GATT or a formal bilateral trade
agreem ent can constrain econom ic
policies on the part of a large coun
try th at severely dam age the econ
omy and m aterial well-being of a
small trading partner.
T here appears to be no recourse
in international law for com pensa
tion for the econom ic dam ages im
posed on one country as a result of
the trade or o th er econom ic poli
cies of an o th er country. Thus in
ternational law does not provide
m uch if any support or encourage
m ent to Cuba if it should try to ob
tain recognition, valuation, and
com pensation for any of the dam 
ages im posed u p o n it by the em 
bargo and the break of virtually all
econom ic relations with the US.
Nonetheless, international law is
n o t necessarily the same thing as
fairness or equity.

the dam ages inflicted by a hostile
neighbor through the imposition
o f a trade boycott, econom ic em 
bargo, political destabilization, or
even through invasion.
A basic sense of equity, on the
o ther hand, does no t support the
right of a large country to dam age
a neighbor—and a small neighbor
at that—by hostile economic, politi
cal, military, or clandestine actions.
F urtherm ore, because Cuba has
already paid many times over
through the dam ages of the em 
bargo, not to m ention the other
US actions, it would be unfair for
Cuba alone to have to pay com pen
sation to the US while the US paid
no com pensation for the damages
it im posed on Cuba. Finally, owing
to its current and prospective eco
nom ic difficulties, Cuba will be
unable to pay any com pensation
involving real n et out-transfers of
resources for many years to come.
Arguably, therefore, little or no
n et real com pensation should be

paid by Cuba to US nationals (via
the FCSC). Perhaps a “symbolic”
paym ent could be m ade, though
this would have to be in a “noncom 
pensation” form, such as “general
ized vouchers” that could then be
used for purchase o f equity in p ro p 
erties being privatized (i.e. a “com 
pensation for equity swap”).
W hen the US-Cuban relation
ship is “norm alized,” the resolution
o f the com pensation issue will prob
ably be ju st a detail, albeit a diffi
cult one to work out. At that time
the weight of ethics and equity
likely will overwhelm that of legali
ties, and the issue will be resolved
without large transfers o f real re
sources out of Cuba. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts from
“Transition in Cuba: Neiv Challenges
for US Policy, ”a study prepared for the
US Department of State by the Cuban
Research Institute at Florida Interna
tional University.

The United States and
Latin America in the 1990s
Beyond the Cold War
E dited by Jo n a th a n H a rtlyn , Lars S ch o u ltz,
and A u g u sto Varas
“ The authors address th e ir th e m e s w ith sub tlety and
insight, in th is firs t overall a sse ssm e n t o f North-South
relatio ns in th e W estern Hem isphere during th e p o s tCold War p e rio d ."— C hristopher M itchell, New York
University
3 42 pp., $ 3 9 .9 5 cloth, $ 1 5 .9 5 paper

Should Cuba Pay?

at bookstores or by toll-free order

O n the issue of w hether Cuba
“should” pay com pensation to US
nationals (through the US Federal
Claims Settlem ent Commission
[FCSC]), law and ethics provide
contradictory answers. Interna
tional law is particularly one-sided:
it supports the right of property
owners to receive com pensation
for properties expropriated by a
foreign governm ent. But it says
nothing about the right of one
country to claim com pensation for
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Crisis Challenges Social Researchers
by Francisco Leon

o understand the role of
social and econom ic re
search in Cuba today, it is
necessary to discard the
long-held image that the
C uban researcher con
tinues to work in a m onolithic, ho
m ogeneous research environm ent.
Since 1985 heterogeneity m ore
than hom ogeneity has charac
terized Cuban research. This het
erogeneity had its origins in the
experiences gained in “internation
alist” missions abroad, the profes
sional form ation com pleted in
socialist countries going through
transform ations towards new m od
els o f econom ic and social organiza
tion and in the sheer num bers of
scholars seeking recognition. The
critical issue today is w hether that
heterogeneity can survive the enor
mous challenges posed by the des
perate social and economic situation.
Traditionally the social scientist
in Cuba h ad to face the challenge
of a centralized bureaucracy, deeply
prejudiced against the experience
and capacity o f the pure researcher.
T he very institutional structure gov
erning scientific research served to
stymie any contribution to solving
national problem s. Despite these
adverse conditions, it is critically
im portant to note that Cuban schol
ars continued to produce scientific
work th at m ight have conceivably
contributed solutions to a whole ar
ray of grave national problems.

T

Francisco Leon is a Cuban sociologist
and the social affairs officer of the UN
Economic Commission for Latin Amer
ica and the Caribbean in Santiago,
Chile. His publications include “Cuba:
procesosy dilemas, ”Cono Sur (1992).

H em isp h ere • Sum m er/F all 1993

The Academia de Ciencias de
Cuba served as the cornerstone
of the bureaucratic centralization.
It was built in the image o f similar
institutions in the Soviet U nion
and Eastern Europe, simply an
o ther part of the general C uban
em ulation of the socialist model.
As such, its evolution was very m uch
a function o f the relations within
COMECON.
T he academy exercised a na
tionwide hegem ony over research
through its control over academ ia
via the distribution of resources,
including grants to study in univer
sities and research centers in social
ist countries. C om plem enting the
academ y’s functions were two types
of centers that com pleted the circle
of control. First, there were a lim
ited num ber o f research centers
(viz. C entro de Estudios sobre Ame
rica, C entro de Investigaciones de
la Econom ia Mundial) that exer
cised a virtual m onopoly over
relations with centers in N orth
America, Latin America, and the
Caribbean. T hen there was the Co
mite Estatal de Colaboracion Eco
nom ica (CECE), which controlled
all research funds com ing from ex
ternal m ultilateral sources (i.e. UN,
Sistema Econom ico Latinoam ericano) as well as from bilateral
sources such as C anada and Spain.
This m onolithic system, includ
ing the academ y’s preponderance,
began to show signs o f fracturing
after Russian and Eastern Euro
pean socialism began to crumble.
The academ y’s domestic status was
also affected by the willy-nilly adop
tion o f the Soviet m odel o f develop
m ent ordered by the highest circles
in Cuba between 1970 and 1985.
Despite these reverses, the acad
emy retained its dom inant role as
guide and evaluator of research at

the national level by continuing to
recruit both researchers and evalua
tors o f their work.
The influence that the academy
has had is evident in the prioritiza
tion o f technical areas o f research.
Areas such as the socioeconom ic
dim ensions of developm ent have
received little attention. A survey
of C uban scientific contributions to
the Asociacion Latinoam ericana de
Production Animal shows that Cuba,
despite its late entry into the asso
ciation (1978), has m ade m ore con
tributions than Chile and Colombia;
only the founding countries, Vene
zuela and Mexico, appear to be do
ing m ore research. Yet there have
been no C uban contributions to
the socioeconom ic section of the
association. This absence is even
m ore rem arkable given the Cuban
preoccupation since the 1960s over
the relative econom ic benefits of
grass or fodder as cattle feed. Con
trary to the im pression left by the
technical studies, there was good
socioeconom ic analysis. It just
never got published.
Despite this dom inance, there is
today growing evidence th at o ther
research centers, and especially
CECE, are gaining new prom i
nence and im portance. This
change is a function o f two proc
esses: the decline of funding from
the ex-COMECON countries and
the increased attention they are re
ceiving as they reorient their re
search from theoretical to practical
areas. They are now expected to
tackle the many urgent problem s
that Cuba faces, suggest alternative
policies, and spell out the im m edi
ate econom ic consequences and
opportunity costs o f each.
It is somewhat ironic, therefore,
that the present severe economic
crisis that has overtaken Cuba has

given new relevance to many stud
ies that previously gathered dust on
bureaucratic shelves. Some of the
erstwhile unpublished works of re
searchers such as Elena Alvarez,
Vilma Hidalgo, and Lourdes Tabares were given international prom i
nence when Eliana Cardoso and
Ann Helwege cited them in their
book, Cuba after Communism (1992).
T he im portance o f all this is that
these newly revealed works are not
m erely the idiosyncratic products
of individual researchers but the re
sult o f serious and ongoing efforts
by teams o f researchers. To cite but
one example, Elena Alvarez, often
accom panied by Marfa Antonia
Fernandez, has com pleted m ore
than half-a-dozen im portant con
tributions suggesting solutions to
the present crisis. T heir work is part
o f the research being done at the
Instituto de Investigaciones Econo
micas. Unfortunately, there are still
num erous studies at that institute
that lie unpublished despite their
p u rp o rted relevance to contem po
rary problem s. A dditional cases in
point are the works o f Rogelio
Torras on industrial (especially
small industry) reorganization and
o f Estela Espina on food and nutri
tion. In the same vein, the research
of Tabares and Hidalgo includes
contributions from a whole group
of investigators from the Departam ento de Econom ia Nacional of
the Universidad de la Habana. It is
a pioneering effort that has been al
lowed to continue, even as govern
m ent officials continue to debate a
retu rn to national accounting (la
vuelta al sistema de cuentas nacionales).
To repeat, these studies either
rem ain unpublished or are pro
duced for very lim ited circulation.
Those researchers who have gained
visibility through their publications
represent a very small proportion
of the nearly 1,000 who come from
research centers across the island.
Equally, they represent a small
fraction o f the m ore than 300 who
p resented papers at the Forum de
Economistas, organized by the
Facultad de Econom ia of the Uni
versidad de la H abana in July 1992.

Because of the crisis m entioned
above, however, some of these for
merly unknown scholars are slowly
breaking into the established jo u r
nals (such as that o f the C entro de
Investigaciones de la Econom ia
M undial) or through new journals,
such as Economia International, es
tablished this year by the C entro de
Investigaciones de la Econom ia In
ternational of the Universidad de
la H abana. T he understandable
desire o f every researcher to be
published has created a new re
searcher-centered m echanism for
in d ep en d en t evaluation and criti
cism that is starting to counter
balance the official bureaucratic
control of social investigation.

The economic crisis
gives new credence to
innovation, creativity,
and sound analysis.

In addition to the “international
ist” causes m entioned above, it is
also im portant to recognize that
there have always been dissenting
voices am ong C uba’s intelligentsia
and research community. They crit
icized the 1969-70 “10 m illion ton
harvest,” the m odel of total integra
tion into, and thus dependence on,
COMECON. But it is fundam en
tally the nature o f the present eco
nom ic crisis that has given new
credence to innovative problem
form ulation, creative proposal writ
ing, and sound analytical m ethods.
This new trend is evident in the
m ore recent publications o f Julio
Carranza and Pedro M onreal of
the C entro de Estudios sobre
America, the work on urban pov
erty of Blanca M orejon of the Cen
tro de Estudios Demograficos, the
work of Elena Alvarez of the Insti
tuto de Investigaciones Econom i
cas on comparative advantages in

the biotechnological industry, the
work on the dynamics of inflation
in the black m arket perform ed by
the LTniversidad de la H ab an a’s
D epartam ento de Econom ia Na
cional, and the work of Jose Luis
Rodriguez on the consequences of
“dollarization.” It is not a trivial
m atter that Rodriguez was recently
appointed m inister o f finance and
that others have been elected to
the Asamblea Nacional.
As encouraging as the trends
toward greater research in d ep en d 
ence and heterogeneity m ight be,
there is a real danger woven right
into its very texture. T he expansion
of research is taking place in the
midst of increasing restrictions on
access, use, and divulgence of social
and econom ic data. For the most
part, as such restrictions respond
to national security considerations,
the only way researchers are able to
continue this ever-increasing diver
sity of research involvement is by
exercising m axim um discretion in
their work and dem onstrating clear
political loyalty to the regim e’s proj
ect on national survival.
The potential pitfalls for objec
tive research in this situation are
quite evident. Decreasing re
sources—from transportation
of personnel to data processing
equipm ent—m ean strategic con
centration of effort into a reduced
num ber o f researchers and re
search centers and, therefore, of
m ore im m ediate political control.
T he alternative to absolute state
control is to seek external funding.
This, however, will require the
adoption of cannons o f academic
independence and freedom that,
given the desperate situation, are
difficult to reconcile with the
increasing dem ands for political
loyalty.
The recently liberated analytical
and scientific instincts of the Cuban
economists and social scientists to
do in d ependent research m ight
just be facing the m ost form idable
challenges yet. ■

(Translated by H em isphere staff)
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Negotiated Autonomy
by Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua

Despite the 1993 plebiscite results, concerns over the costs of federal social
programs and growing US anxieties about cultural and language differences
combine with confusing congressional rules of procedure to make a decision
on the Puerto Rican autonomy issue difficult. There is, however, a simple
constitutional answer: “mutual determination”

rom January 3, 1989, to
February 28, 1991, a his
toric and laborious proc
ess of consultation and
negotiation on the issue
o f political status was con
ducted between Puerto Rico’s three
political parties, the US Congress,
and the W hite House. It was suc
cessful in the House of R epre
sentatives where legislation for
a referendum was adopted by a
unanim ous vote. The two-year ef
fort died an ignom inious death,
however, in the Senate Energy and
N atural Resources Committee.
The bill died in the Senate de
spite intense lobbying by the White
House. Charles Unterm eyer, the
W hite House aide directing Presi
d en t George Bush’s campaign for a
plebiscite in Puerto Rico, stated in
the San Juan Star that Republican
senators in the Energy and Natural
Resources Com mittee, including

F
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cal analyst for El Nuevo H erald in
Miami and a professor at the Centro de
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torial Cultural, 1993).
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The “Zig-Zag” on the Status Issue
Percentage of Survey Respondents

Source: Juan M. Garcia-Passalacqua

those who would have assured the
required majority, had “a healthy
am ount o f doubt on the effects of
statehood.” U nterm eyer confessed
he had changed few minds, particu
larly on the m ost cited reservations:
the cost o f federal social program s
and the compatibility of a foreign
culture within the US. Ironically,
pro-statehood forces won the 1992
elections in Puerto Rico, but doubts
about that option, exercised in a

procedural m aneuver m ore than a
thousand miles away from the is
land, denied the people of Puerto
Rico their right to self-determination.
The chaotic, and therefore of
fensive, nature of the procedure in
W ashington can be ascertained by
a veritable barrage of letters am ong
the principal actors in the US. This
flurry o f correspondence began
with a “Dear C olleague” letter (dis
sem inated O ctober 4, 1990) to the

m em bers o f the House by 30 fellow
m em bers asking for a favorable
vote. A letter from President Bush
to House Interior Affairs Subcom
m ittee chairm an Ron de Lugo
(O ctober 5, 1990) also supported
the legislation, and an o th er from
the three political leaders of the
island (one from each alternative
option) was dispatched to Chair
m an J. B ennett Jo hnston o f the
Senate Energy and N atural Re
sources Com m ittee on O ctober
11, 1990, urging him to accept the
House bill. Finally, a historic and
brilliant statem ent (O ctober 12,
1990) by the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson,
Jr., asked Jo hnston “to allow the
Puerto Rican referendum to go
forward,” and was followed by an
im ploring letter from House com
m ittee chairm an Morris K. Udall.
Jo h n sto n shot back an icy reply
to the island party presidents on
O ctober 15, 1990, refusing to ap
prove the House bill. In the afterm ath, a Washington Post editorial
(O ctober 25, 1990) dem anded that
Jo hnston reconsider and approve
the House version; and, after the
reintroduction o f the House bill
by de Lugo on January 3, 1991,
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
“in a m ood of distress and near
despair,” delivered a scathing and
totally justified condem nation of
the Congress (March 21, 1992) for
its inaction.
It is time for a new m ethod to
deal with the US-Puerto Rican
autonom y negotiations. Presiden
tial executive orders, internal staff
studies, jo in t m etropolitan-insular
com m ittees, interdepartm ental
commissions, congressional com
m ittee hearings and reports, and
test cases in the judicial branch
have all failed to produce a single,
co h eren t policy or procedure. U n
less, and until, a certain and pre
dictable procedure is established
for the consideration o f the wishes
of the insular areas, procedural u n 
certainty will again defeat the best
efforts of both the insular areas
and the US to negotiate a solution
to the issues of lack of autonom y
and final political status.

Status Definitions on the Ballot
A vote for STATEHOOD
is a mandate to demand
Puerto Rico’s admission
as a state of the union.
Statehood:
Is a non-colonial status
with full political dignity. Will
allow us to have the same
rights, benefits and respon
sibilities as the 50 states.
Is permanent union guar
anteed and the opportunity
for economic and political
progress.
Is the permanent guaran
tee of all the rights given
by the Constitution of the
United States of America—
including the preservation
of our culture.
Is the permanent guaran
tee of American citizenship,
our two languages, hymns
and flags.
Is full participation in all
federal programs.
Is the right to vote for the
president of the United
States and to elect no less
than six Puerto Rican repre
sentatives and two sena
tors to Congress.
In the exercise of our
rights as American citizens
we will negotiate the terms
of said admission, which
will be submitted to the peo
ple of Puerto Rico for their
ratification.

A vote for the COMMON
WEALTH is a mandate in
favor of: Guaranteeing our
progress and security as
well as that of our children
within a status of equal po
litical dignity, based on the
permanent union between
Puerto Rico and the United
States, encompassed in a
bilateral pact that cannot
be altered except by mu
tual agreement.
The Commonwealth guar
antees:
Irrevocable US citizenship;
Common market, common
currency and common de
fense with the United States;
Fiscal autonomy for
Puerto Rico;
Puerto Rican Olympic
Committee and our own
international sports repre
sentation;
Full development of our
cultural identity: under Com
monwealth we are Puerto
Ricans first.
We will develop Common
wealth through specific pro
posals to be brought before
the US Congress. We will
immediately propose:
Reformulate Section 936,
ensuring creation of more
and better jobs;
Extend the Supplemen
tary Security Insurance
(SSI) to Puerto Rico;
Obtain Nutritional Assis
tance Program allocations
equal to those received by
the states;
Protect other products of
our agriculture, in addition
to coffee.
Any additional change will
be submitted to the Puerto
Rican people beforehand
for their approval.

INDEPENDENCE is the
right of our people to gov
ern themselves on their
own land; it is enjoying all
the powers and attributes
of sovereignty.
In the exercise of this in
alienable right that cannot
be renounced, Puerto Rico
will be governed by a Con
stitution that establishes a
democratic government,
protects human rights and
affirms our nationality and
language.
Independence will give
Puerto Rico the power
necessary to achieve de
velopment and prosperity,
including the powers to pro
tect and stimulate our in
dustry, agriculture and
commerce, control immi
gration, and negotiate inter
national agreements that
would expand markets and
promote investments from
other countries.
A treaty of friendship and
cooperation with the United
States and a process of
transition to independence
in agreement with legisla
tion already approved by
the US House of Repre
sentatives and Senate
committees will provide
for: the continuation of
acquired Social Security,
veterans and other bene
fits; Puerto Rican and, for
those who want to retain it,
US citizenship; the right to
use our own money or the
dollar; free access to the
US market; tax incentives
for North American invest
ment; federal aid equal to
the current amount for at
least a decade; and the
eventual demilitarization
of the country.

Source: The San Juan Star, July 22, 1993

In essence the issue has a simple
constitutional answer. Article IV,
Section III, Clause 2 of the US Con
stitution states clearly and unequiv
ocally that Congress shall have the
power to “dispose” of the territory
and o ther property belonging to
the US. It also says, of course, that

it has the power to make “all need
ful rules and regulations” respect
ing such territory and property.
The power to regulate, which has
been used for the last 100 years, is
now anachronistic. At this point in
history (after the end o f the Cold
War and on the verge of a new
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A Still Useful Call for
International Observers
. . . Serious consideration should be given to inviting the secretaries
of both organizations to send plebiscite teams to Puerto Rico. T here
are am ple legal precedents for such an invitation. In the last few
years, political status plebiscites have been observed in three US-ad
m inistered territories: the N orthern Marianas Islands, the T rust T erri
tory o f the Pacific Islands, and the Marshall Islands. A plebiscite to
determ ine w hether P uerto Rico will obtain greater hom e rule as a
com m onwealth, becom e a state, o r choose independence is a vote
about change or modification o f status, and it is precisely on ques
tions of changes in the political status o f d ep e n d en t territories that
the UN has a traditional interest. Many m em bers o f the UN or the
OAS will undoubtedly have deep reservations about the appropriate
ness o f a plebiscite, one o f whose possible outcom es is the integration
into the US o f a territory that the US acquired as a result of the same
war th at led to the establishm ent o f a protectorate in Cuba. But it is
in the US interest to explore the em otional, political, and legal
depths o f these reservations before the plebiscite. . . .

Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from Alfred Stepan, “The US and
Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments of Power, ’’Foreign Af
fairs 58, no. 3 (1980).

world order) the US can and must
deal peacefully, and by negotiation,
with its insular areas.
As n o ted by em inent constitu
tionalist Edward S. Corwin, the ter
ritorial clause o f the Constitution
gives the US the power to govern
territories, but it also gives it the
power to cede territory to another
governm ent, as was recognized in
the transfer of the Philippine Is
lands to the Philippine Republic.
M ore recently Gerald L. Newman
of Colum bia University has ques
tioned the pertinence of the tradi
tional territorial theory o f the US
and has called for a new u n d er
standing o f th at clause of the Con
stitution, based on a declaration in
the US Suprem e C ourt case of Reid
v. Covert that the territorial doc
trine should be abandoned. The
idea is to term inate each and every
territorial condition by creating a
new close relationship between all
the insular areas and the US, based
on the cession and disposition of
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the territories. T he cession can, of
course, ultimately produce a repub
lic, a state of the union, or a freely
associated state, but none o f the
insular areas would rem ain a US
territory.
W hen the goal becomes clear,
how to achieve it can be discussed.
With all due respect to the doc
trine o f self-determ ination, that
principle cannot continue to be an
excuse for inaction. “L et’s wait u n 
til they all agree down th e re ” has
by now becom e an insult. W hat is
really on the table is the notion of
“m utual determ ination.”
T he first thing that should be
ended is the old and discredited
gam e o f “Alphonse and G aston”
about who takes the first step. The
most blatant exam ple of this tradi
tional ambiguity is the “symbolic”
m em orandum issued by President
Bush on November 30, 1992. It
leaves the future of Puerto Rico
open to “a general right o f referen
dum or specific referenda spon

sored either by the US governm ent
or the legislature of Puerto Rico,”
while at the same time states: “If
any m atters arise involving the fun
dam entals o f Puerto Rico’s status,
they shall be referred to the Office
o f the President.” What, in heaven’s
nam e, are these “fundam entals?”
Even the White House does not
seem to know. It is time for all sides
to be absolutely clear.
T he 1992 Democratic Party plat
form provides an excellent form ula
tion for resolving the problem , one
that was certainly transform ed into
an electoral m andate by the No
vem ber elections. Endorsed by all
three political parties in Puerto
Rico, it recognizes the right to selfdeterm ination o f the insular area
in a process to be conducted “in
concert” with the US Congress.
W hat does “in concert” mean? The
answer is simply that no one takes
the first step alone, all concerned
parties advance on a broad front to
carry out a jo in t procedural plan of
action to dispose o f all rem aining
US territories and create new forms
o f political relations as we en ter
the twenty-first century.
W hat should such a jo in t proce
dural action plan entail? T here
should be six fundam ental stages,
to be agreed on by all three sides
o f the issue (the president, Con
gress, and the insular areas), be
fore anybody, anywhere, takes a
first step. If we achieve such an
agreem ent before anybody moves,
all participants can be assured of
predictability in their endeavor,
and all involved will be assured of
action before 1996.
First, we m ust identify and lo
cate a single coordinating respon
sibility in the White House. An
excellent m odel is HR 6117 of the
102d Congress, which provides for
the self-determ ined political, so
cial, and econom ic developm ent of
the insular areas. It is a new fram e
work for the developm ent and im
plem entation of insular policy
within the executive branch.
Second, we m ust search for mul
tipartisan consensus in the political
process o f the insular area on the

substantive options. The governor
of Puerto Rico could, by executive
order, create a commission on
status, representative o f all status
options and nonaffiliated public in
terest sectors, to recom m end local
procedures and definitions leading
to a vote, as well as determ ining
the relationship of this local proc
ess to the US executive, legislative,
and judicial branches. That, appar
ently, is the prospect of the adm in
istration o f Pedro Rossello of the
New Progressive Party in Puerto
Rico. This would lead to the third
step, that o f approving legislation
for a referendum in the insular
area am ong the options as defined
by their proponents.
Fourth, we m ust im plem ent a
“fast-track” procedure for the exec
utive branch and Congress to con
sider the winning option. During
the 1989-91 process, House speaker
Thom as Foley m ade a statem ent
that should serve as a guideline
for this stage. H e stated unequivo
cally that the US h ad a responsi
bility “to resp o n d ” to the will of the
people o f Puerto Rico. T hat is all
o ur insular areas can ask for and all
th at is required by their right to
self-determ ination. T he Puerto
Rican people, however, will not
tolerate being ignored by the US
Congress.
A good m odel for the “fast-track”
procedure is Section 5 o f HR 4765
o f the 101st Congress, which would
require legislation to be developed
and considered and acted upon in
both the H ouse and Senate. It
would provide for a 180-calendar
day limit on com m ittee considera
tion, and for consideration by the
Congress 14 legislative days after,
with the in ten t of voting on the leg
islation. T he expedited procedures
would obligate com m ittees to act
and the Congress to vote.
Fifth, we m ust keep the process
open if the option favored by the
insular area electorate fails to win
approval in the “fast-track” proce
dure. A good m odel is Section 7 of
HR 4765 o f the 101st Congress that
would have required the Com mit
tee of Interior and Insular Affairs

and the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Com m ittee to make fur
th er recom m endations on Puerto
Rico’s political status developm ent
if none o f the three statuses re
ceived a majority in the first ref
erendum , or the im plem enting
legislation was no t enacted into
law, or the im plem enting law was
n o t approved in a second referen
dum . A requirem ent would be that
the recom m endations would be
developed in consultation with
representatives of Puerto Rico’s
principal political parties, the
president, and o ther appropriate
groups or persons. Step six would
reserve final approval o f the result
ing package to a self-determ ination
vote by the people in the insular
area.

If these principles to govern the
process are agreeable, and if the
US executive and congressional
branches agree to this procedure
beforehand, then this new certainty
will prevent the effort from becom 
ing, as so many in the past have,
derailed or fruitless. A procedural
agreem ent of the kind outlined
above is an essential prerequisite
to achieve necessary changes be
fore 1996. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper
presented at the conference “A Time of
Change: Relations between the United
States and American Samoa, Guam,
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
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The Chance to Decolonize
by Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana

he politics o f US-Puerto
Rican relations have too
often been officially cast
in the context of a “suc
cess story.” Gen. Nelson
A. Miles’s rhetorical par
oxysms proclaim ing the “blessings,”
not of a status referendum , but of
the US military invasion of 1898,
were usually accom panied by stories
o f friendly natives lining his path,
welcoming the new rulers with tears
of grateful affection. Adding praise
to exultation, the Puerto Ricans,
spoils o f th at “splendid little war”
against Spain, were shortly there
after baptized in the Holy Waters
of US citizenship by a Congress
where, to this day, a Puerto Rican
resident com m issioner can cast a
vote on legislation that affects our
island only if it d oesn’t affect the
outcom e o f the vote.
T he 1930s were usually cast in
the light of the wonders that fed
eral largess bestowed on our poor,
little island o f brown, barefoot,
uneducated peasants. T he 1940s
and 1950s reproduced the H oratio
Alger success story. “Bootstraps”
were purportedly provided by our
“p artn ers” up N orth, who “pro
tected" us from the devious, god
less ideologies that m ight lead us to
sin through arrogant tem ptations
of Puerto Rican sovereignty.
T he 1960s announced the boun
tiful harvest to come. O ur island
would reap the fruits o f regaled citi
zenship through ever larger federal

T
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welfare transfers and m ounting
body counts in Vietnam.
In the 1970s and through the
mid-1980s, Puerto Ricans were at
the exit gates of Purgatory, safe
from the Evil Em pire and ready
for the redem ptive ecstasy of state
hood, which, according to our cur
ren t resident commissioner, would
be especially “for the P oor.” Only
the Babel sounds o f Spanish kept
us from Paradise. Because m ore
than 75 years after our baptismal
citizenship, 60% o f Puerto Ricans
adm it to speaking no English. Only
20% allege to speak it. T he solution
in Puerto Rico came in the form of
a locally legislated “Miracle o f the
A bsurd.”

Puerto Rico’s distinct
identity as a Latin
American nation
of the Caribbean
and its political
subordination and
economic dependence
now pose enormous
cultural and economic
problems for the US.
In order to cleverly convey the
story that all Puerto Ricans speak
English, the current governm ent of
Puerto Rico m ade English an “offi
cial” language o f the island. Now
go tell that story to Congress, to
g ether with a statehood petition!
(If miracles were this cheap, per

haps Congress should make Jap a
nese an official language!)
I do not m ean to imply that
there has been no progress, even
u n d er a subordinate status whereby
Puerto Ricans are governed through
federal laws we do no t make. Im
p ortant changes have taken place
in Puerto Rico, particularly since
the en d o f W orld War II.
Puerto Rico’s per capita income,
inflated by ever-increasing welfare
transfers, is possibly the highest in
Latin America—although, as 40
years ago, it is still approxim ately
half that of Mississippi. Puerto Rico
has also developed a class of com pe
tent and prosperous professionals
in the commercial and financial
areas, com parable to the elites of
many industrial nations.
So there has been progress,
even if at the expense of dem oc
racy. But there are o ther factors of
extrem e im portance, if we m ean to
break away from the fallacious no
tion that we Puerto Ricans m ust
choose either “security” or free
dom. For we m ust recall alm ost a
century o f federal and Puerto Ri
can colonial governm ent practices
o f discrim ination, repression, perse
cution, and efforts to exterm inate
our nationality and the in d ep en d 
ence m ovem ent in particular—
both when we were a majority or
m ore recently as a minority.
Nonetheless, US leaders with
honesty and vision have taken a
serious interest in beginning a
process that would bring about a
principled solution to Puerto
Rico’s undem ocratic plight u n d er
the US flag. Several congressional
leaders, such as Virgin Islands dele
gate Ron de Lugo (who m ust be
com m ended for his new bill, HR
6117— the Insular Areas Policy
Act) and form er representative

R obert Lagom arsino (whose mis
taken support for Puerto Rican
statehood contributed to his recent
defeat), have m ade im portant at
tem pts to raise congressional aware
ness of the responsibility that arises
as a function of power.
Now, almost 95 years after
the military invasion by G eneral
Miles—and followed by the re
design of o u r legal system and tra
ditions to suit the new rulers, the
unilateral im position in 1917 of a
citizenship we expressly did not
want, and the arrogant disregard
for the explicit desire for Puerto
Rican sovereignty through half a
century sprinkled with repeated at
tem pts to stamp out Spanish and
unnaturally impose English—Puer
to Rico still exists, as President Bill
C linton graciously recognized in a
message to the governor-elect, as a
“distinct identity.” N ot a small feat
for Puerto Rican nationality!
So there is a silver lining. We
have hope about the intellectual
honesty of a generation of Ameri
cans that is striving to develop a
m oral and rational policy towards
US territories. “Politics as usual”
has overlooked the underpinnings
of failure in the present relation
ship between o u r two countries.
With the disappearance o f com
m unism, however, the dawn o f the
twenty-first century announces a
radically changed international
panoram a. Nationalities were not
dead. T heir resurgence in the
form er Soviet U nion, in Eastern
Europe, and the resilience of Q ue
bec’s distinct society are sufficient
rem inders of what Sen. Ruben
Berrio, the president o f the Partido
Independentista P uertorriqueno,
wrote in the Washington Post (May
23, 1990): “M inorities and majori
ties com e and go; but nationalities
rem ain.”
All nationalities now seek an
even break to govern themselves
and begin to reap the benefits of
free trade in a global economy.
P uerto Rico’s distinct identity as a
Latin Am erican nation o f the Carib
bean and its political subordination
and econom ic d ep endence now

pose enorm ous cultural and eco
nom ic problem s for the US.
In 1934, 42% o f Puerto Ricans
received welfare relief from the
US. In 1993, m ore than 50% of
Puerto Ricans benefit from the
Food Stamp Program. A bout twothirds o f the population still lives
below the federal poverty level.

“Dependency as
salvation” is a failed
policy. It is, indeed,
“a time for change. ”
What direction that
change zvill take
depends, as usual,
on politics.
T he “success story” with which
my generation grew up attem pts to
cover up a failure of historic pro
portions. T he systemic problem
continues. T he underlying policy
of “dependency as salvation” is a
failed policy. It is, indeed, “a time
for change.” W hat direction that
change will take depends, as usual,
on politics. Puerto Rico’s pro
ponents of statehood rely on a
Hawaiian m odel that is totally in
applicable to a different nation like
Puerto Rico. Congressional Budget
Office estimates place the cost of
statehood to US taxpayers at sev
eral billion dollars a year m ore than
the dole econom y o f our present
subservient status.
In Puerto Rico, however, pro
ponents o f statehood continue to
preach a brand o f statehood that
postulates the nonnegotiable
nature o f our Spanish vernacular
and Puerto Rican culture. They
have called it “Ji'baro Statehood!”
Even Puerto Rico’s governor Pedro
Rossello, who plans to petition for
statehood after a referendum this
year, affirmed in a letter (O ctober
8, 1990) to US congressional lead
ers that “All o f us agree on the

following: Spanish belongs to all
Puerto Ricans, it is no t negotiable
un d er any circum stances or politi
cal status.”
The LIS is a unitary country, not
a m ultinational state. As A rthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., notes, “T he his
toric idea of a unifying American
identity is now in peril in many are
nas—in our politics, our voluntary
organizations, our churches, our
language.”
In the desire to prom ote change,
the American people and the US
governm ent m ust carefully think
about Puerto Rico’s statehood
petition when it arrives in Con
gress. Schlesinger adds, “T he eth 
nic upsurge . . . began as a gesture
of protest against Anglocentric cul
ture. It becam e a cult, and today it
threatens to becom e a counter
revolution against the original the
ory of America as ’one peo p le,’ a
com m on culture, a single n atio n .”
For the US, and for a nation like
Puerto Rico that refuses to re
nounce its distinct identity, in
dependence alone provides the
necessary flexibility to attain m utu
ally convenient econom ic arrange
m ents designed to fit the distinct
needs of Puerto Rico and the US.
W hat is needed in this time of
change is leadership, vision, and
com m on sense. It is a golden op
portunity for the Clinton adm inis
tration.
The US has exercised its power.
Now it m ust assume the responsi
bility o f decolonizing. A sm ooth
transition towards a mutually bene
ficial arrangem ent based on sover
eignty, which respects the cultural
integrity and inalienable right of
self-determ ination o f both o f our
nations, m ust be guaranteed. The
present state of subordination and
dependence m ust be elim inated. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper
presented at the conference “A Time of
Change: Relations between the United
States and American Samoa, Guam,
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
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The Plebiscite: A Time of Change
by Baltasar Corrada del Rio

e should reflect on
how gradually—and,
perhaps, im percep
tibly to those who
are most closely
involved in the de
velopm ent o f the US-Puerto Rican
relationship—W ashington’s atti
tude towards the resolution of
Puerto Rico’s political status prob
lem has changed. The perennial
lack of consensus am ong Puerto
Rico’s three m ajor political parties
about the island’s future is no
longer seen by Congress as suffi
cient justification for perpetuating
the cu rren t political entity.
Several efforts have been m ade
to solve the status problem — the
latest of which came to an end in
1991. A key elem ent in their failure
was a lack o f focus on the end re
sult. G reat em phasis was placed in
giving Puerto Ricans the opportu
nity to determ ine their own politi
cal destiny b u t w ithout due regard
to how the status options were
form ulated. Puerto Ricans should
be given m ore than an opportunity
to decide am ong various political
status alternatives. T he status op
tions presented to the voters must
be o f a p erm an ent nature in order
that exercising self-determination
does n o t becom e a fruitless effort.
If the pursuit for a different or en
hanced political status does not
com e to a conclusion as a result of
a plebiscite or referendum , then
we would have accom plished very
little. T he result of the decision
making process m ust no t only be
change, b u t the resulting change
must be conclusive and final.

W

Baltasar Corrada del Rio is Puerto
Rico’s secretary of state.
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A corollary to the perm anence
o f any status option is, o f course,
that it be legally effective. And, in
the case o f a status option that en
tails a continued relationship with
the federal governm ent u n d er the
sovereignty of the US, the same
must be consistent with the US
Constitution. For instance, legal
authorities have recognized that
the 10th A m endm ent o f the US
C onstitution, which is reserved for
the states, em bodies the maxim um
degree o f autonom y possible for a
political body u n d er the sovereignty
o f the US and that no form ula of
perm anent association or union
with the US can claim a higher
degree of autonomy.

It is clearly understood
that a decision for
independence or
statehood mill be
final and conclusive
inasmuch as each
political status, once
achieved, will not be
subject to revocation
or modification.

In com pliance o f his campaign
prom ise, Gov. Pedro Rossello in
tends to hold, before the end of his
first year in office, a plebiscite be
tween the status alternatives posed
by the three m ajor political parties.
The statehood and independence

options require no definition since
history provides am ple dem onstra
tion of what each of them entail. It
is clearly understood that a deci
sion for independence or state
hood will be final and conclusive
inasm uch as each political status,
once achieved, will no t be subject
to revocation or modification. Inde
pendence and statehood are, there
fore, status options o f a perm anent
nature. T he Partido Democratico
Popular will be responsible for de
fining the freely associated state or
com m onwealth form ula included
in the plebiscite and we urge them
to do so in such a m an n er that the
above criterion is met.
O nce the status options have
been form ulated and the plebiscite
held, the proponents o f the option
that is favored by the people of
Puerto Rico will negotiate with
Congress. T he resulting legislation
would thereupon be subm itted to
the Puerto Rican electorate for
ratification in a “yes or n o ” refer
endum .
In some quarters o f Congress,
the issue of Puerto Rico’s political
status has focused on w hether Puer
to Rico should becom e a part of
the US since Puerto Ricans are said
to have a different culture. This
view is m isguided in two respects:
first, the inhabitants o f Puerto Rico
are natural-born Am erican citizens.
Clearly, allowing Puerto Rico to
becom e a state would n o t m ean the
incorporation o f an alien people
into the nation. The insular cases
notw ithstanding, Puerto Rico has
been a part of this nation for a long
time. Currently, 2.7 million Puerto
Ricans reside in the continental US
and 3.6 million on our island. State
hood will not bring about a signif
icant change in the migratory
patterns o f Puerto Ricans.

In addition to language and
ethnic background, our political
system and the exercise of dem o
cratic liberties are also part of our
culture. By choice, Puerto Ricans
are governed internally by a consti
tution that is republican in form
and th at conform s to that of the
US and to the principles of the
Declaration o f Independence.
Pluralism and diversity have
always been key elem ents in the
Am erican nation-building process,
and they have n o t been at odds with
the com m only held principles of
unity, broad citizen participation in
governm ent and the political proc
ess, equality o f rights, econom ic
growth based on free enterprise,
and respect for individual free
doms. If we share a belief in the
principles and values on which the
political system of this nation has
been built, we should have no fear
that ethnic and cultural diversity
will ever divide it. Quebec, for ex
ample, represents m ore than 25%
of the population and land mass of
Canada, but Puerto Rico represents
less than 1.4% of the total US popu
lation and is n o t a contiguous part
of the US.
Like econom ic developm ent,
freedom and dem ocracy cannot be
im posed from outside; it m ust em a
nate from within the people. The
people of Puerto Rico have dem on
strated their adherence to those
nation-building principles in an
exemplary m an n er and in sharp
contrast with o th er peoples o f this
hem isphere. For instance, Puerto
Ricans have served alongside their
fellow citizens from the continental
US in every arm ed conflict since
the First W orld War. A nd voter par
ticipation in elections is higher
than that o f any state.
In 1991 the adoption of a law
that declared Spanish as the only
official language of Puerto Rico
caused m uch resentm ent, not only
in the US, but on the island as well.
T he so-called Spanish Only Act was
adopted in the face o f widespread
popular opposition in the island,
and at a time w hen the national
news m edia was referring to the

legislation for the status plebiscite
u n d er consideration in the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources
Com m ittee as “the statehood plebi
scite.” A poll com m issioned by a
m ajor daily new spaper in San Juan
showed that two out of three re
spondents rejected the law that
m ade Spanish the only official lan
guage in Puerto Rico.

Pluralism and
diversity have always
been key elements
in the American
nation-building process.
If we share a belief in
the principles and
values on which the
political system of this
nation has been built,
we should have no
fear that ethnic and
cultural diversity will
ever divide i t
G overnor Rossello ran for office
with the prom ise that his adm inis
tration would restore English as
one of the two official languages.
As of January 28, 1993, Spanish and
English are once again the official
languages o f the Commonwealth
o f Puerto Rico.

Section 936
Section 936 o f the US Internal
Revenue Code is an elem ent in a
m odel or strategy for econom ic de
velopm ent—one that is based on
providing tax incentives and gov
ern m en t assistance to attract m anu
facturing industries and create jobs.
The effectiveness of Section 936
has been greatly reduced over the

years. Although Puerto Rico experi
enced rapid and strong economic
growth during the 1950s and 1960s,
it now suffers from unem ploym ent,
low labor force participation, a
decaying infrastructure, and a
bloated public sector resulting
from an effort to reduce unem 
ployment. It is widely recognized
that the so-called O peration Boot
strap m odel o f econom ic develop
m ent is no longer responsive to the
present econom ic and financial
conditions of Puerto Rico and the
need to develop a broader eco
nom ic m odel has been anticipated
regardless of the political status
chosen by the inhabitants o f Puerto
Rico. But, however ineffective as
an econom ic developm ent tool,
Puerto Rico is still d epend en t to
an im portant degree on Section
936. Therefore, for as long as
Puerto Rico is considered a US
possession and until a m ore com 
prehensive and lasting develop
m ent strategy is im plem ented, the
governm ent o f Puerto Rico will
stand behind the continuance of
Section 936 and will vigorously de
fend it against any further erosion.
Moreover, in the event of state
hood, an enterprise zone, along
with o th er transitional adjustm ents,
should be im plem ented so that the
shift into the new political status
n o t be disruptive.
A planned and orderly phase
out o f Section 936, once we agree
on statehood, may be better than
the escalating level o f uncertainty
regarding that section’s future.
Such a phase-out cannot be m ade,
however, until we have statehood
for only statehood can establish the
preconditions for a m ore com pre
hensive and long-term econom ic
and social developm ent strategy to
be effective. Moreover, the political
stability associated with statehood
will differentiate Puerto Rico from
the rest of the Caribbean Basin
and stimulate the kind of invest
m ent and reinvestm ent that allows
for sustained econom ic growth that
would include, am ong its m ajor ele
ments, a strong developm ent of
our tourism industry.
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No Half-Measures
T he future political status of
Puerto Rico is ultimately a ques
tion of w hether its 3.6 million in
habitants will be able to exercise
the rights and duties of their US
citizenship in their place o f birth
and residence or w hether they will
becom e citizens of a separate and
distinct nation, be it with full sover
eignty or u n d er some degree of
association with the US.
Advancing any o ther interm edi
ate solution would result in that US
citizenship being degraded. T hat
would be advocating that one can
be a US citizen yet forever banned
from claiming the full extent o f its
rights, or proposing that US citizen
ship is n o t a source o f equal rights
for those who bear it. Therefore,
the cu rren t adm inistration will not
look favorably to any form of politi
cal status th at would entail US citi
zenship w ithout the full exercise of
its duties and the enjoym ent of all
its prerogatives.
Congress and the White House
should take no m oral com fort in
the fact that there is no consensus
am ong the three political parties
about the future political status of
Puerto Rico. T he rights o f 3.6 mil
lion US citizens dem and im m edi
ate attention.
Since Brown v. The Board of Edu
cation (1954), it has been clear that
a majority of citizens cannot de
prive a m inority from the full
exercise of their constitutionally
protected rights. Therefore, we ask
the White House, Congress, and
the people o f the US to support
the right of the people o f Puerto
Rico to self-determination and to
respond favorably to the will of the
majority of our people in the plebi
scite this year. ■

Editor’s Note: Edited version of a paper
presented at the conference “A Time of
Change: Relations between the United
States and American Samoa, Guam,
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico
and the US Virgin Islands, ’’February
11,1993, in Washington, DC.
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Are you interested in
Central America?
If so, you will want to have a copy of the only media
directory covering Central America and Panama, the
1993 Guia de medios centroamericanos de
comunicacidn. This 220-page pocket-sized book
contains details on:
• Over 300 media organizations
• More than 200 advertising
agencies and public
relations firms
• Nearly 4,000 journalists
• 17 journalism schools and
their faculties
• Goverment and embassy
press spokespersons

As well, there is useful
information, including
statistics and maps of the countries and major cities.
The price is $45 per copy, postage and handling
included.
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Mutual Respect: Congress Must Act
by Marco Antonio Rigau

he inaction and incoher
en t actions of the US
Congress are allowing
US-Puerto Rican relations
to drift into a critical situ
ation. Dem ands on the
part o f Puerto Rico, either to de
velop the cu rren t relationship or to
exercise its right to self-determina
tion have been ignored. Congress
has painted the US and Puerto
Rico into a corner.
D ependence on the transfer of
federal funds grows every year, both
in Puerto Rico’s budget and m en
tality. Reliance on incentives that
create investm ent and jobs in
Puerto Rico is being unilaterally
crippled by Congress, as the situa
tion o f Section 936 o f the Internal
Revenue Code illustrates. This sec
tion offered 100% tax exem ption
to US corporations operating in
Puerto Rico. Congress has ju st
am ended that section to reduce
the percentage of that tax exem p
tion. It is a paradox that while US
leaders are trying to correct the
budget deficit, nothing is being
done to assist Puerto Rico in devel
oping a less d ep en d en t and m ore
self-sufficient economy, while m ain
taining, at least, the present stan
dard of living in the island.
From 1989 to 1991 the people
o f Puerto Rico, o ur three political
parties, the US president, and the
US House of Representatives acted
in a timely fashion. We cannot say
the same for the US Senate. They
did n o t deliver. They balked. Sen.
Daniel Patrick Moyniham, who was
n o t a participant in this mishap, ac
knowledged this in his book Pande-

Marco Antonio Rigau is a senator of
Puerto Rico and a member of the Par
tido Democrdtico Popular.

monium (Oxford University Press,
1993): “. . . The U nited States Gov
ern m en t is caught up with this
seemingly intractable problem of
resolving the status of Puerto Rico,
a prize of colonial war taken from
Spain in 1898. . . . Despite the urg
ing o f President Bush that Con
gress provide for a referendum

Luis Munoz Marin (November 1932)

which will enable the citizens of
Puerto Rico to make such a choice,
Congress has not been willing to
do so. Congressional resistance
arises largely from the question of
w hether the island should have the
option to choose statehood whilst
retaining Spanish as an official lan
guage.” Now a couple of new de
velopm ents—a status plebiscite in
Puerto Rico on November 14, 1993,
and congressional consideration of
HR 94— dem and that the Clinton
adm inistration take a position on
Puerto Rico’s right to self-determi
nation and develop a procedure
for the effective exercise of such
a right.

President Clinton recently ex
pressed on national television, “I
have strongly supported, in the case
of Puerto Rico, self-determ ination.
T hat is if they have a referendum
and they vote to continue their
com m onwealth status or to be
come in dependent or to become
a state, whatever they decide, I will
support.”
Having reaffirm ed its com m it
m ent to self-determ ination, the
Clinton adm inistration should en
dorse a “fast-track" procedure in
Congress to respond to the Novem
ber 14 vote. With that done, they
should next recognize the exis
tence of the Puerto Rican people
as a unique and distinct people, by
granting all Puerto Ricans the right
to participate in this process. Fi
nally, the adm inistration should
clarify the legal and political na
ture of the current relationship.
C oncerning the im plem entation
o f a “fast-track” procedure, we
strongly believe that HR 94 should
be am ended to include such a pro
cedure. It is essential for Congress
to respond to the petition m ade by
the people of Puerto Rico in the
November vote. T he “fast-track”
procedure will reduce the uncer
tainty period to a m inim um , prod
Congress to face the issue tru th 
fully and squarely, and give the
people of Puerto Rico some solid
param eters onto what to expect
from US policy.
W hat about the m ore than 2.5
million Puerto Ricans living out
side the island? They feel they have
a right to have a say in the decision
of their country’s political destiny.
We in the Partido Democratico
Popular agree with them and have
supported their participation in the
November vote. But the statehood
governm ent believes otherwise and
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defeated the am endm ents we pre
sented to address their participa
tion. In response to that, the Puerto
Rican com m unity in the US organ
ized a three-day status vote in O cto
ber 1993. They are doing their part.
W hen the time comes, Congress
m ust do its part to ensure their
participation in the final vote to
determ ine political status. Puerto
Ricans have the right to be recog
nized by Congress and the inter
national com m unity as a distinct
nationality, as a unique people.
Finally, the US m ust clarify the
legal nature of the current relation
ship between it and Puerto Rico.
T he people o f Puerto Rico have be
lieved that the relationship forged
in 1952 en ded their territorial con
dition. This relationship was said to
be en tered “in the nature o f a com 
pact.” Notwithstanding, Section 9
of the Federal Relations Act be
tween the US and Puerto Rico
concedes a generic delegation of
legislative powers to the Congress.
Said delegation to Congress is a de
nial o f the agreem ent. O ne partner
cannot have the right to unilater
ally change the rules of the game.
It is contrary to international law
and public morality.
The federal courts have issued
conflicting opinions regarding the
nature o f the com m onwealth. In
Harris v. Rosario (1980), the Su
prem e C ourt stated that Congress
can legislate over Puerto Rico u n 
d er the powers of the Territorial
Clause. Two years later, however,
in Rodriguez v. PPD (1982), it went
on to say that “Puerto Rico like a
state, is an autonom ous political
entity, sovereign over m atters not
ruled by the C onstitution.” Based
on that dicta, the C ourt o f Appeals
for the First Circuit in US v. Quino
nes (1985), stated that . . in 1952
Puerto Rico ceased being a terri
tory o f the U nited States subject to
the plenary powers of Congress as
provided in the Federal Constitu
tion.”
Just recently the Eleventh Circuit
coripluded in US v. Sanchez (June
1993), that Puerto Rico is still a
US territory and that the com m on
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A New Pattern of Freedom
Puerto Rico needs to be “placed” afresh in the US m ind—placed not
ju st geographically, b u t economically, culturally, and juridically, so
that the deeper political m eaning o f its relationships can be seen in
new and correct perspective. P uerto Rican affairs have been moving
full-steam ahead. T he island is no longer a liability but a credit. . ..
To bring the picture into focus, the following facts m ust be estab
lished at the start: P uerto Rico is n o t asking for statehood. Puerto
Rico is n o t dem anding independence. P uerto Rico is deadset against
colonialism. In o ther words, Puerto Rico is developing a new pattern
o f political fre e d o m .. ..
A political form had to be developed to fit the econom ic facts,
the cultural realities, the free and yet non-nationalistic ideals o f the
people. It also had to m eet the legitim ate econom ic and military in
terests of the US, as well as the broader interests implicit in the rela
tionship. It h ad to dem onstrate to the world the significance and the
sincerity of the attitude o f the US in its dealings with this underdevel
oped, civilized and freedom-loving com m unity of the Latin world in
the Am erican hem isphere.
. . . T hroughout its history P uerto Rico has been neither separatist
n o r assimilist. It was never so in Spanish times; and what it was then
it is now. It endeavors to keep its own personality, its collective sense
of itself, and it retains its loyalty to a broader political system, which
is also, as I have indicated, a way o f being loyal to a conception of
the b ro therhood o f man. T he position can perhaps be described
as autonom ist, as distinguished from both separatist and federalist.
O ut o f this tradition the com m onwealth status evolved.. ..

Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from Luis Munoz Marin, “Puerto
Rico and the US, Their Future Together, ’’Foreign Affairs (July 1954).

w ealth’s creation in 1952 did not
alter that. This decision stated that
“With each new organic act, first
the Foraker Act in 1902, then the
Jones Act in 1917, and then the
Federal Relations Act in 1950 and
later am endm ents, Congress has
simply delegated m ore authority to
Puerto Rico over local m atters. But
this has not changed in any way
Puerto Rico’s constitutional status
as a territory, or the source of
power over Puerto Rico. Congress
continues to be the ultim ate source
of power pursuant to the Territory
Clause o f the Constitution. . . . Con
gress may unilaterally repeal the
Puerto Rican Constitution or the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act

and replace them with any rules or
regulations o f its choice.” As of
now, therefore, a conflict exists be
tween the First and Eleventh Cir
cuits as to the legal nature of the
com m onwealth status. This conflict
has not yet been resolved by the Su
prem e C ourt in a definitive m atter.
Interpretations by the executive
branch regarding the nature of the
current relationship have been
equally conflicting. While the
Kennedy adm inistration issued a
m em orandum that recognized the
“unique relationship” between
Puerto Rico and the US, the Bush
adm inistration issued a new m em o
randum that stated that Puerto
Rico is still a US territory.

T he legal nature of the current
com m onwealth is unclear. Failure
of the political branches to act deci
sively to clarify this situation, one
way or the other, has com pounded
the issue. Congress and the presi
d en t m ust present a clear picture
to the people o f Puerto Rico so
th at we can finally enter into a
relationship with the US that is
w ithout a doubt nonterritorial
in nature.
In o u r proposed definition for
the plebiscite, the Partido Democratico Popular tackles this issue by
stating th at com m onwealth must
be “consecrated in a bilateral com 
pact which can only be altered by
m utual consent.” T he US govern
m ent would n o t be able to uni
laterally alter the term s of the
relationship in this freely associ
ated state or nonterritorial com 
m onwealth. As we had stated in
1989: “T he enhancem ents to the
com m onw ealth have to be in re
gards to the n atu re of the relation-

Congress and the
president must present
a clear picture to the
people of Puerto Rico
so that we can finally
enter into a relationship
with the US that is
urithout a doubt non
territorial in nature.

ship. A bilateral com pact m ust
be established so that neither of
the two parties, n o r Puerto Rico
n o r the U nited States, may am end
unilaterally. T hat is the perm anent
u n io n ” (El Nuevo Dia, February 23,
1989).

A bilateral com pact would be
one between equals, which guaran
tees the nonterritorial condition of
the com m onwealth. U nder US con
stitutional law, territories cannot es
tablish bilateral com pacts with the
federal governm ent. T he freely
associated state or com m onwealth
that the Partido Dem ocratico Popu
lar proposes can.
This definition is the first step in
the process of developing the n on
territorial com m onwealth of Puer
to Rico or free associated state, an
association between two countries.
If favored by our people, it will be
subm itted to Congress and to the
president. T hen, a process o f nego
tiation will begin that will define
for the US and Puerto Rico the
real and possible param eters of
that developm ent. We stand confi
d ent it will comply with US constitu
tional law, international law, and
with the aspirations to dignity and
prosperity held by the Puerto Ri
can people and the US. ■

A MAJOR CHARITABLE GIFTOPPORHINITY FOR HE RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to
remote areas of Central Am erica providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of
twenty M E D.I.C.O. teams have spent one week of their time, sharing their concern and talents at
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran government and m edical
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven
teams scheduled for 1993, including two special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endowm ent to financially
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven
track record, the opportunity to be an integral part of a heartwarm ing successful hum anitarian
foundation is very real.

M.E.D.I.C.te

For More Information, Contact:
Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors
M.E.D.I.C.O., Inc.
1107 Main Street, Georgetown, Texas 78626
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.
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A New Course in Foreign Affairs?
by Joseph S. Tulchin

Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy
toward Latin America and
the Caribbean
by Robert A. Pastor. Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1992. 3 3 8 p.
ith the end o f the
Cold War and the
im plosion of the
Soviet U nion, a de
bate erupted over
what the most ap
propriate role for the US would be
in the new world and what foreign
policy it should adopt to play that
role. As to how the world will be or
dered in the com ing years, m uch
rem ains to be decided. With regard
to Latin America, several vital ques
tions cry o u t for answers: how Latin

W

Joseph S. Tulchin is the director of the
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Latin Ameri
can Program in Washington, DC. He
is the author of Argentina and the
U nited States: A Conflicted Rela
tionship (Boston: Twayne, 1990).
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America will fit into the new world
order; w hether Latin America can
sustain the dem ocracies so recently
restored or established; w hether
the transition from closed econo
mies to m ore open econom ies is
perm anent o r reversible; how the
weakened states and the shaky
econom ies will deal with the grow
ing social deficits that affront the
conscience and the populist tradi
tions o f the region; and what will
be the nature o f Latin A m erica’s re
lationship with the US now that the
threat from the Soviet U nion has
disappeared.
R obert A. Pastor, form er m em 
ber o f the National Security Coun
cil (NSC) during the Carter
adm inistration and now professor
o f political science at Emory U ni
versity and executive secretary of
the C arter C en ter’s Council of
Freely-Elected Heads o f Govern
m ent, offers answers to these ques
tions and m ore in the best book on
hem ispheric relations since Fede
rico G. Gil’s Latin American-United
States Relations was published nearly
25 years ago. Pastor’s is the first
book to rank with Gil’s in com
bining, with such grace and skill,
broad erudition and a shrewd
sense o f the policy process, an ap
preciation o f US national interests,
and an understanding o f Latin
America.

Into the Whirlpool
Pastor uses the m etaphor o f the
whirlpool to describe the nature
o f US relations with Latin America.
H e suggests that Latin Am erican af
fairs are like a whirlpool that sucks
the US into the vortex o f Latin
American problem s in an obsessive
m anner. His purpose is “to u n d er
stand the causes o f the periodic

obsessions with that closer region
[the C aribbean], so th at future
policy reflects a longer term defini
tion o f US interests and a m ore
balanced approach to all o f Latin
America and the C aribbean” (p. 25).
The contours o f the whirlpool are
determ ined by five conditions: dif
fering interpretations o f history;
the vast disparity in power and
wealth between the US and the
nations o f Latin America; diver
gent perceptions o f events; Latin
Am erica’s chronic instability and
proximity to the US; and the im
pact o f international rivalries on
local conflicts (p. 204). Pastor ex
plores with great skill the history of
US policy toward Latin America so
that we understand the origins of
these conditions. Precisely because
he has read widely and well in the
historical literature, he sees pat
terns that most analysts o f public
policy miss and that lead him to
make what I consider one o f his
m ost im portant points: th at the end
of the Cold War has no t solved—
and will n o t solve—o u r problem s
in the hem isphere. It is still neces
sary, then, to learn how to get out
o f the whirlpool.
The first section o f the book sets
the stage for his argum ent by pro
viding a quick history o f US rela
tions with Latin America in the
twentieth century. Pastor uses a
detailed discussion o f Panam anian
strongm an O m ar Torrijos as a sym
bol o f the complexities o f Latin
America. It is a discussion th at also
serves to explain why the US has
so m uch difficulty understanding
those complexities. It is a subtle
argum ent that is h ard to summarize
in few words. Essentially, however,
Pastor uses Torrijos to explore
what he considers the m ajor dim en
sions o f Latin America: national

ism, autonom y, and dependence;
the political left and right; and de
mocracy and developm ent. Despite
his defects, Torrijos is a hero to Pas
tor, mainly because he was instru
m ental in securing passage of the
Panam a Canal treaties.
T he second section is a series of
chapters on the policy o f the Car
ter, Reagan, and Bush adm inistra
tions. This section includes a final
chapter on the relationship be
tween the executive—in Pastor’s
view, clearly the principal actor—
and the Congress, which he calls
the “great com pensator” (p. 116).
In the third section, Pastor returns
to the m ajor elem ents or problem s
that he described in the opening
chapter: succession crises, revolu
tionary regimes, developm ent, and
democracy. While this is an extra
ordinarily broad range of issues,
Pastor dem onstrates his virtuosity
in dealing with econom ic, political,
and cultural m atters with equal
ease.

Out of the Whirlpool?
Pastor finishes with a five-chapter
section in which he offers sugges
tions on how the US can get out of
the whirlpool, and how it can for
m ulate a flexible policy that is best
suited to the post-Cold War period
and sympathetic to the interests of
Latin Am erican nations. This sec
tion is characterized by an evenhandedness n o t com m on to books
on inter-American relations. He
gives blam e where it is due, em pha
sizing, as his whirlpool m etaphor
suggests, that the US and the Latin
Americans are in this together and
that it does no good for either to
blam e the o th er w ithout assuming
a fair share o f the responsibility.
This is n o t an obvious point, nor

an easy one, because it gets to the
heart o f ideological debates both
in this country and in Latin Amer
ica. Conservatives in the US are too
quick to assume that the blam e for
Latin Am erican underdevelopm ent
lies either within the Latin Ameri
cans themselves or is caused by
some evil outsider. O n the other
hand, many in Latin America, on
the left and right, foist the blame
for their region’s problem s on the
US, as if everything in the region
would be fine if only the US would
either go away or behave properly,
whatever that means. To Pastor’s
credit, he insists that both the US
and Latin America share in the re
sponsibility for getting out o f the
whirlpool.

The end of the
Cold War has not
solved—and will not
solve— our problems
in the hemisphere. It
is still necessary, then,
to learn how to get out
of the whirlpool.

Pastor’s prescription for US pol
icy is no t remarkably innovative.
We have heard it before—from
gringos like Abraham Lowenthal
and myself, as well as from Latin
Americans like Carlos Rico, Heraldo Munoz, and Luis Guillermo
Solis, am ong others. H e urges the
US governm ent to be m ore sympa
thetic to the needs o f Latin Amer

ica, to be m ore patient with and tol
erant of their rhetorical flourishes,
and, most significant, to move
toward a m ultilateral approach to
security issues. Most specifically, he
calls for m ultilateral protection of
dem ocracy and guarantees for
hum an rights in the hem isphere.
Pastor’s argum ent is convincing be
cause he sets it up so well. H e dem 
onstrates that, while the Cold War
appears to have ended, the pattern
of external threats to the hem i
sphere that stimulated US concern
for its security in the past could re
cur at any time. Meanwhile, threats
to our security come from what are
known as global issues—such as drug
trafficking, environm ental degrada
tion, illegal m igration, arms prolif
eration, and problem s of public
health. Unlike traditional threats
to our security, such global threats
must be confronted no t unilater
ally, but multilaterally (chapter 12).
He uses N icaragua’s transition
to dem ocracy to show how the
rules o f the game have changed,
“redrawing the political boundaries
of sovereignty,” by legitimizing ex
ternal m ultilateral intervention in
support o f democracy. T hen, in a
chapter on the Mexican econom ic
restructuring program , he extends
the argum ent to “renegotiating the
econom ic boundaries [of sover
eignty],” suggesting that we are
about to overcome Latin American
nationalism and enter a new stage
m arked by econom ic collaboration
and cooperation to the benefit of
all.
Having set up the argum ent,
Pastor pushes hom e the point by
insisting “that the hem isphere is
on the verge o f a transform ation.
W hat is needed now are ideas and
leadership” (p. 278). T he goals of
this new policy will be the security
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o f nations in the region through
collective security, guarantees for
dem ocracy and hum an rights, the
prom otion o f econom ic develop
m ent, and im provem ent of the
quality o f life. To accomplish these
goals, Pastor calls for a new system
o f collective obligations and respon
sibilities (pp. 288-89). In choosing
his goals, Pastor is right on target;
and in pointing to the way we can
accomplish these goals and get out
o f the whirlpool, he is headed in
the right direction.
I differ with Pastor on a few
points. My first is analytical: to ex
plain the seemingly sudden shifts
from obsession to disinterest, it is
necessary to explore the crucial
link between US foreign policy and
dom estic politics in determ ining
which events or episodes overseas
are perceived as crises. For exam 
ple, the civil war in El Salvador be
came a crisis in US foreign policy
in the early 1980s because the
Am erican people thought they saw
an o th er Vietnam coming, another
quagm ire, and they did n o t want
any part o f it. As I have argued at
greater length elsewhere, how the
Latin Am erican struggle was per
ceived converted it into a crisis;
once the A m erican public was con
vinced the country was no t about
to get bogged down in Central
America, El Salvador ceased to be a
crisis and ceased to be news. The
same can be said about Nicaragua
10 years later.
T he civil war in El Salvador was
im portant in understanding how
US foreign policy is form ulated be
cause it m arked the em ergence of
the Congress as a significant actor,
n o t ju st as a great com pensator.
Perhaps Pastor’s perception o f the
policy process was skewed by his
time in the NSC bunker. After
W atergate and after Vietnam,
Congress acquired its own, inde
p en d e n t inform ation-gathering
capacity. T he m ost telling episode
came when Secretary o f Defense
Caspar W einberger called a news
conference to issue a “W hite Pa
p e r” detailing the involvement of
external forces in the Salvadoran
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conflict. Within days, the congres
sional opponents o f the adm inis
tration’s policy issued their own
“W hite P aper” refuting the adm in
istration’s claims, with the evening
news seeming to confirm Con
gress’s findings, no t the adm inis
tration’s.

To explain the
seemingly sudden
shifts from obsession
to disinterest, it is
necessary to explore
the crucial link
between USforeign,
policy and domestic
politics in determining
which events or
episodes overseas are
perceived as crises.
Pastor is a bit too optimistic
about the future. I agree com 
pletely with his evaluation o f the
significance o f the Nicaraguan epi
sode. It did indeed stretch the enve
lope o f sovereignty and open the
way to com m unity defense o f de
mocracy. But I disagree that Haiti
is an o th er case that strengthens the
international com m unity’s push
for democracy. T he rules o f the
gam e were rewritten with the con
sensus of the m ajor political actors
in Nicaragua in agreem ent with the
international community. T hat is
n o t the case in Haiti and, as o f this
writing, there is little evidence the
political forces in Haiti are even
close to com plete agreem ent about
how their country should be ruled.
My guess is, again, that Pastor’s per
ception is influenced by where he
sits—he has observed too many
elections. H e may have becom e
convinced that dem ocracy is a

m atter o f good elections, and vice
versa. Clean, well-observed elec
tions may be a necessary condition
for a functioning democracy, but
they are far from being the suffi
cient condition. Moreover, what is
to prevent a m ultilateral interven
tion from being sucked into local
politics, as occurred with US in
volvement in historical cases such
as Nicaragua or the Dom inican Re
public and as, m ore recently, the
UN did in Somalia and the OAS in
Nicaragua?
In addition, Pastor is too opti
mistic in seeing the inevitability of
m ultilateral action in the hem i
sphere. T he problem is n o t merely
to do things in a m ultilateral fash
ion. The key is to em power the
o th er nations who form part of the
multilateral community. The move
m ent for peace in C entral America
was successful precisely because
the presidents o f the subregion
took m atters into their own hands
despite the US. T here is m ounting
evidence—which provides solid
grounds for optimism —that the
nations o f Latin America are now
convinced that they m ust form a
com m unity to defend democracy
and hum an rights. But there is lit
tle evidence thus far th at the US is
prepared to cede either power or
part o f the responsibility for m anag
ing things in the region to others.
Until that happens, multilateralism
will be a hollow concept th at will
only frustrate the nations o f Latin
America.
Finally, I have a tiny quibble.
I wanted to learn m ore about pol
icy form ulation during the Carter
adm inistration. I realize Pastor
wanted to establish some balance
in his chronological treatm ent and
that a “kiss and tell” book was inap
propriate given his curren t position
at the C arter Center. Nevertheless,
he could have told us a bit m ore
about differences am ong the Carterites than he did.
All in all, however, Pastor’s con
tribution leads us in the right direc
tion. L et’s hope his optimism about
the future of hem ispheric relations
is well- founded. ■
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The US, Cuba, and Puerto Rico
by Marian Goslinga

W

ithin the framework of US foreign policy, the Caribbean has always occupied a special niche. T he larger
islands, in particular, have had a close relationship with their neighbor to the n o rth —a relationship fre
quently m ired in ambiguity.

This bibliography focuses on Cuba and Puerto Rico and their respective relationships with the US
during the last 30 years. T he literature on Cuba far outnum bers that on Puerto Rico. This has always
been the case, but particularly since the 1959 revolution. T he “Pearl of the Antilles” continues to have
an
enduring
fascination
forfrom
N orth Am erican
fueled
by controversy
strife.
P uerto
towardand
Cuba
hasStable
been m
arked Rico,
by
Thewriters—a
Caribbeanfascination
Crisis: A View
from
American History: A View
on
the
o
th
er
hand,
suffers
in
com
parison,
in
spite
o
f
the
question
o
f
its
political
status.
noninterventionism
based
m ore on
the
Kremlin.
Oleg
Troyanovski.
In
Cuba. Oscar Zanetti .Journal of
hesitancy than action.]
ternational Affairs (April-May 1992),
American History, v. 79, no. 2 (Sep
p. 147-57. [A form er assistant to
tem ber 1992), p. 530-32. [Dem on
Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev
strates how the US has influenced
World. Edward Gonzalez, David Ronexamines the Cuban Missile Crisis.]
the course of Cuban history.]
feldt. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand
Castro under Siege. Samuel Farber.
Corporation, 1992. 82 p. [Exam
At Arm’s Length, or Closer? [Con
ines US policy options.]
World Policy Journal, v. 9 (Spring
tinuing Debate over Statehood or
1992), p. 329-48. [Assesses the role
In d ependence for Puerto R ico].
Cuba after Communism. Eliana
of the US blockade in strengthen
The Economist, v. 326 (January 9,
Cardoso, A nn Helwege. Cam bridge,
ing the regim e’s grip over the
1993), p. 26-27. [Gov. Pedro
Mass.: MIT Press, 1992. 148 p. [Dis
C uban people.]
Rossello believes econom ic pros
cusses prospects for the Cuban
perity for Puerto Rico depends on
economy and a possible role for
Castro’s Scapegoats. Martin
stronger relations with the US. Polls
the US.]
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exile groups, headed by Jorge Mas
Canosa, to m aintain the US eco
nom ic em bargo and propaganda
efforts against the Castro regime.]
Cuba Looks to the Year 2000.
Marc Frank. New York: Interna
tional Publishers, 1993. 225 p.
[Analyzes the state o f C uban so
cialism, including the rectification
movement.]
Cuba’s Lost Horizon. Jo h n Simp
son. World Monitor (May 1993),
p. 38-43. [According to the author,
despite the US trade em bargo, the
island is n o t on the brink o f col
lapse.]
Cuba: a la sumision por el hambre.
Ian Williams. Nexos, v. 15, no. 180
(D ecem ber 1992), p. 43-45. [Con
tends that the US intends to starve
the Cuban people into rebellion.]
Cuba: asimetrias. Jesus Orozco
Zablah. Este Pat's, no. 23 (February
1993), p. 23-27. [Com pares public
opinion in the US and Mexico con
cerning C uba’s political situation.]
Cuba: Implications o f Trade and
Business with the US. Jam es D.
W hisenand. Butterworth’sJournal of
International Banking and Financial
Law, v. 7, no. 9 (Septem ber 1992),
p. 414-20, and v. 7, no. 10 (O ctober
1992), p. 476-83. [This two-part
analysis traces the history o f USC uban trade and examines the le
gal foundation o f the US trade
em bargo.]
Cuba: Moving Back to the Future
with Tourism. Gerald R. Webster.
Journal of Geography, v. 91, no. 5
(Septem ber-O ctober 1992), p. 22633. [Discusses the Cuban tourist
industry and US travel restrictions.]

Cuba: On Their Bikes. Andrew
W hitehead, Ian Williams. New States
man Society, v. 5, no. 228 (Novem
ber 13, 1992), p. 16-18. [Describes
the daily m anifestations o f C uba’s
severe econom ic crisis brought on
largely by the US trade em bargo.]
Cuba: The Domino that Refuses to
Fall. Clifford E. Griffin. Caribbean
Affairs, v. 5, no. 1 (1992), p. 24-42.
[Asserts that, while there is no
doubt C uban socialism is u n d er
great stress, expectations about an
im m inent collapse are wishful
thinking.]
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited.
James A. Nathan. New York: St. Mar
tin ’s Press, 1992. 302 p. [Reevalua
tion o f the 1962 crisis in light of
recently released inform ation by
the US, Russia, and Cuba.]
Dateline Washington: CubanAmerican Clout. Carla A nne Rob
bins. Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall
1992), p. 162-82.
The Disenchanted Island: Puerto
Rico and the United States in the
Twentieth Century. Ronald Fernan
dez.. W estport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992.
264 p. [Analyzes Puerto Rico’s po
litical status and aspirations since
1898 with particular reference to
the independence m ovement.]
Foreign Policy Failures in China,
Cuba, and Nicaragua: A Paradigm.
Ray S. Cline, Roger W. Fontaine.
W ashington, DC: US Global Strat
egy Council, 1992. 246 p.
Framing the Enemy: New York
Times Coverage o f Cuba in the
1980’s. Silvo Lenart, Harry R. Targ.
Peace and Change, v. 17 (July 1992),
p. 341-62. [Argues that US m edia

portrayal o f Cuba has shifted to
accom m odate the post-Cold War
structure o f international relations
with greater focus on domestic is
sues, especially hum an rights.]
Getting Ready for Cuba after Cas
tro. Rudi Dornbusch. Business Week,
no. 3320 (May 24, 1993), p. 19.
[Discusses US policy options to pro
m ote stability in Cuba and to pre
vent extrem ist groups from taking
control. These policies include the
elim ination of trade restrictions
and the restructuring o f the na
tional debt.]
A Hurricane Heads for Puerto
Rico: Yanking a Tax Break Called
936 Could Set O ff an Economic
Storm. Gail DeGeorge. Business
Week (June 14, 1993), p. 52+.
The Impact o f Global Economic In
vestment and Commercial Trends
on Post-Castro Cuba. A ntonio Villamil. North-South, v. 2, no. 6 (AprilMay 1993), p. 29-32. [Com m ents
that a post-Castro governm ent will
need to forge strong ties with the
US in o rd er to survive in the rap
idly changing world o f the 1990s.]
In Fidel Castro’s Grim Backyard.
J o h n Simpson. Spectator, v. 270
(February 27, 1993), p. 11-13. [As
serts that US press reports of the
im m inent downfall o f Castro are
unfounded. T he people are critical
o f social hardships, bu t blam e the
US em bargo for C uba’s problems.]
Is Cuba Next? Mark Falcoff. Com
mentary, v. 94, no. 5 (November
1992), p. 42-46. [Asserts that antiAmericanism, skillfully exploited
by Fidel Castro, is one of the main
reasons com m unism survives in
Cuba.]
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Publications Update

Knot in US-Cuba Relations Re
mains Tied. Gao Ping. Beijing Re
view, v. 35 (Septem ber 7, 1992),
p. 14-16.
The Navy as Social Provider in
Vieques, Puerto Rico. Sara Grusky.
Armed Forces and Society, v. 18 (Win
ter 1992), p. 215-30. [Examines the
Navy’s role in influencing social,
political, and econom ic develop
m ent on the island of Vieques.]
Now It’s U.S. Policy: Starving Cuba
into Submission. Ian Williams. The
Nation, v. 255, no. 13 (O ctober 26,
1992), p. 464-66. [Discusses the im
pact o f the C uban Democracy Act,
which aims to tighten the US em 
bargo against Cuba.]
Puerto Rico no quiere ser tan hispano y lo dice bien alto. Claudio
Alvarez Dunn. Cambio, v. 16 (De
cem ber 23, 1991), p. 106. [Com
m ents on the D ecem ber 8, 1991,
referendum and the decision to
continue com m onwealth status.]
Puerto Rico’s Cloudy Future. Juan
M. Garcia Passalacqua. World and I,
v. 7 (November 1992), p. 106-11.
[Discusses the implications o f state
hood, com m onwealth, or inde
pendence.]

The Secrets o f Castro’s Staying
Power. Jorge I. Dominguez. Foreign
Affairs, v. 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993),
p. 97-107. [Asserts that the Castro
regim e endures in part because of
US policies.]
Television Marti: Electronic
Invasion in the Post-Cold War.
Laurien Alexandre. Media, Culture
& Society, v. 14 (O ctober 1992),
p. 523-40.
The Torricelli Bill: Tightening the
Chokehold on Cuba. Saul Landau.
The Nation, v. 254, no. 23 (June 15,
1992), p. 818-20.

El veto de Washington no importa:
la apertura de Cuba atrae inversionistas, sobre todo estadounidenses.
H om ero Campa. Proceso, v. 15,
no. 817 (June 29, 1992), p. 40-43.
[Com m ents upon the C uban gov
ern m en t’s successful drive to at
tract foreign investment.]

UN Vote Condemns US Trade
Embargo on Cuba. Sara Lobm an.
Militant, v. 56, no. 45, p. 1-12.

Why Does Castro Survive? J. Rich
ard Planas. World Affairs, v. 154
(W inter 1992), p. 87-93.
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The Radio and TV Marti Contro
versy: A Re-Examination. Kyu Ho
Youm. Gazette, v. 48, no. 2 (1991),
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Aletheia Press, 1993. 331 p. [Com
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trade em bargo against Cuba.]
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